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Foreword
When I came (o Maastricht four years ago. a cultural change in two
expected me - from Germany to the Netherlands and to Belgium, where I live, and from
a psychology department to an economics department. Noticing the cultural differences
between Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium made me more aware about many
things typical Tor my home country, which I never reali/cd as such before
During the first two years I resisted to (um into an economist, visited doctoral
workshops in social psychology and spent a lot of time discussing my research with
social psychologists. I learned a lot about economics from my supervisors and my
colleagues, but I never really liked economics My stay in Barcelona at Universität
Autonome changed this. In many discussions with economists working interdisciplinary
or being interested in interdisciplinary research, I finally understood the values of
economic thinking The time in Barcelona, of course was not only research-wise u nice
experience. Last but not least, the stay resulted in a new double-cultural change lor the
time to come - my next job will be at Universität Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, as an
assistant professor in Business.
For contributing to my identity-loss as a psychologist 1 first and foremost have to
thank my supervisors, Maarten Vendrik and Peter de Gijsel. They gave me the possibility
to work independently, and encouraged me to go to many summer schools and
conferences, most of them interdisciplinary, which helped to build a network of contacts
in experimental economics and economic psychology. Peter made me think over my
ideas again and again, playing the devil's advocate, questioning all I was doing - but
always in a useful way which led to an improvement of my results. Maarten on the other
hand had a quite hard time teaching me to be precise and to value good structure. Me did
not really turn me into a perfectionist, but pushed me a bit further in that direction. I also
want to thank Arien van Witteloostuijn and Christophe Boone who helped me in the
beginning to define my project, and encouraged me to find my own way to do research.
1 also want to thank my colleague, friend, and 'paranymphe' Franziska
Gassmann. With her I shared the office in the beginning and we became friends quite
quickly. She told me all I needed to know to get a first understanding of this university,
of Maastricht, and of the Netherlands. My second 'paranymphe', Ursula Glunk, made meForeword
aware of the field of Organizational Behavior, which is now becoming my new area of
research in Barcelona Doing research and going to several conferences together however
is a secondary aspect of our friendship.
For contributions to one or several of the chapters I want to thank among others
especially the following people: For helpful discussions and comments about the
theoretical model I owe thank to I.ex ßorghans, Pablo Guillen Alvarez, Rein Haagsma,
fieorg Kirchsteiger, Peter Wakker, Cicert Woltjer, and the participants of a NAKE
Research Day in Amsterdam and the MiMaMa seminar at the Universiteit Maastricht.
For helping with the data collection in Heidelberg I want to thank Tilmann Betsch,
Susanne I labcrstroh, I lenning Plessner and several student assistants Pia Steffens helped
with the experiments in Maastricht Joep Sonncmans. Jos Theelen, Jens Grosser, and
other members of the CREED-team in Amsterdam provided most valuable help with the
computerized experiments I also want to thank Michael I hike for hints regarding
programming, and Arnim l-alk for allowing me to use one of his programs and giving me
advise on z-tree whenever needed. Ineke Verhagen helped with the data collection during
both management games, and Rita Walczuch, Jan Nijhuis and several tutors supported
me in convincing students to participate, and more general in conducting the research. I
would also like to thank David Rodriguez for his great help in preparing and executing
the double auction experiment, and Jordi Brandts and Marc Vorsatz for translating the
originally German instructions into Spanish. Moreover, I would like to thank Matthias
Sutler and Martin Strobel for useful comments on a draft of the paper chapter 6 is based
00. •" ' -..-•. •-:• , ^•...-:- ,i:-. • -.,•
Writing a thesis and starting an academic career is not only a matter of
colleagues, but you also need the support of friends and family. I therefore want to thank
my parents for all their support during my long education, and for always stimulating my
intellectual interests. Last but not least, I want to thank my partner Michael for all his
support, for sustaining my periods of being doubtful about what I was doing, and for
telling me to stop ruminating and 'cut and eat' when necessary. Apart from emotional
support, he helped a lot with all computer-related aspects of my work (thanks to him my
laptop contains a cork of a bottle of wine), and also with structuring and presenting my
work.Contents
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1 Introduction
1.1 The research topic
The last decade has seen a growing interest of economics in social- and cognitive-
psychological research. This interest has evolved from empirical findings showing that
people in 'real-life' often do not behave in line with the assumptions of standard
economic theory. Other factors than those considered so lor in mamsircuin economics
have been found to influence behavior, like preferences for fairness (e.g., Fehr A
Schmidt, 1999), the willingness to punish others for lying (Brandts & (harness, 2003),
impatience (Laibson, 1997), 'social tics' (Uranovettcr, 1973. van Dijk, Sonncmans, van
Winden, 2002), heuristic decision-making (Uigerenzer & Selten. 2001) or limited
willpower (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). Using such concepts, many kinds of behavior
found in real-life situations could be explained better, and could also be reproduced in
the controlled setting of experiments.
This thesis adopts the idea of integrating social-psychological and economic
theorizing to approach a complex, politically and economically relevant problem:
Discrimination in the labor market. Because of its surprising persistence even in
industrialized societies, which actively strive to eliminate it, a lot of research in
economics, (social-) psychology, and related disciplines deals with discrimination (in the
labor market). Apart from providing evidence of its existence, using mainly econometric
methods (e.g. recently Blau & Kahn, 2000; see section 2.2 for an overview of empirical
economic literature), economic research of various theoretical orientations tries to
explain the phenomenon and its persistence (see sections 1.2 & 2.3/2.4). Most of social
psychology deals in more general terms with discrimination, not specifically focusing on
the labor market, and mainly relying on laboratory experiments to test theoretical ideas
(see sections 1.2 & 2.3, 2.4 & 2.5). More recently, also some quasi-experimental studies
(audit studies, see section 2.2) have been done in economics. Still, up to now few
attempts have been made to integrate economic and psychological research in this field.
A short overview of the literature in both disciplines, however, indicates that the different
ways of approaching the topic could supplement each other with aspects and points of
view each approach alone is missing. Of course, such an integration of approaches,
which differ in level of analysis, methodology and terminology, poses many problems,
which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2.Introduction
Before a first attempt to such an integration is made, one cannot be sure whether
the gains will outweigh the problems, but. as the overview in chapter 2 shows, there is a
lot of communalny in the main explanatory concepts used Differences lie rather in the
focus of analysis and the specific use of the concepts, and in the research methodologies
qiplied. Economic theories make use of 'psychological' concepts, but without
considering their deeper implications, and psychologists assume that their models can be
applied to all kinds of situations, including economic ones. All this said, there is reason
to assume that an integrative approach can be fruitful in this area of research
To start with, a common definition of the basic concept, discrimination, is
needed A very basic definition of (group) discrimination, which fits with economic as
well as psychological approaches, is 'equals are treated unequally' As this thesis focuses
on discrimination in the labor market, the definition has to be more specific. Therefore, a
definition by Blau et al (1998, p 186) is used: "Labor market discrimination exists when
two equally qualified individuals are treated differently solely on the basis of their gender
(race. age. disability, etc)" Different treatment is only seen as discrimination, if the
rh*r*rtt>n«lir* u*»d for hiring or ••«^* imnoiu an mx rofatev/ <u (ntnfükd'viiy.
Following a distinction made in social psychology (see section 2.1), discrimination here
always refers to a behavior, i.e., just having discriminatory thoughts and ideas - stated
preferences, which do not and are not expected to translate into behavior - is not defined
as discrimination.
This thesis focuses mainly on labor market discrimination of women and
(national) minorities with respect to hiring and pay, but generalizations to other kinds of
discrimination are possible. It is assumed here that the basic underlying mechanisms are
essentially the same in all kinds of discrimination, no matter, which group is
discriminated against (see e.g., Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; but see Linville & Fisher,
1998, for counter-arguments). Discrimination outside the labor market, e.g., differential
treatment of children during socialization or discrimination in housing, is, for simplicity,
not considered, even if such discrimination can be the basis for later discriminatory
outcomes in the labor market.
In the following, the main theoretical approaches to explain discrimination in
both disciplines, which will be the basis of this integration, are sketched shortly. A more
detailed description of economic and psychological theories and concepts is provided in
chapter 2. The short description of economic and psychological concepts here is followed
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by a brief description of the theoretical and methodological approach this thesis adopts.
At the end of the latter description, an overview of the chapters of the thesis is given.
1.2 Economic and psychological approaches to discrimination
Various theoretical approaches have been developed in economics to explain
discrimination in the labor market, most of which are based on the neoclassical choice
model. A prominent example is the theory of discriminator} tastes of Decker (1957,
1971). This theory conceptualizes discrimination as motivated by a given personal
prejudice, or discriminatory taste, against associating with a particular group When
employers have such tastes, they arc willing to pay a higher wage to the preferred
workers than they would have to pay to workers of the other group. An interesting
implication is that when the product market in which the employers operate becomes
more competitive, discnminating employers are driven out of the market because of their
inefficient behavior Before that happens, an income effect of falling profits (C'omanor,
1973) induces discriminating employers to diminish their discriminatory behavior
Another important economic theory on discrimination is the theory of statistical
discrimination (Arrow, 1973, Phelps, 1972). Statistical discrimination models argue that
employers have to make hiring decisions under imperfect information. If certain groups,
e.g., men and women, differ in average productivity, in the variance of productivities, or
in the accuracy of measurement of productivity - or are perceived as differing in these
variables - employers use this group information to make individual hiring decisions.
The resulting discrimination is individual discrimination, not group discrimination, if the
productivity differences between the groups are real. If the differences are just perceived,
it constitutes also group discrimination. The latter should disappear with strengthened
competition, as it leads to inefficient hiring decisions, and employers as well as
employees will try to get and provide more reliable information.
Social-psychological research in the framework of social identity theory (SIT,
e.g., Mullin & Hogg, 1998) suggests that strengthening competition may have quite the
opposite effect on discriminatory behavior of employers. It can enhance self-relevant
subjective uncertainty' for employers, and hence induce them to identify more strongly
with a salient group to which they themselves belong (e.g., men, whites), because,
Self-relevant (subjective) uncertainty means subjectively felt uncertainly about important things in the
life of a person, especially important things for self-definition, for example having a job or being able to
make a living, or being successful in some important task See also section 2 6 2 for an elaboration
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following SIT, this reduces the (aversive) feelings of uncertainty. In its turn, this will
prompt them to rely more on stereotypes and prejudices in their hiring decisions, and
hence reinforce (heir discriminatory behavior, riven employers who initially do not have
a discriminatory taste (the existence of whom is often assumed in the context of Becker's
theory) may, by this psychological mechanism, develop a discriminatory taste when
competition intensifies" In such a situation, strengthening competition will not drive all
discriminating employers out of the product market in the long run. Following social-
psychological literature, the strength of prejudice itself and the extent to which it
translates into behavior' can be influenced by competition.
The different predictions from both disciplines with respect to the effects of
competition, which become visible here, are one more reason to assume that an
integration can provide interesting new insights about discrimination in the labor market.
U The approach of this thesis
The basic aim of this thesis is to find out whether an integration of psychological
and economic concepts with respect to discrimination in the labor fnarlet can add (o
current knowledge and contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon. The
integration refers also to the methods used, as economic modeling is complemented here
by experiments and quasi-experiments, which borrow from psychological as well as
economic experimental methods.
For this integration, some of the standard variables of economic explanations of
discrimination will be treated differently than in most standard economic models. First,
competition is seen as an activity, i.e., the analysis is more explicitly focused on the
behavior of people involved in competition than in standard analyses. Economics hardly
looks at competition as an activity of people (see, e.g., Blaug 2001; Zafirofsky, 2002).
Moreover, when economics investigates the 'process' of competition (see, e.g., Schinkel,
2001), it usually takes preferences as given. Social psychology and some economic
approaches (see e.g. Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993; Farmer & Terrell, 1996),
however, assume, that the process or the activity of 'competing' might influence those
subject to it not only in an 'economic', but also in a 'psychological' way.
' Such employers may initially already have an (unconscious) prejudice, which, in our approach, is
distinguished from having a discriminatory taste Only when group identification is sufficiently strong, the
prejudice will lead to a (stated or revealed) discriminatory taste (see chapter 3 for details).
Social psychologists controversially discuss in how far 'attitudes' (i.e., evaluative judgements, see
footnote 12) translate into behavior (see. eg, Eagly & Chaiken, 1998)
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Therefore, it is secondly assumed here that during the strengthening of
competition, cognitive and emotional factors and the interaction of such factors can
change and can influence (discriminatory) preferences (and hence behavior) This
implies that variables, which are usual I > treated as exogenous by economists, arc
assumed to be endogeneous. The activity of competition could for example, from the
point of view of psychological theories, lead to changes in preferences, eg in
discriminatory tastes: For example, in the social-identity approach - as opposed to
Becker's theory - 'discriminatory tastes' are not exogenously given and constant, hut are
influenced by environmental variables like competition. This works via identification
with a social group to which employers belong (cf. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).
Analyzing how the activity of competition influences cognitions, emotions, and hence
behavior can lead to deeper insights in what determines discrimination in the labor
market. What specific long-run equilibrium is reached in such a case is not clear from the
outset, and is not the focus of interest here.
The general aims of this thesis therefore are: (i) To make a comparison of the
relevant literature in economics and social psychology, (ii) to develop an integrated,
testable theoretical model making use of both literatures, (iii) to test at least part of the
predictions of this model experimentally and (iv) to find out, whether very competitive
market settings allow at all for psychological factors to work.
The basic questions the thesis wants to answer therefore are whether an
integration of economic and psychological factors can explain discriminatory behavior in
the labor market better than one approach alone; whether an integrated theoretical model
can lead to new testable predictions; and finally, whether experimental tests can provide
evidence for at least some of these predictions. The structure of the thesis broadly reflects
the general aims:
Chapter 2 first describes empirical evidence of discrimination in the labor market.
Next, it gives an overview of the most prominent social-psychological and economic
theories dealing with discrimination (on the labor market). The chapter compares
definitions of the key concepts in both disciplines and shows how they can be integrated.
Integrative definitions of these key concepts are developed, it further motivates the
integration, discusses the methodology, and shows which problems arise. In chapter 3 an
integrated utility model is developed. It is described intuitively first, and then developed
formally. Predictions for strengthening competition are derived, and it is discussed in
how far the integrated model contributes to an understanding of discrimination in the
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labor market Chapter 4 describes a series of experiments, which partially build on the
theoretical model developed in chapter 3. The experiments test some of the predictions of
the model in a controlled laboratory setting. Results are discussed in the light of the
theoretical model In Chapter 5, a quasi-experimental study, which also tests part of the
predictions of the integrated model, is described It has been conducted using a business-
simulation game and looks at nationality-based discrimination. Chapter 6 describes an
experiment done to look at wage differences in experimental markets more in general It
tests, whether efficiency-wage effects could be an explanation for the gender wage gap,
and whether in very competitive market settings other than strictly economic forces can
influence behavior The idea behind this approach is explained and results of the
experiment arc described and discussed Chapter 7 summarizes and jointly discusses the
implications of the theoretical, experimental and quasi-experimental research.
142 Tb« integrated framework
2 The integrated framework
- main factors influencing discrimination, empirical
evidence, and methodology ....,,-,. .... .^
2.1 Introduction
This chapter gives an overview of the economic and social-psychological
research of relevance for an analysis of discrimination in the labor market It is not meant
though as an exhaustive review of both literatures, but rather as on introduction in either
field for those of the readers having a background in the other discipline
Many concepts used to explain discrimination on lirsl sight seem common to both
disciplines, but they are often defined differently in each of them To be able to integrate
the approaches, it is necessary to be aware of these differences and to make a clear
choice of the definitions used for the integration Doing this, new problems arise.
Economics is. in general, using wcll-operalionali/.ed and formalized concepts, which are
part of a general, comprehensive theoretical framework Social psychology, on the
contrary, mainly looks at many different detailed aspects of (individual and group)
behavior, missing a more general, unified theoretical framework Iric concepts used are
not always explicitly and clearly defined. There are sometimes even differences in
definitions between research schools and traditions, which are not always made explicit.
This makes it difficult to choose the definition of a concept to rely on, and to be precise
on the consequences of this choice. Brewer (1994) gives a good example of the
difficulties one encounters when trying to summarize social-psychological research in the
field of discrimination and related concepts: „Understanding prejudice and intergroup
conflict invokes virtually every area of social psychological inquiry, including the study
of person perception, social attitudes, aggression, self-esteem, social comparison, equity,
cooperation and competition, and conformity and compliance. Further, the study of
prejudice crosses all levels of analysis, from intra-individual to interpersonal to
intergroup processes. [...] unfortunately, much of this knowledge is encapsulated in
isolated - sometimes competing - research traditions. The lack of integration of social
psychological research and theory relevant to the understanding of prejudice and
discrimination makes it difficult to tell the story to the world" (p. 316f).
As an attempt to overcome problems resulting from that situation, this chapter
compares definitions of the main concepts in social psychology and economics and
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explains the choice of definitions for the integrated model Further, benefits, challenges
and problems of the integration are discussed, also focusing on methodological
questions
The selection of the research reported here followed the principle to report only
what is necessary for an understanding of the motivation for the integration in general
and of the integrated model and the experimental research conducted in particular The
review tries to organize the diverse, sometimes contradictory findings of both disciplines,
and to place them into a larger framework.
Economic research is focusing mainly on discrimination in the labor market, whereas
social-psychological research is dealing with discrimination on a more general level,
seldom explicitly with the labor market As the principles discovered generally are
assumed to be basic principles of human behavior, they can, however, be applied to labor
market discrimination Most commonly, social psychological research on discrimination
makes a division into three components (Fiske. 1998):
• Discrimination as the behavioral component,
• Prejudice as the emotional component,
• Stereotyping as the cognitive component.
In addition, the integration makes use of the concept of social identity, and, as
environmental variables rather stemming from econom/c theorizing, looks at the role of
uncertainty and competition.
Both disciplines deal with most of these concepts in their analyses of
discrimination, but in very different ways. In the following, it will be discussed more in
detail, how each discipline uses these five interrelated concepts - stereotyping, prejudice,
social identity, uncertainty, and competition.
The chapter is in general organized along these concepts, but first empirical
evidence of discrimination in the labor market is reported. The next section then reviews
research on stereotypes in social psychology and related economic research. Section 2.4
deals in the same way with prejudice. The following section treats social identity, mainly
in a social-psychological framework, as not much economic research considers identity.
Section 2.6 sketches the role of uncertainty as viewed in both disciplines. Section 2.7
describes the role of competition from an economic and a social-psychological point of
view. Section 2.8 finally discusses methodological differences between the disciplines
and sketches the integrated framework.
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2.2 Empirical evidence Tor discrimination in the labor market
In economic research, a large amount of «cotomrtnc literature explores the
gender (and racial) wage gap (see eg Stanley & Jarell, 1998. for a discussion of this
approach), and measures which part of it can be explained by human-capital factors and
other productivity- and wage-related variables, e.g. specific preferences, employment in
specific sectors and rewards for skills, overall wage structure, wage inequality in a
society, etc. The unexplained residual is usually interpreted as evidence for
discrimination. Different decomposition techniques based on different reference
populations are used. In the framework of the most widely used decomposition
technique, the Oaxaca/Blindcr decomposition, it is usually assumed that the returns to job
characteristics of women in the absence of discrimination would be equal to those of men
(see, e.g., Oaxaca, 1973. Blinder, 1973. Oaxaca & Ransom. 1994)
All studies find a wage gap between blacks and whites and between women and
men. and all studies also lind an unexplained residual Some of the studies use
longitudinal data (eg. Shenhav, 1992; »lau & Kahn. 1994. Dada Ciupta et al. 1999) and
analyze the development of discrimination over time Most of the research on wage
discrimination has been done in the U.S., research on gender discrimination as well as on
discrimination of blacks.
Studies dealing with the gender wage gap report a trend towards narrowing of the
gap during the last 40 years (e.g., O'Neill, 1985; Fuchs, 1986; Ashraf, 1996; Blau &
Kahn, 1994; 1997; 2000; 2002). Overall, the female-to-male wage ratio in the US,
estimated on a yearly basis, increased from 59% in 1981 to 72% in 1998. Using weekly
earnings of full-time workers, it increased from 61% to 77% between 1978 and 1999
(Blau et al., 2002). Studies dealing with European countries find similar patterns as in the
U.S., with a somewhat better general situation in Scandinavian countries and a somewhat
worse situation in Germany (e.g., Mavromaras & Rudolph, 1999), and stagnation in the
development of the male-female wage gap in the 1990s (e.g., Blau & Kahn, 1994; Datta
Gupta et al., 1999). One of the most important questions with respect to an explanation of
the narrowing of the wage gap is whether this is only due to changes in 'hard', objective
(e.g., human-capital) variables, or whether there is also a change in the amount of
discrimination'*. Evidence on this question is mixed. There is general consensus
' For an analysis of the role of human-capital variables see eg Anderson & Shapiro (1996), for other
variables see eg Forlin & Lemieux (1988)
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nowadays that advancement in the acquisition of human capital by women (blacks) h?>
played a significant role in closing the wage gap. Debate continues over the relationship
of those human-capital factors with discrimination, and the relative importance of certai'
of these factors (see, e.g., Sandell & Shapiro. 1978; Corcoran & Duncan, 1979; O"Neil.
1985; Blau & Ferber, 1992; for a review of part of this discussion see Blau et al.. 1998
2002). Blau & Kahn (2000) explain part of the narrowing of the wage gap with the fat*
that new cohorts entering the labor market now have better chances. A rise in wages fo
older women plays a role as well In general, estimates of the unexplained part and if
development vary widely, influenced by which variables are included in the equation'
(see, eg, Blau et al. 1998) Estimates range from up to two thirds of the wage gap f
around 10% of it (see. eg, Blau & Kahn, 2000). Most studies report a decline in th<
unexplained part alongside with the decline in the wage gap, but Blau & Kahn (1994'
point to the fact that this docs not necessarily result from a decline in discrimination, bu
can also, eg, result from an "upgrading in women's unmeasured labor market skills" (p
31) A recent study on top corporate jobs (Bertrand & Hal lock. 2000) focusing on tht
five highest paid executives of US firms between 1992 and 1997 and controlling foi
age, experience, and company-related factors, finds that the part of the 45% wage gar
between women and men in these positions, which remains unexplained, is less than 5%
JJ^.IV^W, ,»<v»fg rAv VA^VUH.W iii tnc siuuy tue only ^.J7o lemale, i.e., trie possibility ot
discrimination in promotion or by segregation is not ruled out by these results - as in
most studies of this kind.
Research on wage discrimination against blacks in the U.S. also reports a decline
in the wage gap between black and white men (e.g., Blau & Beller, 1988). The situation
for black women is somewhat more complex (see e.g., Shenhav, 1992; Ashraf, 1996).
Blau et al (2002) show that in 1999 the female-to-male income ratio was higher among
blacks than whites (83% as compared to 71%). The median income of black males in the
same year was 77% of white males', but the income ratio for black women was 90%
compared to white women. Again, estimates of the unexplained part of the gap vary
widely.
The main problem with the econometric approach is that the estimation of the
non-explained part of the wage gap varies widely depending on the specific models and
decomposition methods the studies use. Specification and omission of variables and
measurement of wages and other important variables strongly influence the results.
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Furthermore, selection bias* has an impact on the results of such studies. Passage of time
and gender of the researchers (male researchers report a larger wage gap) also have been
found to influence estimates of the wage gap (see the meta-rcgrcssion analysis by Stanley
& Jarell, 1998) Therefore, some researchers took different approaches to find out
whether discrimination against certain groups exists.
One alternative approach is "correspondence testing" (also known as "auditing"),
which is focused at discrimination in hiring Matched pairs of written job applications,
varying only in race or gender of the applicants, are sent in response lo advertised
vacancies, to test for discrimination in hiring at the initial stage of selection for a job
interview In some studies actors were sent to job interviews Statistically significant
amounts of discrimination were found in several countries, against women as well as
against people of certain racial origin, at least for some of the jobs tested I xaniplcs are
Jowell & Prescott-Clarke (1995). Neumark & McLenncn (1995), and (ioldm & Rouse
(2000) The latter use a slightly different methodology: They analyze in how far the
introduction of 'blind' auditions for professional orchestras has led to more hiring of
women, and find that it significantly reduced discrimination against women. A review of
more audit studies can be found at Ileckman & Siegelman (1993).
Of course, this kind of studies faces problems as well Using mulched
applications, the question always remains whether these applications really only differ in
gender or race, and not also in other, maybe productivity-related aspects. This results
from the fact that applications can be matched, but of course not made exactly equal.
This becomes even more relevant for such studies where actors 'play' applicants.
Furthermore, this approach can rather be used to show that discrimination in hiring
exists, and does not account for wage discrimination, as the 'applicants' never are really
hired.
Relatively few empirical studies explicitly aim at testing the common economic
theories, i.e., the 'taste' model (Becker, 1957) and statistical discrimination models
(Arrow, 1973, Phelps, 1972). The methodology used in the studies that do so is usually
some kind of regression-analytical technique, using Held data.
Evidence on /footer'j mo^e/ is mixed: Some studies report supporting evidence,
such as those of Haessel & Palmer (1978), Fujii & Trapani (1978), Luksetich (1979),
Ashenfeller and Hannan (1986), Peoples & Saunders (1993), Heywood & Peoples
' Selection bias refers lo Ihe problem that people taking part in such a study are not a random selection of
the population of. eg, women
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(1994). Hellerstein et al (1997), and Bruggert & Schippers, (1999) A coupl of other
studies, eg Shepherd & Levin (1973), Oster (1975), and Baldwin & Johnson 1996) do
not find much support for it. An example of recent interesting research testing ti Becker
model is a study, which has been conducted by Szymanski (2000) and lesion &
Szymanski (2000) They test for employer and customer discrimination by ne in the
English professional soccer leagues They find evidence that clubs in fact disiminate,
and also incur 'productivity' losses from this behavior The reason for discntmation in
this case is employers' preferences, not customers'. Furthermore, it was evtent that
discrimination is not based on wrong estimates of the productivity of black pyers, as
performance criteria in soccer are quite clear. However, the labor market for prt'essional
soccer players has been organized competitively only recently, which makes tr authors
think (hat conclusions with respect to the predictions of the Becker model at not yet
possible.
Many empirical studies deal with the question whether higher tumoverates can
be seen as a reason for Jtof«f;cä/ </«cr/mjnarion against women (see e.g. Bu et al.,
1998, Altonji & Blank, 1999) Hmpirical evidence with respect to turnover or qu rates is
mixed. Quit rates are said to be higher overall for women than for men, ut these
differences disappear when characteristics of workers, of the labor market, ad of the
specific" joos are controlled lor (Viscusi, 1980; blau & Kahn, 1981; Osterman, 1982;
Haber, Lamas & Green, 1983; Light & Ureta, 1992; Sicherman, 1996). An example of an
empirical analysis of statistical discrimination is a study conducted by Altonij and Pierret
(1997), who test for statistical discrimination by firms in a situation where firms can
learn. Using data of young men from the NLSY (National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth), they find evidence that firms statistically discriminate using education (years of
schooling), but not using race. This constitutes statistical discrimination in the sense that
years of schooling is a characteristic which is not perfectly related to productivity and
which is used instead of collecting individual (test) information.
This very restricted overview of empirical evidence in economics only aims at
providing some evidence for the relevance of the topic, and at showing the spectrum of
empirical methodologies used in economic research in this field. Social psychology in
contrast nearly only relies on laboratory experiments, as will be shown below.
The following sections will now discuss the most important concepts and their
definitions in both disciplines, and develop the definition^) of each concept to be used in
this thesis.
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2 J Stereotypes
Among the most important social-psychological determinants of discrimination
are stereo«ypes (e.g. Fiske, 1998) In social psychology, stereotypes are most often, on a
high level of abstraction, defined as common beliefs about personal attributes and
behavior of members of a group More specifically, they are defined as the subjectively
expected correlation between charactenstics of individuals and membership of a certain
group (translated from Fiedler, 1996b p 162) Still, a clear-cut, universally used
definition of stereotypes in social psychology is hard tu find For example, stereotypes
can be seen either as consensual beliefs, or as unjustified beliefs. Gardner (1994) goes so
far as to state that „[ ] the terms prejudice and stereotypes are bad in | | their scientific
utility: Both terms have acquired such a great deal of excess meaning (ollen in the
absence of any empirical justification) that when researchers gather to discuss them, they
often talk at cross purposes. Theorists use the same terms to refer to very different
phenomena, often referring to the same previous research, and then are surprised to find
that they disagree on very basic conclusions." (p 1)
' The basis of stereotyping is the differential perception of groups. For an effective
categorization, easily identifiable features of the perceived objects are used, e.g., race,
gender, or age. The features used for categorization do not have to be of any social
importance, or to be indicative for something else than the membership in a certain
group. Research in the framework of the minimal-group paradigm has shown that many
of the effects of stereotyping can be evoked just by artificially constructing two groups
by means of, e.g., preferences for a painter (Tajfel et al, 1971). One assumption which
has important (methodological) implications, but which is subject of disagreement
among social psychologists, is the assumption that the fundamental nature and
functioning of all stereotypes is the same (Hamilton & I roller, 1986; for a contrary
opinion see, e.g., Linville & Fisher, 1998).
Stereotypes have their origins in the socialization process. Cognitive mechanisms
- information-processing biases - can lead to the development of Stereotypie belief
systems; social-learning processes further its development. The cultural context defines
the utility of various categories, and people develop consensus about such cultural
categories. Stereotypes are thus at least partially linked to experiences made in reality. In
his "BIAS"-model, Fiedler (2000) points to the fact that stereotypes and stereotype-
212 The integrated framework
driven behavior can be explained parsimoniously by the effect of biased samples, for
example concerning sample size for in- and outgroup'': ". ecological samples are
virtually never random, some data are more likely to be sampled than others. Most real
samples are therefore biased in multiple ways and subject to multiple boundary
conditions (Wells & Windschill, 1999) Judgments that have to rely on these samples are
consequently infected by the same biases. Biases occur despite, or exactly because, the
judgments are often remarkably accurate - reflecting precisely the information conveyed
by the sample. Crucial to this cognitive process is the lack of meta-cognitive devices that
would be necessary to understand sampling constraints and to correct sample statistics
accordingly." (p. 6). Therefore, many so-called 'biases' in stereotype verification and
differential perception of in- and outgroups can be explained by the fact that stereotype-
confirming or ingroup samples arc usually bigger, and hence the pattern of relevant
attributes of the ingroup sample correlates more strongly with the ideal pattern than the
pattern ot relevant attributes of the outgroup sample does'
The fact that stereotypes are related to experiences is reflected also in some
findings concerning the accuracy of stereotypes Ottali and I.ee (1995) review studies on
stereotype accuracy and find evidence for convergence of the stereotypes various groups
hold of particular other groups and the view groups have of themselves, and of
stereotypes and more 'objective' indicators. Furthermore, they find that people are
sensitive to within-group variations. This is also confirmed by a review of Linville &
Fisher (1998), who show that people are able to make reasonably accurate estimates of
group variability, even if they are sometimes biased (see also Judd, Ryan & Park, 1991;
Quattrone & Jones, 1980).
Categorization of individuals into groups can have many different consequences.
Only those of the known consequences which are relevant for the topic at hand are now
described shortly (following an overview of Hamilton & Trolier, 1986):
• Members of the same category are perceived as being more similar to each other,
members of different categories as being more dissimilar, even when the assignment to
the groups is arbitrary and the feature for the group identification is uninformative for
anything else than the category (see minimal-group paradigm, e.g. Tajfel et al., 1971).
* 'Outgroup' in social psychology means any group different from one's own (which is called 'ingroup'),
eg soccer supporters of another team than ihe one oneself supports, people of a different nationality or the
other sex We use ingroup' here for the discriminating group, and 'outgroup' for the group discriminated
against, lo make integration with social-psychological theories of intergroup conflict easier.
' It would lead too far to explain the model in detail here, but see Fiedler et al (1999a, b), Fiedler (2000).
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• The perceiver's causal attributions about the behavior of members of the groups ore
influenced by the categorization
• Categorization influences what aspects of the information at hand arc attended to.
how it is interpreted, and what part of it is retrieved from memory later Stereotype
consistency of the information can influence the ease of processing of information in
both directions (making either more or less stereotypical information easier to process)
depending on the context (see e.g. Hamilton & Rose, 1980; Lui & Brewer, 1983;
Bodenhausen & W'yer, 1985).
• The judgmental standards used in a situation where people have to make social
judgments are influenced by stereotypes Standards often differ from one social
category to another (see e.g. Biernat ct al, 1998. for an interesting experimental study
see BiematA Kobrynowic, 1997)
• Behavior thai involves the allocation of limited resources (zero-sum allocation, e.g.,
of money or jobs) is said to be strongly influenced by stereotypes (e.g. Biemat et al,
1998)
Research has shown that relying on stereotypes can be functional, as it helps
economizing on cognitive resources in a complex world (e.g., Tetlock, 1992, Fiske,
1998). People categorize others into groups to reduce the amount of information they
must contend with. The link of such a category with certain traits, i.e., a stereotype,
allows the perceiver to predict the course of an interaction with a member of that
category, because it makes him 'know' certain traits of the target. Relying on stereotypes
therefore helps people to interact more easily in social situations. This functionality is
reinforced by the phenomenon of behavioral confirmation (self-fulfilling prophecies),
which is considered in economics as well. It describes a situation in which beliefs and
expectations 'create their own reality' (Snyder, 1992). Merton (1948) defines the self-
fulfilling prophecy as being a false definition of the situation in the beginning, which
then evokes a certain behavior, making the originally false conception come true. In
other words, the perceiver behaves according to his stereotypes and thereby elicits
confirmatory stereotypical behavior from the target. This makes the behavior of the
target more predictable and thereby more controllable (see e. g., Darley & Fazio, 1980;
Snyder, 1984; for a review of the literature see Snyder, 1992). Claire & Fiske (1998)
extend this idea to whole societies. In their view, if powerful groups in a society share a
stereotype, and the stereotype continuously influences the target persons or groups, it
may influence them so far that they really fulfill the resulting expectancy. This facilitates
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social interactions, but it can have negative consequences for members of the stereotyped
groups
Some authors (eg, Jost & Banaji, 1994; Snyder & Miene, 1994) argue that
stereotypes have a justification function: Jost & Banaji (1994) distinguish ego
justification, group justification, and system justification. They go so far as to argue that
under some circumstances, stereotypes that serve to justify an existing order can operate
even against individual or collective self-interest' Klein & Kunda (1992) extend this
argument to all kinds of reasoning: They assume that people usually want to justify their
conclusions and beliefs rationally Further, people are said to attempt to rely as well as
possible on rules and evidence given. To cope with biases in cognitions which arise
despite of the strive for accuracy these biases are extended to general belief systems to
make them seemingly consistent. Motivational effects like this are especially likely when
the knowledge base is ambiguous or self-contradictory, which is often the case with
beliefs about people and society As Damasio (1994) formulates: The personal and
immediate social domain is the one closest to our destiny and the one which involves the
greatest uncertainty and complexity" (p 169) Furthermore, stereotypes can be 'used' to
justify prejudice, i e , negative emotions towards certain groups (see section 2.4.1).
It thus has been shown that stereotypes can be used to simplify complex social
situations. However, they do not necessarily influence behavior (see e.g. Linville &
Fisher, 1998), and they can influence behavior context-specific. A variety of factors may
influence the use of stereotypes (and the emergence of prejudice and discrimination) in
interactions with members of stereotyped groups. Among the factors which give
stereotypes an advantage compared to more evidence-based processing are, e.g., mental
busyness, information overload, time pressure, pressure to implement a decision, and
certain emotional states (moods), including happiness, anger, and anxiety (e.g., Isen et al,
1985; 1987; Pratto & Bargh, 1991; Esses, Haddock & Zanna, 1994; Dijker & Koomen,
1996). It could be shown that the actual presence of information may not be crucial for
the question whether people use stereotypes. The feeling of being informed, even without
any information objectively present, may be sufficient to allow for Stereotypie judgment
(Yzerbyt et al., 1994). What probably matters is people's own impression of the quality
of the information at hand, which is based on personal experience and one's own group
* This is an important aspect with respect to labor-market discrimination, because it implies that under
some circumstances, stereotype» justifying an existing order can operate even against (financial-) economic
rationality •.. ,,.
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membership (Fiske, 1998) Bodenhausen et al (2001) argue that Stereotypie beliefs can
just be 'added' to the information available. If the basic information is ambiguous, the
'added' stereotypical information can have a strong influence.
Another important question is. which of the possible stereotypes will be activated
In every social interaction, several stereotypes could possibly be activated, eg, in a
hiring situation, an Asian women could be first and foremost seen as an instance of the
category "Asians" or of the category "women" Hodenhausen et al (1998) assume thai
there is a 'cognitive competition' among the various possible categorizations, and which
one wins is affected, among other factors, by the recency of category activation, the
presence of situational cues, and contextual salience.
A lot of research discusses how stereotype change can be reached. Obviously, the
first condition necessary for stereotype change is awareness of the possibility Ihut
stereotypes influence a perceiver. This is not given in the case of implicit stereotyping
effects, i.e., when stereotypes work unconsciously' (see, e.g., Greenwald & Banaji.
1995).
Awareness alone is not sufficient to change stereotypes or inhibit the use of them,
because people may deceive themselves about their susceptibility to the influence of
stereotypes (Bodenhausen et al, 1998; see also Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Therefore,
motivation to control for the effects of stereotypes (and prejudices) is necessary as well.
Furthermore, certain attentional requirements have to be fulfilled. Trying to avoid a
particular thought actually may result in its hyper-accessibility. This may, in case of too
few resources for the operating process, result in more biased construals. This 'rebound'
effect was found to be not limited to impressions and judgments, but also to find
behavioral expression (Macrae et al., 1994). Bodenhausen et al. (2001) add as a further
condition for stereotype change that the individuating information must be
unambiguously in poor fit with the Stereotypie expectations.
Further, the level of homogeneity of the outgroup is important. Linville & Fisher
(1998) report that when the outgroup is in general very homogeneous, a counler-
stereotypic new exemplar is unlikely to be classified as an instance of the group, and
therefore will not lead to a change in the stereotype. In a very variable group, on the
other hand, the inclusion of an(other) atypical member has little effect on the overall
group stereotype. Thus, counter-slereotypic information has to be presented in the
* As using stereotypes preserves mental resources, this relative automaticity is also functional.
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context of a typical outgroup member, because only then, generalization from specific
individuals to the group as a whole is possible (Hewstone & Lord, 1998). If stereotype-
disconfirming information is presented in combination with an otherwise atypical
member of the group, this will rather lead to the formation of a 'subtype' (eg., career
women as a subtype of women, see Fiske, 1998). Using subtypes is socially and
cognitively pragmatic in that the overall stereotype can be maintained and the status quo
can be justified and perpetuated
Important for stereotype change is also whether people themselves can control the
nature and amount of information they receive about a target group, or whether they are
forced to process all the information available (Johnston & Macrae 1994) People usually
show a preference for stereotype-matching information and therefore do not change their
Stereotypie impression of the group when they can choose the information processed On
the other hand, if they are forced to process all information, their Stereotypie evaluation
of the group can diminish This implies that in naturalistic, information-seeking settings,
the resistance of stereotypes to change is high
If one wants to achieve stereotype change in a situation of group contact, as in the
'classical' interventions (Allport, 1954; Cook, 1962; Amir, 1969), membership of the
groups must be obvious to make generalized attitude change possible (Hewstone & Lord,
1998). The situation thus must be clearly an intergroup situation, not an interpersonal
situation. However, even then it is possible that only the perception of the jpec//ic
outgroup changes: Hewstone & Lord (1998) find that stereotype change achieved in one
contact situation usually does not generalize, neither across situations nor across persons.
Fiske & Stevens (1993) add as another condition for stereotype change through contact
that the two groups must have equal status.
Another problem with achieving stereotype change by providing any kind of
stereotype-inconsistent information is that such information tends to be experienced as
threatening and thereby can create negative affect - which in turn can negatively
influence behavior towards the outgroup (Bodenhausen et al., 2001). Jussim et al. (I99S)
see the partial independence of affect and cognition as a major obstacle for change,
because affectively based discrimination could continue after the change of the
stereotype.
This overview of research on stereotypes in (social-') psychology gives an
impression of the huge amount of studies done in this field. In economics naturally far
less research is concerned with stereotype-like phenomena.
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73.2 S/a/ufica/dbcz-imtnarKW! -
Economic theory dealing with discrimination is not usually talking about
stereotypes, however, statistical-discrimination theory (Arrow, 1973, Phelps, 1972)
makes use of a very similar concept Statistical discrimination occurs when employers
(correctly)'" expect that, on average, members of a certain group are less productive or
less stable employees than members of another group Since employers have to make
personnel decisions under incomplete information and uncertainty" about the
productivity of an individual applicant or employee, they will, at least partially, base their
decisions on their beliefs about group averages Any infonnation seen as conclutcd with
productivity in the widest sense, which can easily be obtained, e.g. information about sex
or race, can be used for making personnel decisions (Perceived) group differences can
exist not only in average levels of productivity or variance of individual productivity, but
also in the reliability or accuracy of the way the productivity of individual members of
the groups is measured (see e.g. Aigner & Cain, 1977, l.undbcrg & Start/ 1983;
Lundberg 1991). When differences between groups are real, the result is discrimination
•gainst intftvtt/ua/ (out-)group members in hinng. pay or promotion In this case,
statistical discrimination cannot be regarded as discrimination against groups, and it
rational from a profit-maximizing point of view.
The perception of a productivity difference may also work as a self-fulfilling
prophecy by the adverse incentive effects of lower wages, less productive jobs and fewer
training facilities for outgroup members (e.g., Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993;
Fanner & Terrell, 1996). Berk (1999) relies on a similar mechanism to reach the opposite
conclusion: Self-selection bias resulting from discrimination should reduce
discrimination in the long run. From a discriminated group only those with very high
qualifications will apply for certain jobs because the less qualified cannot expect to have
a chance. This should then lead to the impression that the discriminated group is on
average more productive than the other group. Neal & Johnson (1996) report empirical
evidence for such an effect. This is a mechanism, which resembles the basic idea of the
BIAS-mechanism Fiedler proposes (e.g., Fiedler et al., 1999a, b).
'° Aigner & Cain (1977) argue that statistical discrimination can only persist when group differences are
real, and not just perceived by the employers Blau et al (2002) include (wrongly) perceived difference»
into their description of statistical discrimination In the following the latter will be referred to a» weak
variant of statistical discrimination
" See section 2.6 about uncertainty and imperfect information
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When feedback effects or self-fulfilling prophecies do not apply, and there
continues to be no actual difference in average productivity between the ingroup and the
outgroup, a false perception may be expected to yield to new information about the
absence of an actual productivity difference over time If, however, the perception
originates from a personal prejudice, it may serve as a rationalization and justification for
this prejudice and the ensuing discriminatory behavior. This can be explained from the
psychological inclination of a person to reduce cognitive dissonance between, on the one
hand, her perception and, on the other hand, her discriminatory prejudice (and behavior)
(Festinger, 1957; Arrow, 1973).
7 3. J Summary ant/ <&/i/iff/o/i wee/ fere
To summarize, social-psychological research basically defines stereotypes as
common beliefs about personal attributes and behavior of members of a group The basis
of stereotyping is the differential perception of groups based on easily identifiable
features like race or gender. Stereotypes are achieved during socialization, and to a
certain extent reflect real group differences. The categorization of individuals into groups
can have many different consequences, which often, but not always, have aversive
consequences for the stereotyped groups. Relying on stereotypes can be functional in that
it helps economizing on cognitive resources and facilitates social interactions.
Stereotypes can also be used to justify prejudices. However, they do not necessarily
influence behavior in all contexts. Whether people behave following their stereotypes
depends, among other factors, on personal experience and one's own group membership.
In general, stereotypes are highly resistant to change, especially in naturalistic,
information-seeking settings.
In economics, the explanation of discrimination advanced by statistical-
discrimination theory corresponds to the basic concept of a stereotype, namely a (correct
or wrong) perception of a group average, which is then applied to judge members ofthat
group. Employers have to make personnel decisions under incomplete information and
therefore partially base their decisions on their expectations about group averages. Any
easily obtainable information seen as correlated with productivity or job stability, e.g.
information about sex or race, can be used for making personnel decisions. The
perception of differences between groups can be correct or false. These two cases have
different implications for discriminatory behavior in the long run.
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The definition or stereotypes my research is based on is taken from social
psychology: Ster^onpz/tg u "...rAe u/tcontcioMt or cwurfoiu qpp/ica/nvt o/focvuru« or
o/ a groifp m yucfyng a /rwm/wr o/ rV groiy" ffia/Nyi <f
2.4 Prejudice
Recently, research in social and economic psychology has generally turned more
towards analyzing the importance of emotional aspects for decision-making Jussini cl al.
(1995) criticize the cognitive approach, because most judgments in their view are not
purely cognitive. Even in hiring decisions, applicants are evu/uufet/ and thus, the
judgment is not purely cognitive (see also Nelson, Hicmat, & Mams, 1990, Hicrnat,
Mams, & Nelson, 1991; Jussim, 1991). Loewenstein et al (2001) summarize an
approach, which sees emotions, more precisely anticipatory emotions, as a basic
necessity for decision-making. An example is Damasio's 'somatic marker hypothesis'
that posits that decision-making is guided by somatic reactions ('gut feelings') to
decision alternatives that provide information about the valuation of the alternatives, e.g.,
whether they are risky or not (Damasio, 1994; for a related argument see also Clore,
Schwarz, & Conway, 1994).
The emotional aspect of discriminatory behavior is often referred to as 'prejudice'
(e.g. Schaller et al., 1998), and this is how the term is going to be used here as well.
Prejudices can be de lined as negative, 'affect laden' (Pettigrew, 1997) attitudes" towards
all or most members of a certain group. Unfortunately, for the definition of prejudice in
social psychology holds the same as for stereotypes - there are many variants and it is not
always made explicit which variant is used
Prejudice has been shown to be usually a better predictor for discriminatory
behavior than stereotypes are (e.g. Stangor et al., 1991; Dovidio et al., 1996). Betsch et
al. (2001) show that implicitly formed attitudes (value judgments) toward a target can
"The definition of attitudes also is subject of discussion in social psychology Most generally, they can be
defined as a "psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree
of favor or disfavor" (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998, p 269) There is, however, some controversy whether
attitudes comprise cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects or only affective aspects (e g. Petty &
Cacioppo. 1981) In the following, if not otherwise indicated, the one-dirocnnonal interpretation (only
consisting of affective reactions) is used
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very accurately follow from value-loaded experiences with the stimulus, eve if the
informational content of these experiences cannot be recalled cognitively any moe.
This does not imply that all negative prejudice against certain groups is hsed on
per.Tona/ negative experiences with those groups Prejudice can also folio from
'second-hand' experiences, i.e., it can be learned from what others tell about th groups
in question.
Bodenhausen et al (2001, p 319f) distinguish between "chronic integrahflect",
"episodic integral affect" and "incidental affect" towards certain groups if most
relevance for the research here are the first two kinds of affect. Chronic integral ffect is
the enduring affective reaction to, e.g., a certain social group, which can ifluence
behavior towards this group Fpisodic integral affect comprises affective lactions
created spontaneously in an intergroup situation. These episodic reactions can e quite
different from the chronic ones. An example would be a positive experience <ith one
member of a generally negatively stereotyped and evaluated group. Rodenhusen &
Moreno (2000) predict under what circumstances chronic integral affect irtuences
behavior towards stereotyped group members: "...when perceivers (a) are unawe that
they arc being influenced by their chronic background feelings about the group(b) are
unmotivated to correct such biases [...]; (c) lack the attentional resources that are
necessary to suppress or correct for affective biases; or (d) convince themselves (hat their
negative feelings are due to something other than the group's identity per se" (cited from
Bodenhausen et al. 2001, p. 322). This is similar to the conditions for the influence of
stereotypes on behavior.
Emotional reactions to members of certain groups, are probably also situation-
specific: Seeing a good-looking woman in a bar will for most people not lead to negative
emotional reactions, while seeing a good-looking woman applying for a top-management
position might evoke such negative reactions.
Emotional factors can thus explain why e.g. a woman can be more negatively
judged when applying for a certain job than a man, even if the 'cognitive' information
about both is equal and the perceiver tries to avoid stereotyping. Emotions can especially
become important in decision-making when no clear cognitive judgment is achieved. In
such a case the existence of a (strong) emotional 'judgment' might determine the
decision.
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Taftei/br «/ücriminafNM
Gary Becker (I9S7; 1971) conceptualized discrimination as motivated by a
personal prejudice, or what he called a 'taste', against associating with a particular group.
This 'taste for discrimination is influenced in his view, among other factors, by the
degree of contact between the groups in question: Becker assumes that, depending on the
size of the groups, the economic significance of the groups, and the duration and level of
contact between them, one group develops a preference against contact with the other
group, which can vary in strength If there is absolutely no contact or very intensive
contact between the groups, no such preferences will develop, limploycrs, employees,
and/or customers all may have such discriminatory tastes At the same time, the model
assumes that there are no actual differences in the distributions of productivities between
the particular group and other groups According to the definition of Keeker, "if an
individual has a "taste for discrimination", he must act at //he were willing to pay
something, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some
persons instead of others" (1971, p 14)
The amount of money, which he" is willing to pay, is represented by the
(facr/mi/iaf/on coe^ic/en/. The discrimination coefficient can be said to represent the
nonpecuniary psychological cost of employing, working with, or purchasing from a
member of the particular group in terms of money. In the case of employer
discrimination, the full costs of employing a member of the particular group (the
outgroup) are his/her wage plus the discrimination coefficient. This means that
discriminating employers will hire members of the outgroup only at a wage lower than
that of members of the ingroup. Hence, in a competitive labor market, where ingroup
members are paid in accordance with their productivity, outgroup members will be hired
only if they are paid less than their productivity. The actual wage difference in a
competitive labor market, i.e. the market discrimination coefficient, depends on the size
and distribution of the individual discrimination coefficients among employers and on
the relative labor supply of ingroup and outgroup members. For example, suppose there
is only one industry and a fixed supply of ingroup and outgroup members such that the
supply of ingroup members is one-third that of outgroup members. Further assume that
ingroup and outgroup members are perfect substitutes in production and that in
" A more formal description of this model is given inaection 3.4.1.
" Throughout this thesis, the male form is used to indicate both sexes. This has been done for convenience
of the reader
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equilibrium the labor demand by each firm is the same. The equilibrim
discrimination coefficient would then equal the first-quartile discrimination cofficient in
(he distribution of individual discrimination coefficients (see Becker, 1971, | 43, for a
proof).
In the view of Becker, a discriminatory taste incorporates both prcidice and
ignorance about the absence of an actual average productivity difference, hcsc two
concepts are sharply distinguished since "ignorance may be quickly dimmed by the
spread of knowledge, while a prejudice (i.e., preference) is relatively indeendent of
knowledge" (Becker, 1971, p 16). This would imply, psychologically spealng, that a
'taste' consists of a prejudice pan and a stereotype part. However, econorrt research
building on Becker's model usually uses 'taste' as synonymous for 'prejudice'
The present analysis focuses on employer and employee discrimiation, but
discrimination by customers or the government can be analyzed similarly, imployee
discrimination is a situation where employees of a certain group have taste for
discrimination against an outgroup If an employee has a taste for discriminate against
an oulgroup, he will demand a compensating premium equal to his disiimination
coefficient for wnrkina with a member of this outwoup " One response of us profit-
maximizing employer to such a situation could be to hire a segregated work force. If this
is not profitable because of substantial costs of adjustment from the previous situation,
and many outgroup members seek employment in firms with discriminating ingroup
employees, the market wage for outgroup members will be lower than for ingroup
members (Arrow, 1973). Moreover, employee discrimination may adversely affect the
morale and productivity of discriminating ingroup members who are forced to work with
outgroup members (Bergmann and Darity, 1981). In addition, the productivity of the
outgroup members themselves may also be reduced, as ingroup members are reluctant to
give advice and assistance to new outgroup members and to include them in their
mentor-protege relationships and informal networks.
2.4.3 Summarv and a"e/fn;fion used Aere
For the psychological definition of prejudice holds the same as for stereotypes: It
has developed a lot of diverging excess meaning and comprises many variants. The most
basic definition sees it as the emotional aspect of discrimination (Fiske 1998). Social
psychology assumes that most judgments are not purely cognitive. Recently, emotions by
"This description of employee discrimination follows the account by Blau et al. (I998, pp. 203-205).
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some researchers are even seen as a basic necessity for decision-making Damasio
(1994), for example, assumes that emotions always have some kind of influence on our
decisions. Prejudice has been shown to be a better predictor for discriminatory behavior
than stereotypes are However, prejudice as well does not necessarily influence decision-
making. The conditions for an influence of prejudice on behavior are in general similar to
those for stereotypes. Emotions become especially important in decision-making when
no clear cognitive judgment is achieved.
Becker sees prejudice (a 'taste') as the basic reason for discrimination against a
particular group. This 'taste for discrimination' is influenced, in his view, by the degree
of contact between the groups in question. Employers, employees, and/or customers all
may have such discriminatory tastes, even in the absence of real productivity differences
between the groups. Strength of this taste is represented in Decker's model by the
discrimination coefficient (Ü), which is the amount of money someone is willing to pay,
e.g., for not having to work together with a member of a certain group
For the purpose of the integration proposed here, prejudice is defined - in
agreement with social psychology and Becker's model - as the emotional aspect of
discrimination:
/Ve/wftc« are negaf/ve, ajfecl/ve a/Ww/cr towardi a// or mim /ne/nfor.? o/ a
certom groi^7 fc/ PeM/grew, 7997/
2.5 The role of social identity
2.5. / 7Vie /m* fterween cogmf/o/i, emor«?«, and fte/wv/or
In social psychology, the link between stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination,
i.e., cognitive, emotional and behavioral components, is discussed controversially. In
most real-world cases it is impossible to make a clear-cut distinction between cognitive,
affective and behavioral aspects, because they are strongly interrelated and not easily
disentangled (but, see Jussim et al, 1995). Up to now, however, most research focused
on cognitive and emotional aspects. Not much research has been done on the behavioral
component, and even less on the links between the three aspects.
There still is a lot of disagreement in the literature about how the three aspects are
connected (see e.g. Brewer, 1994). Most researchers assume that consistency exists
among stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination (e.g., Merton, 1948; Allport 1954;
Darley & Fazio, 1980; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Jussim, 1991; Dovidio, Brigham,
Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Bodenhausen, Macrae & Garst 1998) Some, (e.g., Mackie &
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Smith, 1998) oppose this opinion Schaller et al (1998) see reciprocal relations between
cognitions about groups and behavior toward group members. Examples are behavioral
confirmation effects (self-fulfilling prophecies, see section 2 3) Some authors see
prejudice as determining stereotypes (eg. ßovidio et al, 1996; Schaller & Maass, 1989),
others see prejudice am/ stereotypes as a result from attempts to justify discrimination,
rather than serving as prerequisites to such behavior (eg Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jost &
Banaji, 1994). Kmpincal evidence exists for different interpretations: There exists
evidence that (cognitive) beliefs influence (emotional) evaluations and behaviors, but
tome studies also find that cognitive measures of beliefs are basically unrelated to
measures of prejudice or discriminatory behavior"' I.inville & Fisher (1998) argue that
cognitive-behavioral consistency with respect to Stereotypie beliefs is more likely for
groups with which the perceiver is relatively less familiar. A quite elaborated model of
the transition from cognition to behavior is Fazio's (1999) MODI: model, which basically
proposes that attitudes can directly and rather unconsciously influence behavior towards
an object, but cognitions can also first trigger a conscious decision about behavior.
Dovidio et al (1996) assume that intergroup cognitions are (he forerunners of intergroup
behaviors, and those cognitions arc themselves influenced by ongoing affective states.
7.5.2 Sbc/o/ ;<tertf/ry fAeorv anrf sW/"-ca/*gor/:af/ort z/ieory
A theoretical model, which makes elaborate assumptions about conditions for
cognitive-affective-behavioral links, is social-identity theory (SIT; Turner et al., 1986),
and its extension self-categorization theory (SCT; e.g., Haslam et al., 1996). The research
reported here uses these theories as the general social psychological basis, because they
integrate the social context into an analysis of cognitive (and affective) antecedents of
group behavior in a way which is well-suited for an integration of economic factors. In
economics, contrary to most social psychology, the social context, e.g., market
institutions, is usually seen as a very important factor. In my view, the low amount of
interest in how institutions shape behavior is a shortcoming of today's social-
psychological research. For an integration with economic research, a psychological
theory which makes assumptions about how the (social) context influences cognitions
and behavior is well-suited (c.f Friedman & Sunder, 1994). Furthermore, as the aim of
this thesis is to explain />e/iav;or using cognitive and emotional factors, a theory is
" This can in pan probably be explained by social desirability influencing cognitive measures more
strongly.
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needed which makes statements about the link between cognitions, emotions and
behavior
In short, soctal-identity theory postulates a link between social identification with
existing groups and the tendency to rely on stereotypes and prejudice in behavior, i.e.. to
discriminate Self-catcgonzation theory elaborates on the cognitive mechanisms, which
influence social identification Researchers working in the framework of the social-
identity/self-categonzation approach believe that a purely (individual) cognitive analysis
of human behavior is incomplete and does not sufficiently take the social context into
account (see e.g. Ilaslam et al, 1996) SCT therefore aims at understanding "experience
and behavior as the product of an interaction between psychological variables | | and
"social reality"! ..]"(Spears. 2001, p 172). Group behavior and the distinction between
ingroup and outgroup are a central point in the explanation of discriminatory behavior.
Groups can be 'real' groups like work teams or sports teams, but they can also be more
abstract, wider groups, like women and men or even, as some experiments with the
minimal-group paradigm show (Tajlei el al., 1971), totally artificial groups like 'blue' or
'red'. Consequentially, (content and use of) stereotypes are in SCT assumed to be
influenced by the social context. They can "vary with intergroup relations, the context of
judgement and the perspective of the perceiver" (Turner 1999, p. 26).
SIT and SCT basically argue that people have personal and (one or more) group
identities. In some situations the personal identity is more salient; in other situations a
specific group identity is more salient. Self-categorization means that one perceives
oneself in terms of a certain group, i.e., 'depersonalizes' to a certain extent, (logg (2001)
even states that the group is more important than individuality or interpersonal relations:
"The argument rests on the ubiquity of groups in our lives, the need to represent a
complex social world in terms of prototypes representing different groups, the fact that
we are born into groups and categories [...]." (Hogg, 2001, p. 138f).
People identify with groups they belong to, to enhance their self-esteem and to
reduce uncertainty in their life (Mullin & Hogg, 1998). The social context of the group is
very important in determining which group one identifies with, how strongly one
identifies, and how the group influences social identity and behavior (e.g., F.llemcrs,
Spears & Doosje, 1999). Uncertainty, e.g. by some threat, evokes self-categorization.
Following Spears (2001, p. 190), it is important to notice that only group-level threats
have been found to elicit group-level reactions. Many threats, however, can be perceived
either as a group-level threat or as an individual-level threat, depending on the situation
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A perhaps surprising idea is that one possible source of uncertainty evoked by a group
threat is intergroup contact, because it can challenge beliefs about the groups and their
relationship (Ilogg & Mullin, 1999)
If, in a situation of uncertainty, identification with an ingroup is possible, a
subjective feeling of 'certainty' can be reached by doing so - and leads to more use of
stereotypes in decision-making This is contrary to what Tiedens & Linton (2001) found,
namely that uncertainty-related emotions lead to less heuristic processing and less
reliance on stereotypes. This, however, holds for a different kind of situation,
individualized decision-making, i.e , situations, where belonging to a certain group does
not play a role, and therefore, a state of subjective certainty cannot be reached by social
identification One could even imagine that uncertainty reduction via identification
finally leads to a relatively high feeling of certainty, and feelings of certainty are positive
emotions A positive emotional state does not only lead to positive feelings about oneself
and one's group, but also influences decision-making and information processing in that
it leads to more heuristic processing (eg., Bless et al., 19%; Bless & Schwarz, 1999).
Hogg and Mains (1998) find in experiments that strongly identifying small decision-
making groups "faced with difficult decisions and much uncertainty produce
overwhelming social attraction and unwarranted certainty" (Hogg & Mullin, 1999, p.
267).
Turner et al. (1986) show that social-identity salience leads to greater perceived
ingroup homogeneity (for related arguments see also Haslam et al., 1996). Identification
with an ingroup also affects the perception of individual ingroup and outgroup members.
The most important effect in our context is that it renders perceptions of outgroup
members more stereotypical. This is essentially one way how identification with the
ingroup reduces uncertainty: Enhancing stereotypicality, it makes (he world appear less
complex, and gives clear guidelines what is 'right' and 'wrong'. Hogg & Mullin (1999),
however, reject the idea that it is just search for simplification, which underlies the need
for certainty, but rather assume a - not further specified - search for 'meaning'.
If people categorize themselves in terms of a salient ingroup, a general tendency
to favor ingroup members (see Fiedler, 2000) and discriminatory behavior against
members of an outgroup can result. This is again especially likely to happen when the
identity of the group is threatened. Minimal-group studies have further shown that people
not only favor their own groups, but that they sometimes even sacrifice maximum
ingroup gain to ensure a greater re/arrv? gain of their group (Spears 2001; see
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also Brewer. 1979; Tajfel et al.. 1971; Turner. 1981) Especially high identifiers arc
prone to display ingroup-favoring behavior, or refrain from compensating behavior
towards the outgroup.
Social identity becomes especially salient when the status relations between
groups become unstable (Doosje, Kllemers & Spears. 1999, p 9.1). or when norms of
different groups become too similar. This is given for labor market discrimination of
women and blacks, as the relative status of these minority" groups is changing recently
and norms these groups hold with respect to work become more similar to those of the
majority groups, endangering distinctiveness (Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1999). As
people strive for a distinct social identity, similar norms (but also very different ones)
between groups can lead to more discriminatory behavior against an outgroup. tu protect
the unique identity of the ingroup (see also Jetten, Spears & Manstead. 1996, lor an
experimental study of this phenomenon). Jetten et al. (1999) found different effects of
differentiability of groups depending on whether subjects where high or low identifiers
and whether they were 'prototypical' members of their group High
identifiers/prototypical members showed more ingroup bias", when norms were 'too'
similar, whereas low identifiers showed more ingroup bias when intergroup norms were
very different. In general, more prototypical members showed more ingroup bias when
groups were threatened, while less prototypical members showed less ingroup bias in
such a situation, thus distinguishing themselves from the group (Jetten Spears &
Manstead 1997 on prototypicality; Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1998 on strength of
identification). Spears (2001) reports a similar kind of'strategic' self-categorization: In
an experimental study, low identifiers responded to identity threats to the ingroup by
distancing themselves from the group (thereby avoiding the threat by focusing on their
individual self), while high identifiers 'closed ranks' (Spears, 2001, p. 189; for details on
the experiment see Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999).
Decision-making on a group basis can also lead to the opposite of outgroup
discrimination, outgroup favoritism. This happens if the stereotype of the other group is
positive in some relevant aspect, and the related emotion is positive, or if there exist
some learned status differences (see e.g. Spears et al, 2001).
Interindividual differences in the extent to which people are prone to uncertainty
reduction by identification with a group have been reported as well. Hogg & Mullin
" Women are of course not a minority in general, but in many occupations they still are
" Ingroup bias means showing a preference for the ingroup, be it cognitive, emotional or in behavior
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(1999) distinguish between "uncertainty-oriented" people, who "work on the resolution
of uncertainty in order to satisfy a self-assessment motive, whereas certainty-oriented
people are more concerned with self-verification and the maintenance of existing beliefs
- they avoid situations of uncertainty and if confronted by uncertainty fall back on simple
heuristics rather than resolution of uncertainty |...)" (p. 157)'**. These intenndividual
differences are, however, not the focus of interest of this thesis.
25. J /d?»«//caf/on /» ecwwm/«
Not much economic research is dealing with identification up to now. Akerlof &
Kranton (2000) are among the few economists making use ofthat concept in an analysis
of discrimination They adopt a simple definition from psychology, identity as "a
person's sense of self (p. 715), and add it as one more variable to the utility function.
Mating that people derive utility from identifying with a certain group Identity is
lupposcd to prescribe certain behaviors and thereby can evoke discriminatory outcomes
•gainst some groups An example would be that the prescriptive behavior for a female
identity is rather being a housewife and not working, such that working implies an
identity loss Working alongside with women implies an identity loss for men, leading to
a discriminatory taste against women.
Other examples of economic research on the role of identity are Fly (1995)
analyzing women's problems with their identity when being in largely male firms, or
Bloch & Rao (1993) who developed a model that shows how minority-group members
can opt for adopting behavior associated with the dominant group identity, and thereby
ameliorate their situation.
2.5.4 Summary ant/dV/?n//;ofl tuet/ Aere
Stroebe et al (1996) define social identity as a person's feeling about who or
what he or she is, resulting from the belonging to a group (p. 631, own translation). The
most prominent social-psychological theories dealing with identification and social
identity are social-identity theory and its extension self-categorization theory. Both
theories are based on the idea that a purely cognitive analysis of human behavior is
incomplete, and that aside from cognitions and emotions the social context has to be
taken into account as well. Identification and self-categorization in terms of a salient
ingroup are seen as important links between stereotypical cognitions, prejudices and
" Self-assessment means, eg, to figure out whether the own position is comet, while self-verification
means to confirm r/uu the own position is correct2 The integrated framework
behavior. Reasons for self-categorization in terms of a certain group are striving for self-
esteem and reduction of uncertainty in one's life. The social context of the group plays an
important role in determining which group and how strongly to identify with, and also
how behavior is influenced by the identification Identification renders perceptions of
outgroup members more stereotypical and can lead to ingroup-favoring or outgroup-
discriminating behavior (in certain cases also to the opposite). Social identity becomes
especially salient when the status relations or norm diflerences between groups become
unstable. A few economists use identification in analyses of discrimination or related
topics based on psychological definitions
For the research conducted in this thesis, the basic concept from social-identity
theory is used, i.e. social identity refers to: ca/egonra//on w fwrnj o/om/ j</fmi/itti/i<M
groi^w o« Ae/ongj to. Hie ioc/o/ (i/cnu/y « pa/7 0/0 pwio/i, in ihA/ir/ori to rAf
/fr'. Groins on* « port o/and idVn/f/i» wirt a« co//*c/ mgroi^w', m
2.6 The role of uncertainty
Uncertainty is an important concept in the economic and social-psychological
analysis of decision-making. It is discussed interdisciplinary in decision-making
psychology and economics, but still seems to be more central to research in economics
than in psychology, and therefore in the following first the economic use of the concept
is discussed.
2.6. / £conom;cs on uncertoi/jfv
In economics, several concepts of uncertainty are distinguished, in part depending
on research schools. General-equilibrium economics usually deals with uncertainty in the
sense of imperfect information. The assumption of (rational) expectations or calculable
risk (see below) allows analyzing situations of uncertainty within its core theoretical
framework (cf. Rothschild, 1981). Examples are uncertainty about the behavior of
competitors in oligopoly situations, asymmetric information (see for a seminal paper
Akerlof (1970) on the market for lemons) or imperfect information as used in statistical
discrimination models.
(Interdisciplinary) research on decision-making under uncertainty in economics
and psychology is quite specific about the kind of imperfect information or uncertainty it
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is dealing with. Usually, a distinction is made between risk and ambiguity'" (Knight,
1921, sec also Camerer and Weber, 1992). Risk is uncertainty about the outcome of a
decision in a situation where the probabilities of possible outcomes are, at least
subjectively, known. "Ambiguity is uncertainty about the probabilities, created by
missing information that is relevant and could be known" (Camerer & Weber, 1992, p.
330). Another distinction made especially by (neo-) Keynesian research is the distinction
between ambiguity (in the above sense) and fundamental uncertainty, the latter being a
situation where probabilities are not known and cannot be known in principle, because
possible future developments cannot be anticipated. In the following, these three
concepts will be described in more detail.
Risk is the concept the most prominent theory of choice, expected utility theory
(EU; v. Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) deals with In f'U the utility of a choice is
calculated as the expected utility of the possible oulcomes weighted by their objectively
known probabilities (see for an overview Camerer, 1998; Camerer & Weber, 1992).
Subjective expected utility theory (SHU; Savage, 1954) does not assume that
probabilities of outcomes are objectively known, but posits that people have subjective
probabilities for all possible 'states'. Often, 'real' probabilities are assumed to be
unobserved Subjective probabilities are supposed to be revealed by the choices people
make. By definition, subjective probabilities cannot be unknown to the individual. They
may, however, be different across people. Thus, the distinction between known and
unknown probabilities does not apply to SEU, and decisions can be treated as decisions
under risk.
But, how much people know about the probability of a state has been found to
influence whether they are willing to bet on that state: People are ambiguity averse. This
has to be distinguished from risk aversion, wich is aversion against uncertain oufcomer,
while ambiguity aversion is aversion against uncertain proAafri/ifi« (see, e.g., Ellsberg
1961; Viscusi & Chesson, 1999; Ho et al, 2002). Camerer & Weber (1992) give as an
illustration the example of having the possibility to bet on one of two coins. One of them
has been thrown a thousand times and proved to be fair. The other one has been thrown
two times and showed once head and once tail. Even if most people would in general
believe that both coins are fair, many would prefer to bet on the first coin, because it
appears less ambiguous.
Sometimes also called 'uncertainty'.
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Many different sources of ambiguous probabilities are possible "Uncertainty
about the composition of an um of balls..." (as in Ellsberg's study) "... is just one kind of
missing information Feeling ignorant about football or politics, having doubts about
which of several experts is nght. wondering whether your child has a predisposition to
the side effects of a vaccine, or being unsure about another country's economy urc all
manifestations of missing information Some new studies suggest these other kinds of
missing information about events make people reluctant to bet on the events" (Ouncrcr
& Weber. 1992. p. 360) Explanations for ambiguity aversion range Irom the ideu that
not knowing important information is scary (Heath and Tversky, 1991), over the
assumption that people use heuristics in decision making (Frisch & Baron. 1988), to the
argument that people strive for a reeling of competence (Fox and Weber, 2002) Camcrcr
and Weber (1992) conclude that ambiguity aversion will make people value the provision
of more information, if this information reduces ambiguity or enhances perceived
competence - whether it will change the decision or not.
Fundamental uncertainty is defined by Dcquech (2001) as a situation, where at
the time of the decision some information does not exist, and cannot be known: "| .. |
situations of fundamental uncertainty are essentially characterized by the possibility of
creativity and structural change and therefore by significant indeterminacy of the future.
The future cannot be anticipated by a fully reliable probabilistic estimate because the
future is yet to be created. [...] The institutional arrangements are such that competition
stimulates decision makers to innovate in search for extra profits, which introduces an
endogenous pressure for something that causes fundamental uncertainty." (Uequech,
2001, p. 916)
Fundamental uncertainty implies that waiting for more information before
making a decision may not be worthwhile, because some information can never be
obtained ex ante. The passage of time implies that fundamental uncertainty would even
exist if people could compute everything they want using the information at hand,
because there is still information, which cannot be known at the moment of decision-
making. Fundamental uncertainty is therefore not the same as complexity, because in a
complex situation one can imagine all information to be knowable in principle.
Fundamental uncertainty, however, is also not the same as complete ignorance The
existence of fundamental uncertainty is seen by many neo-keynesian economists as one
main argument against neoclassical general equilibrium models, which cannot deal with
such uncertainty other than by assuming it away and transforming it into risk (see
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Rothschild, 1981). This, in their view, does not meet the character of uncertain
expectations, which (i) can be subjective, and (ii) often cannot be calculated. But, of
course, it is far more difficult to deal with such fundamental uncertainty in a formal way
(Me Rothschild, 1981, p 124)
Theories like statistical discrimination, which are rooted in the neoclassical
approach, do not make such a clear-cut distinction between risk, uncertainty, and
fundamental uncertainty when talking about 'uncertainty', but rather use it in the general
sense of imperfect information Assuming that probabilities of productivities of
applicants are at least subjectively known, this imperfect information is operationalized
at risk.
One stream of decision research in social psychology is closely linked with
economic decision research, as described before There is a difference in specific areas of
interests between economists and psychologists in this field, but in general the concepts
used are the same
In social-identity theory, a conceptualization of uncertainty different from the
ones described up to now is used: self-relevant subjective uncertainty. This refers to
subjectively felt uncertainty about things, which are important for one's life. It might be
uncertainty about a job, about the personal situation etc. In this tradition, uncertainty is
rather seen as an aversive emotional state, associated with emotions like unease or even
fear, "[...] because it is ultimately associated with reduced control over one's life" (Hogg
& Mullin, 1999, p. 253). (Self-relevant) subjective uncertainty is said to be evoked by the
(social) context, e.g. "[...] threats that arise from geographical relocation, rapidly
changing status differentials, loss of membership or loss of validation of membership in a
group [...]. Sudden loss of work-related identity through retrenchment or retirement can
have similar effects" (Hogg & Mullin, 1999, p. 266). Among the situations, which evoke
(self-relevant) subjective uncertainty, Hogg & Mullin (1999) mention situations of
strengthened economic competition. The concept of competition here is used in the way
colloquial language uses it, not as an economic technical term (see section 2.7.2).
Hogg & Mullin (1999) generally assume that self-relevant subjective uncertainty
includes some 'deeper' uncertainty, related to one's self-concept, but in their
operational ization of the concept for experimental studies they do not refer to such
'deeper' uncertainty, and just use situations of subjective, but hardly self-relevant.
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uncertainty: Minimal-group studies are assumed to represent situations of high subjective
uncertainty, because they are new situations to the subjects and the task probably seems
strange (Hogg <& Mull in, 1999). (Self relevant) subjective uncertainty is linked to
discriminatory behavior, because it is assumed to enhance identification with a salient
ingroup, which then reinforces discriminatory attitudes and behavior (see section 2.5.2).
Even if. on first sight, it looks as if this concept of '(self-relevant) subjective
uncertainty' has not much in common with the economic and decision-theoretic concept
of uncertainty, taking a closer look, commonalities can be found (Sclf-rclcvant)
subjective uncertainty arises obviously from uncertainties in the environment, or at least
from their subjective perception. Decision researchers like C'amerer (1998) also mention
that ambiguity is accompanied by aversive feelings (see above). This, of course, also
holds for risk, even if aversive feelings might be weaker under risk than under ambiguity,
and it holds for fundamental uncertainty, where aversive feelings might be stronger.
One can therefore interpret self-relevant subjective uncertainly as consisting oft
subjective perception of ('objective') uncertainty accompanied by an aversive emotional
stale, which becomes stronger, the more self-relevant the source of uncertainly and the
higher the level of 'objective' uncertainty is.
2.6.J Summary ana" aV/m/f/o/tr usea" Aere
Uncertainty is an important concept in the economic and social-psychological
analysis of decision-making. Interdisciplinary research on decision-making distinguishes
between risk, ambiguity, and fundamental uncertainty, which arc distinguished by
whether outcomes or probabilities are uncertain and whether the latter probabilities can
be known. Standard (neoclassical) microeconomic theory usually uses uncertainly in the
sense of risk, where probabilities are objectively (or subjectively) known and thus can be
treated within a general-equilibrium framework assuming, e.g., rational expectations.
In social-identity theory, another conceptualization of uncertainty is used: '(self-
relevant) subjective uncertainty'. This concept does not deal with the question how much
of the information is known, but rather with the psychological effects of missing
information. It mainly refers to subjectively felt uncertainty about important things in
life. (Self-relevant) subjective uncertainty induces self-categorization and identification
and thereby can lead to discriminatory behavior against outgroups.
/« /Ae_/ö//oM>mg, we H>/// /art afroi/J ra* u/iew /Aere is u/icer/a/n/y aAouJ //ie j/a/e
q/'/Zie Hw/a* 6u/ // it asjumcrf /fart /vo/>a6/////e$ are A/KW/I. We *•/// /art afaw/ amft<£«/(v2 The integrated framework
to Ca/nwer a/*/ fffAer'j f/992^ co/i«pf o/ "tt
mwji/ig ;n/brmaf/o« /Aa/ « re/eva« am/ coi/W 6e ibioHTi" (]p.
/ Se^-re/eva/i/ juA/ecf/ve u/icerta//i/y « aV/i/wrf at a jutyec/rve /jercepfto/i o/"
f'oA/ecf/ve V i/icerta/nfy accompa^i/e^ 6y a/i ave«/ve emo/iomj/ ;/ari, H-A/CA ftecom«
*«wig«r, fA« mo« i^-re/rvo/»/ /Ae 501/rce, anrf fAe A/gAer »A« /«*/ 0/ 'otyecf/ve'
u/icfrtornfv «. // caw periaz/r to o// £//KÜS q/" iz/icertomry. w//A growr^g jfr*;»gfA: OfAer
/, rut evotri weaker y«e/;/igj 0/
2.7 The role of competition
As competition also is a concept which is more prominent in economic than in
psychological research on discrimination, in the following first the economic and
secondly the psychological definition of the concept is discussed. But, to start with, a
more general definition of competition, taken from the Oxford advanced learners'
dictionary is given, to show how economic and psychological uses of the concept relate
to such a definition The dictionary describes 'competition' as "activity in which persons
compete," and lo compete in its turn is defined as "take part in a race, contest,
examination etc.". Competition in this basic definition is thus seen as an activity, taking
place between different subjects, to reach a certain goal, which can only be reached by
some or even one of them, e.g., winning a medal in a race. We now turn to the question,
how economics and social psychology interpret this concept.
2.7. / £«vwm/or o« fAe ro/e o/compef/7/on
Competition is one of the most important concepts in an economic analysis of
discrimination. However, there are different ways of defining the concept, depending on
research schools (see for a discussion Zafirofsky, 2002). The basic idea of economic
competition is the same as described in the lexicon article: As many goods are scarce,
economic agents have to compete for them. Markets evolved as institutions where this
takes place and where prices for these goods develop. Markets for scarce goods can take
different forms, depending, among others, on the number of competitors, on how the
good can be divided, etc., i.e., on the specific form this competition takes. The form of
competition also determines the (perceived) strength of competition in a market - e.g., the
more competitors there are and the smaller the chance is to get the desired result or
amount of a scarce resource, the stronger competition is (perceived).
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Among the different forms competition can have, one of the most important
(benchmark) concepts of today's mainstream economic research is 'perfect competition'.
The textbook definition of a perfectly competitive industry' illustrates this concept
(Nicholson, 1998): "A perfectly competitive industry is one that obeys the following
assumptions: I) There are a large number of firms, each producing the same
homogeneous product 2) Hach firm attempts to maximize profits. 3) Bach firm is a price
taker: It assumes that its actions have no effect on market price 4) Prices are assumed lo
be known by all market participants - information is per led 5) Transactions are costless:
Buyers and sellers incur no costs in making exchanges" (p. 40If) This conception on
first sight deviates in pan from the dictionary definition: There is nothing said about an
activity of competing, but it rather describes a static situation and different features
characterizing it. There are, however, hints about a competitive activity, namely
conditions 2 and 3. Condition 2 states that firms try lo maximize profits, which goes at
the expense of other firms' profits Thus, it comes close lo part of (he dictionary
definition Condition 3 implies competitive activities as well, however, rather price-
suppressing activities ofthe other participants in the market.
the focus in neoclassical general equilibrium models, which often use perfect
competition as a benchmark, is on the existence and characteristics of equilibria, which
markets can reach when they fulfill certain conditions, and not so much on how people
precisely act in such a market. This becomes also obvious in that firms are treated as
'black boxes', holistic entities, and not as consisting of human beings with cognitions,
emotions, motivations, and specific behaviors. Human beings enter these models usually
as rationally calculating agents, and firms' behavior is not seen as differing from the
behavior of single entities. Of course, there are exceptions to such models, and in recent
times, e.g., research in 'behavioral economics' as mentioned in section I.I, introduces
more and more 'human' aspects into economic analysis.
A perfectly competitive equilibrium can be a model for many relationships found
in real markets, but captures process aspects of competition only implicitly, in that it
makes a distinction between short-run and long-run equilibria and then analyses
comparative statics of such short-run or long-run equilibria. The processes, by which
such equilibria are reached (or not), are not investigated in most ofthe economic research
in that tradition (Friedman & Sunder, 1994)
Aside from analyzing perfecly competitive equilibria, many (neoclassical)
economic models deal with situations of /mpe//ec7 competition, e.g., monopolies.
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oligopolies, or markets with imperfect information. Situations of imperfect competition
most basically are competitive situations where not all the above conditions are met The
main focus is on the analysis of possible equilibria in various situations and of how they
differ from perfectly competitive equilibria (for (critical) discussions of equilibrium
economics see, eg, Rothschild, 1981; Zafirofsky, 2002).
Blaug (2001) discusses the mainstream way of dealing with competition, arguing,
that economics in former times in fact had a conceptualization of competition much
closer to the dictionary definition. Kconomics, he argues, historically had two different
"notions of what is meant by competition: [...]". Either an "end state of rest in the rivalry
between buyers and sellers", as in the perfect-competition model, or "...a process of
rivalry thai may or may not terminate in an end state". Blaug himself favors the process
conception, which he describes as seeing competition as "[...] an active process of
jockeying for advantage, tending towards, but never actually culminating in, an
equilibrium end-state" (p 37f) It is basically the idea that competition is an activity of
people that inspires an incorporation of psychological variables into an (equilibrium)
analysis of, e.g., effects of competition on discrimination in the labor market.
F.fTects of competition (in the sense of the end-state definition) are analyzed in
both economic theories of discrimination described here. In general, (perfect)
competition is assumed to eliminate 'irrational', not profit-maximizing behavior of firms.
An important question in both discrimination models therefore is what happens to
discrimination when competition strengthens and/or reaches the long-run competitive
equilibrium.
In Becker's model of employer discrimination, the analysis of the effects of
competition on discrimination has a central place. As described in section 2.4.2, the
model assumes that discriminating employers have a 'taste for discrimination', i.e., they
are willing to forego profits when they can avoid working with a certain kind of workers.
However, under perfect competition, and if all firms had the same production function,
firms that discriminated less would always have lower unit production costs than firms
that discriminated more, since the former firms hire a larger number of less expensive,
but equally productive outgroup members. Hence, in a competitive product market, less
discriminatory firms have a competitive advantage. In the case of constant unit costs, this
enables them to expand and drive the more discriminatory firms out of business in the
long run. Alternatively, when unit costs rise with output beyond the unit-cost-minimizing
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start new plants and thus gradually take over the market.*' As a result, the demand for
outgroup labor would increase and the market «age gap would he reduced IT the least
discriminatory employer has a zero discrimination coefficient, the market wage gap
would even become zero, i.e. discrimination would be eliminated. Buying out a more
discriminatory employer can also occur when the employer has monopoly power which
is transferable (Becker. 1971) However, many monopolies are mm-transfer able and
buying out may not always be profitable (Ashenfelter and Haiinan, 1986)
Even in the case of competitive markets it can be noted that in practice a long-run
equilibrium in which the more discriminating firms have left the market because of
losses may never be reached because of remaining entry barriers " (>n the other hand,
long before discriminating employers could be driven out of the market by less
discriminating employers, strengthening competition may urge the former employers to
diminish their discriminatory behavior This income effect of falling profits*' is easily
explained as follows. Assume that following one's discriminatory taste is a normal good
When profits, and thus income, go down (for simplicity, assume with Ashenfelter &
Hannan (1986, p. 154) an owner-manager), for example because of market entry of more
firms, less of this normal good will be consumed, and thus discriminatory behavior
diminishes.
Overall, the preceding analysis predicts that as the product market is more
competitive, employer discrimination will be weaker (c.p.)." ()n the other hand, in
Becker's theory there are other kinds of discrimination, which may not diminish so easily
under competitive pressure, and which often accompany employer discrimination. One of
these is employee discrimination, as described in section 2.4.2. If ingroup employees
receive fixed wages independent of profits, employee discrimination will not diminish
under competitive pressure since there will be no income effect of falling wages and
since profit-maximizing employers have to take into account the discrimination by their
employees. On the other hand, if employees (also) receive profit shares, they will be
more sensitive to the economic advantages of hiring cheap outgroup members When
competition becomes tougher, their discrimination coefficient may then diminish by an
"' Surprisingly, Becker (1971) and Becker (1993) do no« mention the latter two option» for the cate of
competitive industries Becker (1971) mentions the option of buying out discriminatory employers for
monopolistic industries only
** The competitive market then gets stuck in a long-run equilibrium, which is similar to a thort-mn
equilibrium with positive profits in the perfect -competition model
" See Comanor (197.1. p 372) and Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986. p 154)
" See Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) for two more arguments for this prediction
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effect similar to the income effect discussed above. If, however, under competitive
pressure fears for unemployment increase among ingroup employees, they may become
afraid of being replaced by cheap outgroup members. This may raise their discrimination
coefficient even if they receive profit shares.
Borjas and Bronars (1989), Black (1995), and Bowl us & Eckstein (1998) show
how search costs, either for firms or for workers, can lead to persistent discriminatory
outcomes, even when competition strengthens, when only some employers are
unprejudiced: Outgroup workers are assumed to have higher search costs than ingroup
members, because they have to find an unprejudiced firm, which makes longer search
necessary Search costs also prevent total segregation of the market. Only if an unlimited
number of possible employers exist, entry will eliminate discrimination in Black's (1995)
model. Bowlus and Fckstein (1998) focus on search by firms, and come to similar
results. Without equal-opportunity laws, firms might reach complete segregation of the
market in their model
Statistical discrimination is a model of imperfect information, i.e., of imperfect,
hut pure, competition. It analyzes what happens to discrimination when the economy
npprouches the competitive equilibrium (with imperfect information), in the case when
the perceptions of groups leading to discriminatory behavior are correct and in case they
are wrong. In the latter case, the discriminated group will try to provide better measures
for their productivity, and so in the long run information will become better and
discrimination will diminish or disappear. If, however, the (wrong) perception originates
from a personal prejudice and serves as its rationalization and justification, as described
in section 2.3.2, an increase in competition does not lead to a change in perceptions. In
that case, the same mechanism as in the model of Becker applies with respect to
discriminating firms - they will be competed out of the market.
In the former case, when perceptions are correct, under competitive pressure (for
example, when more firms enter the market) discrimination will not be suppressed, as it
is economically rational behavior to hire members of groups which are on average more
productive, when there is no more diagnostic information about individual applicants
available. Statistical discrimination in that case is rational from a profit-maximizing point
of view.
A combinination of a taste-based concept with statistical discrimination provides
an interesting case in which the strengthening of competition reinforces discrimination.
This is the case when initially no actual ditTerence in average productivity between the
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ingroup and the outgroup exists, but employee discrimination reduces the marginal
productivity of outgroup members directly as well as indirectly by lowering the
productivity of discriminating ingroup members (see section 2.4.2).
2 7..? Sbcia//M>c/>o/ogy o/i »Ae TO/« o/«vnpe-i/»K»i
Social psychology does not handle an explicit definition of competition In
general, if the term is used, it is used like in everyday speech, i e, like the dictionary
definition, indicating rather an acr/vifv of competing. Research on discrimination mainly
discusses mtergroup competition - either as a tool to reduce prejudice within u group
consisting of members of different (sub-) groups (sec, eg. Sherif el ol l%l)'\ or in
analyses of how competition of groups influences identification with the ingroup and
related variables (e.g. Bornstein et al., 19%). Sport psychology is dealing with the
influence of competition on athletes (e.g. Anshcl. Jamie son & Kaviv, 2001). Van de
Vliert (1999) discusses whether competition (again seen as an activity) is the contrary of
or related to cooperation. Hogg & Mullin (1999) mention economic competition as one
reason for self-relevant subjective uncertainty (sec section 2.5 I), hut without defining
more clearly what they mean by competition in that case li can be assumed that they use
the term in a manner everyday speech uses it when speaking of economic competition,
i.e. in the sense of a rather tough competitive activity going on in the economy.
2.7.3 Sum/nary and de/imi/o/» «serf /iere
If neoclassical economists talk about (perfect) competition, their use of this word
deviates from the concept known from everyday speech. They usually mean by (perfect)
competition, that a large number of firms producing an homogeneous product try to
maximize profits. Firms are price takers, information is supposed to be perfect and there
are no transaction costs. Neoclassical economics also analyses situations of 'imperfect
competition', e.g., monopoly or situations with imperfect information. However, apart
from this 'end-state' concept of competition, economics also knows a 'process' notion of
competition, i.e., competition is - mainly by economists from the 'Austrian' school - seen
as a process of rivalry.
Both economic discrimination theories reviewed here deal with the effects of
competition, based on the neoclassical concept. In Becker's model, information is
complete and discrimination results from 'irrational' tastes. Strengthening competition
" Shenf et al (1961) showed thai groups who formerly diiliked each other became friends when
cooperating in competition against another group
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therefore will eliminate employer discrimination in the long run Employee- or customer
discrimination, on the other hand, does not necessarily disappear when competition
strengthens.
Statistical discrimination theory assumes imperfect information. Discrimination is
supposed to persist when competition strengthens, if groups really differ in some
important characteristics Otherwise, groups will provide better information and
discrimination will disappear in the long run. When perceptions of differences are
rationalizations of discriminatory tastes, the same mechanism as in Becker's model will
apply
Social psychology uses the term competition generally like in everyday speech,
indicating the activity of competing. Hogg & Mullin (1999) mention economic
competition as one reason for self-relevant subjective uncertainty, which can lead to
more discrimination
A link between an economic and a psychological conceptualization of
competition has to rely on an activity conceptualization in so far as psychological aspects
of human behavior and interactions have to be considered. However, this does not imply
that an equilibrium approach is useless for the research here. There is no contradiction
between analyzing equilibria and the assumption that competition also implies an activity
of people. An equilibrium can be interpreted as a situation in which activities have settled
at a stable level. Thus, one can emphasize that in a perfectly competitive situation people
are engaged in a certain activity. This makes it logical to look also at how their
psychological 'states' are influenced by the situation and how this in turn influences their
behavior. The approach taken here is not interested in what long-run equilibrium the
economy reaches. It assumes however, that 'individual' equilibria in the sense of utility
maximization as well as short-run market equilibria are possible, and that the former are
influenced by the level of competition in the latter market equilibria Therefore, it
conceptualizes competition as an acf/v/ry per/brmea" fry/www or o/Aer econom/c ogenw,
w/io engage in /A« oc//v/rv aga/ns/ eocA orter to reac/i certain goau.
In the following table the core concepts as defined by (social) psychology,
economics, and as chosen for the research here are summarized.







A (wrong or correct) perception of a
group average, which is then applied
to judge members ofthat group
Taste' against associating with a
particular group.
A person's sense of self (taken from
psychology).
Imperfect information -
a) Risk (uncertainty about state)
b) Ambiguity (uncertainty about
probabilities)
c) Fundamental uncertainty
(probabilities are not known and
cannot be known)
a) An activity of competing, in which
economic agents engage
b) An equilibrium end-state, fulfilling
certain conditions
Social psychology
Common beliefs about personal
attributes and behavior of
members of a group
The emotional aspect of
discrimination
A person's feeling about who or
what he or she is, resulting from
the belonging to a group
a) Imperfect information -
probabilities of possible





things, which are important for
ones life, accompanied by an
aversive feeling.
The activity of competing m
which people engage
Definitions chosen
Stereotyping is " the unconscious or conscious application
of (accurate or inaccurate) knowledge of a group in judging
a member of the group" (Banaji & Greenwald 1994. p 54)
Prejudices are negative, affective attitudes towards all or
most members of a certain group (cf Pettigrew. 1997)
'Social identity' Identification with and categorization in
terms of groups one belongs to It is part of a person, in
addition to the 'personal identity' Groups one is part of and
identifies with are called 'ingroups'. in contrast to
outgroups'
a) Risk Uncertainty about the state of the world, it is
assumed that probabilities are known
b) Ambiguity "Uncertainty about probability, created by
missing information that is relevant and could be known"
(Camerer and Webers (1992), p 330)
c) Self-relevant subjective uncertainty A subjective
perception of ('objective') uncertainty accompanied by an
aversive emotional state, which becomes stronger, the more
self-relevant the source, and the higher the level of
uncertainty is It can pertain to all kinds of uncertainty, with
growing strength
An activity performed by firms or other economic agents,
who engage m this activity against each other, to reach
certain goals
Table 2.1: Samaury of the core coaeepts as dcfiaed ia each of the two diitipSan aad lac arftaatwas chowa
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2.8 The general integrative framework
Before discussing possible contributions and problems of an integration, it is
important to define what is meant by integration in this context.
Mamuth (1993) describes theoretical models of different disciplines as 'abstract
maps', which arc useful to answer the questions relevant for each discipline. These
'maps' in his view cannot be used by different disciplines together, as they are organized
in a specific way to answer the questions each specific discipline has. If this is the case,
how could an integrative approach be possible at all'' The idea of this project is, while
being aware of the fact that for many questions in psychology and economics different
'maps' are necessary and useful, there are certain questions where at least part of (he
answer can be found on a common 'map'. Econometric studies about the wage gap for
example are on a different level of aggregation than experimental psychological studies,
i.e, they use differently scaled maps Rut, if the question about discrimination in the
labor market is asked in a way where the level of aggregation is the individual in
interaction with its environment, psychology and microeconomics do in fact use a 'map'
of the same scale.
This thesis tries to integrate economic and social-psychological research on
discrimination in the labor market with respect to concepts used and the methodology
applied (see also section 2 8.2). With respect to concepts, integration means that the ideas
both disciplines have about discrimination - on the level of the individual in interaction
with its environment - are analyzed to find out what they have in common and where
they differ, as has been done in this chapter. Doing this, an attempt is made to construct a
conceptual framework for an explanation of discrimination in the labor market using
contributions of both disciplines in a way that allows gaining new insights. This will lead
to a rather broad integrative framework, parts of which are then transformed into a
coherent formal model. Parts of this model and of the general framework are submitted
to empirical testing: making use of (quasi-) experimental techniques borrowing from the
methodological traditions of both disciplines.
Another 'integrative' aspect is the integration of different concepts within the
same discipline. As has been said before, especially social psychology is a very scattered
discipline. The integrative framework and the theoretical model constructed here also
aim at unifying some of these divergent ideas in one model in as far as this is possible.
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This chapter showed that definitions of the concepts important for an analysis of
discrimination differ within and between the disciplines. However, there are also many
similarities, so that it seems possible to bridge these differences at least partially This is
what the integration firstly aims at. It further assumes that in an analysis of the effects of
competition on discriminatory behavior of employers and employees not only
'economic' mechanisms play a role, but also 'psychological' mechanisms, especially if
one focuses on (strengthening) competition.
It may be useful to say a few words about the use which is made here of the
concept of 'economic' 'Economic mechanisms' here refers to a restricted concept of
'economic', dealing with 'financial-economic' rationality, i.e.. constrained utility-
maximization with respect to profits. Therefore, if we speak about the 'economic effect
of competition', such a financial-economic effect is meant Micro-economic rationality is
a much broader concept, referring to utility maximization under constraints more in
general This can comprise motives like a discriminatory taste, which are 'irrational'
from the point of view of financial-economic rationality This thesis uses the narrow
concept of financial-economic rationality for pragmatic reasons, to be able to distinguish
between 'psychological' and 'economic' mechanisms in an intuitively appealing way.
The two main economic theories explaining discrimination in the labor market,
Becker's 'taste' approach and statistical discrimination, both use 'psychological'
variables as explanatory variables for the existence of discrimination, but in a static sense
and interpreted as exogenous. The concept of competition they work with does not take
into consideration how the 'activity' or the 'process' of competing might influence these
psychological variables and thus preferences of subjects involved in this activity. In fact,
such questions are usually more the focus of psychological research, but answers to them
are important for economics as well, especially if one is also interested to sec what
happens when there is uncertainty and markets are not in long-run equilibrium (cf.
Rothschild. 1981, p. 124).
In both economic frameworks, several possibilities are discussed how
competition influences discrimination and how discrimination in turn can be persistent
even when competition becomes stronger (see section 2.7). In Becker's framework, this
is especially possible when discrimination comes from the side of employees or
customers, or when there is no employer with a zero discriminatory taste. In the
framework of statistical discrimination, this is only possible when perceptions of
productivity differences are, or become, true.
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The review of psychological literature has shown that stereotypes and prejudices
influence behavior context-specific. This implies that competition might influence
whether and how these factors translate into discriminatory behavior For example,
competition can become stronger by an increase in the number of competing firms in the
market Under the general assumption of imperfect information, this can lead to a
situation of strong (self-relevant) subjective uncertainty for members of individual firms,
which already are in the market, since the risk of going bankrupt increases To reduce
this aversive feeling of uncertainty, people in firms can rum to stronger identification
with their most salient ingroup - which could, for example, be white males This, in its
turn, strengthens the use of stereotypes and prejudice in decision-making and can in the
end lead to more discriminatory hiring. That way the assumption of endogenous
stereotyping and use of prejudice, influenced by competition, leads to predictions about
the development of discrimination when competition strengthens, which are different
from those of standard economic models. It is important to note that the research reported
here is interested in the question what happens to discriminatory behavior when
competition between agents increases, i.e., when the economy is becoming more
competitive, but has not yet reached the end-state of a long-run competitive equilibrium
It is not of interest here, precisely what kind of equilibrium the economy reaches in the
long run.
The main difficulty with such an integration of approaches from two disciplines
lies in the fact that both use similar concepts differently. Therefore, this chapter tried to
develop inclusive definitions of the most important concepts, by comparing definitions of
economics and social psychology. For the theoretical and empirical research reported in
the next chapters some of these concepts had to be operationalized. How this is done will
be described in each chapter in detail, but first, section 2.8.2 deals with more general
methodological questions.
One important aspect in which this thesis deviates from standard economic
approaches to analyze discrimination is the methodology applied. As has been shown, an
important part of economic methodology to approach discrimination in the labor market
consists of formal modeling, building on a strong, coherent theoretical framework. In
(social-) psychology, such techniques are hardly applied at all. A lot of rather short-
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ranged theoretical models exist next to each other, which are mainly judged by how well
they explain empirical data, and not, in how far they fit with any existing theoretical core.
Most empirical economic studies use econometric techniques to estimate, eg. the
size of the wage gap or the amount of segregation, as described in section 2 2 The main
problem with these methods is that the unexplained residual, which is usually interpreted
as stemming from discrimination, even with today's sophisticated regression analytic
techniques, depends heavily on model specifications, as has been described in section 2 2
(c.f. Stanley & Jarell. 1998). Only a few empirical economic studies explicitly test the
main theoretical models, usually also using econometric methods. That this is so rarely
done results in part from the fact that many of the variables used are difficult to
operationalize and measure validly Singell & Thornton (1997), for example, sec a
methodological problem for testing Becker's model in the fact that it is empirically
impossible to decide whether someone is utility maximizing or only profit maximizing.
Such differences in part result from the fact that, using real-world empirical data, it is
more or less impossible to manipulate only certain variables keeping others constant, to
test for the influence of changes in specific variables. Many factors in the 'real world'
cannot easily be disentangled. This is better possible in experimental studies, but at the
cost of less external validity (see below). However, few economic studies on
discrimination use experimental or quasi-experimental methods, and most of them
mainly focus on the question whether there is discrimination (in hiring) at all (see section
2.2).
Empirical psychological research, on the other hand, mainly relies on laboratory
experiments. Social-psychological research in general does not refer to one unified
theoretical model, but consists of many small- and middle-range theories, which are
tested extensively in experiments. The advantage hereby is the possibility to directly test
for the specific relationships assumed: Certain variables, which are assumed to influence
the outcome, can be varied in the laboratory, keeping all other variables constant A
disadvantage is, of course, that results from laboratory experiments cannot easily be
generalized to human behavior outside of the laboratory.
Each of the two disciplines thus relies mainly on a certain methodology with its
specific advantages and shortcomings. Somehow surprisingly, as at least part of social
psychology and eonomics are interested in similar topics, there is not much
methodological overlap in research on discrimination. Economics more recently started
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to use experiments as well, but up to now hardly to analyse discrimination in the labor
market.
There are some important differences between experimental economics and
experimental social psychology, which do not only pertain to the different focus of
interest Experimental economics is most interested in testing predictions of different
theoretical approaches against each other, and in testing whether in specific situations
certain equilibria are reached Social psychology rather is interested in observing
fundamental cognitive or social procejj« Both disciplines sometimes use experiments
in an exploratory way.
Apart from the differences in questions of interest, there are methodological
differences between economic and social-psychological experimentation. While
economists are convinced that it is necessary to provide real monetary incentives,
psychologists often assume that it is enough to ask subjects to 'do their best' to motivate
them. Secondly, economists try to model the context of interest as closely as possible in
experiments, e.g., by giving subjects their utility functions in the experiment.
Psychologists rather look at how people behave without such specific restrictions. This
latter difference mainly results from the different focus of interest both disciplines have
Psychologists are more interested in general, universal patterns of human behavior, while
economists are mostly interested in behavior of people in specific 'economic' situations.
A third important difference is the attitude towards deception. While
psychologists think that - if subjects are carefully debriefed at the end - deception is
acceptable in situations where it is necessary to answer a certain question, e.g., in
discrimination research to avoid that social desirability concerns strongly influence
behavior, economists in general see deception as inacceptable. This does not only have
ethical reasons, but also is based on the idea that subjects should not become suspicious
of being deceived in experiments, because this could influence their behavior (see e.g.
Friedman & Sunder, 1994, p. 132ff; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001, provide an exhaustive
discussion of differences between the two disciplines in experimental methods).
A last, less important difference lies in the terminology used. This difference
becomes important when experimental economists and experimental psychologists try to
explain their experiments to each other. For example, what economists call 'treatment' is
called 'condition' in experimental psychology. There are more such examples, but to
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expenmental economics is used, even if the expenmenial methodology borrows from
both traditions.
This thesis not only integrates economic and psychological models, it also
partially integrates methodologies The main aims hereby are: (i) To describe a general
framework of economic and social-psychological research on discrimination in the labor
market (ii) To develop a theoretical (utility-) model of discrimination in the labor
market, using concepts of economics and social psychology, and thus creating a concise,
formal model of a circumscribed situation, (ii) to submit some ol the predictions of both
the general framework and the formal model to experimental and quasi-expenmental
testing.
The choice for using (quasi-) experiments rather than field data was mainly made
because it is very' difficult to analyze the process of discrimination in the labor market
using field data. First, several comparable situations have to be found which can be used
in such a test. Secondly, it is necessary to measure discriminatory behavior and also some
of the motives assumed to determine such behavior This is very difficult to achieve in a
real-world setting, as people know that discriminatory behavior is not socially desirable.
Therefore, they rather do not report it, even if they are aware of it - which is not always
the case either Thirdly, in field settings it is often not possible to keep certain variables
constant while changing others, to test only for some relationships between variables.
Of course, using experiments does not solve all methodological problems. In
experiments as well, variables have to be operationalized and measured, and similar
problems of measurability or of finding useful proxies for certain concepts as in other
methods arise. The operationalization of the variables for the experiments used here
always tries to capture the concepts of importance as well as possible, but this is always
open to interpretation, as it is in other methods. The use of experimentation also does not
completely solve the problem of social desirability, but one can construct experiments in
a way that reduces social-desirability problems as much as possible. A last problem with
experimental research is the question of external validity: Hxperimcnlal results always
are derived in 'artificial', laboratory settings, which differ in important aspects from the
real-life settings they are supposed to model Participants are usually students or other
easily available groups, which are not necessarily representative for the population in
question - and which often also acquire some experience in doing experiments. liven if
important factors like utility functions are given, the situation in experiments is always a
'scenario', where participants have to imagine that they, e.g., want to maximize some2 The integrated framework
utility function. One can doubt whether reactions in such a scenario are the same as when
participants really are in a certain situation.
The clear advantage of using experiments lies in the fact that it provides a
controlled setting, where the variables of interest can be analysed relatively free from the
influence of other factors They can be manipulated in ways, which are often not possible
in real-life settings. That way, it can be known quite well what happens in a situation and
what factors do influence behavior in what way. In contrast to field studies, it is even
possible in experiments to establish causality or at least the direction of a relationship
between variables
To test some predictions of the model at least in a slightly more realistic setting,
in this thesis use was made of a business simulation-game as a 'quasi-experimental' test.
Of course, this goes along with a loss of control. Still, it would be desirable to have
additional empirical evidence from the real world, but this goes beyond the scope of this
thesis.
The advantage of using different methods to approach the same topic lies in the
fact that each method has different shortcomings and advantages, which have to be
traded off against each other, when only one method is chosen. Using different methods
to analyse the same topic, in the end a clearer picture of the phenomenon analyzed can
result. This of course only holds if the question to be answered lends itself to an analysis
with different methodologies equally well, each of the methods is applied carefully, and
comparability of the results is critically examined. This does not mean that for example
the empirical (experimental) designs applied have to be one-to-one translations of the
theoretical model, and the theoretical model has to be a one-to-one transformation of the
framework of economic and psychological ideas into one formal model. In modeling as
well as in designing experiments one has to make certain simplifications. Doing this, the
aim still is to capture the most important aspects as well as possible. For example,
treating competition as an activity does basically imply here that in the model certain
important variables like stereotypes and prejudices are treated as endogeneous and are
allowed to change, and in the experiments, subjects engage in competitive activity.
The general framework resulting from an integration of economic and
psychological research on discrimination in the labor market is shown in figure 2.1. The
figure shows many possible relationships between more 'economic' and more
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'psychological' factors influencing discrimination in the labor market against outgroups
or negatively stereotyped groups. The framework sketched here is very unspecific and
just intends to show what kind of relationships can be thought of when combining
economic and social-psychological insights The following chapters will each select
some of the relationships and analyse them more specifically
The lower part of the graph shows rather 'economic' mechanisms, while the
upper part shows rather 'psychological' mechanisms Altogether, the graph shows how
'economic' and 'psychological' mechanisms could interact. A more 'economic'
mechanism is the effect an increase in competition has on discrimination via enhancing
the marginal utility of profits and risk aversion Assuming that there are no real
differences between the two groups in question, competition should then reduce
discriminatory behavior, as it makes it more costly in terms of (monetary) utility.
However, an increase in competition can also enhance 'objective' (see Rothschild, 1981)
and 'subjective' uncertainty, since it raises the risk of going bancrupt This can cither
lead to more information search about possible applicants or to identification with a
salient ingroup - which has different effects on discrimination Psychologically seen, an
increase in the activity of competition can also directly enhance identification with the
ingroup (see, e.g., Sherif et al. 1961) - with the same effects on discrimination stronger
use of stereotypes and prejudice and thereby enhancement of discrimination. However, in
real-life settings different stereotypes about the same group can become salient at
different times or even at the same time. Feedback effects from discriminatory outcomes
on the discriminated group can further complicate the picture.
The following chapters are going to analyse some aspects of this framework: The
theoretical model developed in chapter 3, which incorporates a large part of the
framework, aims at being a first step towards a formal analysis of discrimination in the
labor market using psychological concepts as endogenous variables. Economics provides
the formalized framework, which allows for a more rigorous analysis than standard
social psychology is used to. Therefore, the modeling exercise not only contributes to
economic theorizing on discrimination, but also to social-psychological research in that it
integrates social-psychological concepts in one well-defined formalized model.
The experiments described in chapter 4 focus on competition's effect on
discriminatory behavior, without explicitly testing for the link via stereotypes and
prejudice. The first two experiments also neglect financial costs, and hence the effect of
increases in the marginal utility of profits. The third and fourth experiments include a2 The integrated framework
financial cost for making a decision, but only as a measure for the importance of e
preference They also do not analyse the 'economic effect of competition' as describe«
the theoretical model
The business game (chapter 5) again abstracts from financial costs and margil
utility of profits and takes expected productivity differences as the important econort'
factor, while focusing more on the influence of different stereotypes and prejudicesn
discriminatory behavior.
Chapter 6 finally tests in how far efficiency-wage effects can play a role inn
explanation of gender wage differences in the labor market, and in how far psychologil
mechanisms apply also in very competitive (double-auction) settings.
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3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, economic and social-psychological literature on
discrimination was reviewed. As was mentioned there, a striking difference between
economic and social psychological approaches in general is that economic approaches
usually treat variables like the extents to which stereotypes and prejudices lead to
discriminatory behavior as given. Social-psychological models, on the other hand,
distinguish between many different situations in which stereotypes and prejudices
influence behavior to varying extents The model developed here integrates this idea of
social-psychological research into a microeconomic utility-analysis, endogenizing use of
stereotypes and prejudice These factors are used in social-psychological research for
years to explain discriminatory behavior, but the insights gained from this research have
so far been neglected by mainstream economic thinking to a high extent. On the other
hand, standard economic theory offers a theoretical framework that is rigorous and well
developed to analyze economic settings. As such, it is a good starting point for a more
comprehensive analysis of discriminatory behavior in the labor market. Therefore, a
formal utility model is developed, which explains the extent to which behavior in certain
situations is guided by group perceptions, i.e. stereotypes and prejudice, within a
microeconomic framework. Social identification is used as the mediating factor, which
influences whether prejudice and stereotypes translate into behavior. Social
identification, in turn, is influenced by situational factors, i.e., in this context, mainly the
competitive situation of the firm in question. It is suggested that a strengthening of
market competition may reinforce the use of stereotypes and prejudices, and that this, in
its turn, may lead to more discrimination in the labor market. Indications from the 'real
world' are that, e.g., in a country like Russia the old stereotype that men should have a
job and women should stay at home has revived (Hunt, 1997), and at the same time labor
market discrimination against women has increased.
An important purpose of the integration of social-psychological and economic
theories is to construct a testable model. Our model is formulated such that it allows for
* This chapter is based on a working paper, written together with Maarten Vendrik: "Psychological vs.
economic effects of competition on discrimination: An integrated model".
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empirical testing with experiments and in Held settings. First experiments have produced
encouraging results, which will be reported in chapter 4.
In the present chapter the social-psychological insights from chapter 2 are used to
develop a model that tries to explain how an increase in competition can induce
employers to rely more on Stereotypie perceptions and prejudices in their hiring, pay and
promotion decisions. The starting point or the model is the observation in social
psychology thai using Stereotypie perceptions (lor example, in personnel decisions) has
certain benefits as well as costs (e.g., Fiske, 1998). The focus here is on the way in which
an employer forms his perception of the relative productivities of a number of candidates
for a position. He (or she) may base this perception on Stereotypie information on the
average productivity of groups candidates belong to (men/women, white/black,
German/Dutch, etc.). However, he may also use individualized inlbnnulion from job
interviews, hiring tests, etc. The extent to which he uses Stereotypie perceptions versus
individualized information in the formation of this perception then becomes an
endogenous choice variable (5). In choosing 5 the employer is likely to maximize his
expected utility of 5, which reflects its benefits and costs.
One important psychological benefit of using stereotypes is the following: In a
situation of high uncertainty about things which arc important for the employer, like
profits, (leading to self-relevant uncertainty in the terminology of Social Identity Theory
(e.g., Mullin & Hogg, 1998, see also sections 2.S and 2.6.2), he is inclined to identify
himself with a salient group he belongs to (his ingroup, e.g., men). In combination with
using Stereotypie perceptions this identification has the joint benefit of reducing feelings
of uncertainty (i.e., the 'emotional' part of the self-relevant uncertainty, as opposed to the
cognitive perception). Thus, using stereotypes and ingroup identification can be said to
compensate for a lack of perceived self-relevant certainly in arousing feelings of
(seeming) certainty. Hence, the model assumes that use of stereotypes and ingroup
identification are substitutes for perceived self-relevant certainly in producing the basic
commodity 'feeling certain' (Stigler & Becker, 1977). Moreover, use of stereotypes and
ingroup identification are assumed to be complements in producing this basic
commodity.
A related psychological benefit of using stereotypes is that it may serve as a
means to justify discriminatory behavior, and in particular to rationalize discriminatory
tastes (see also Arrow, 1973). Whereas Stereotypie perceptions arc cognitive, prejudice
represents a negative emotional evaluation, which may give rise to a discriminatory taste
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(Becker, 1957; Schaller et al., 1998). The extent to which prejudice is used in the
formation of the discriminatory taste increases with ingroup identification. Hence, we
assume that the use of prejudice is complementary' to ingroup identification as well as ise
of stereotypes in producing feelings of certainty. In their rum, as a basic commodity,
feelings of certainty are a determinant of the employer's expected utility.
Another basic commodity in the employer's expected-utility function is economic
profits. The expected utility of these profits is affected by an economic cost of making
use of stereotypes, which is the risk of mistakenly expecting an individual productivity
difference between candidates from the ingroup and the outgroup at the expense of
profits The employer balances this cost against the benefits of making use of stereotypes
and prejudice by maximizing his expected utility with respect to these variables as well
as ingroup identification (more or less consciously).
When competition increases, this affects the choice of stereotyping, using
prejudice and identification in two ways. First, it raises perceived self-relevant
uncertainty of the employer, which he will compensate by identifying more strongly with
his ingroup and by relying more on Stereotypie perceptions and prejudice in his
perceptions and preferences with respect to candidates from the ingroup and the
oulgroup This will lead to an increase in employer discrimination, which represents a
psychological effect of strengthening competition on discrimination. On the other hand,
by suppressing profits an increase in competition may also make employers more risk
averse, implying a higher utility loss from the risk of mistakenly using Stereotypie
perceptions and prejudice. This will reduce the use of stereotypes, and hence lead to a
decrease in employer discrimination. This economic effect of increasing competition on
discrimination adds to the income effect of falling profits due to prejudice (Comanor,
1973) and counteracts the psychological effect explained above.
The stereotypical perceptions used may be correct as well as wrong. Social-
psychological research suggests that even wrong stereotypical perceptions can persist,
among other things due to rationalization of prejudice and due to metacognitive bias in
the perception of bigger ingroup samples versus smaller outgroup samples (Fiedler,
1996a, see also section 2.3.1).
This implies that the psychological effect of competition may raise discrimination
even when there are no nc/wa/ differences in productivity distributions, so even when
discrimination is not rational from a profit-maximizing point of view. The counteracting
risk aversion and income effects work in the same direction as the long-run selection
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mechanism in Becker's theory of employer discrimination, according to which
employers with zero discriminatory taste drive employers with a positive discriminatory
taste out of the competitive product market. In this case, the psychological elTect of
competition may work in such a way that under competitive pressure even employers
with zero discriminatory taste develop a positive one over time This would then imply
that not all employers with positive discriminatory taste would be driven out of the
market.
Other economic theories (e.g. employee and customer discrimination, statistical
discrimination, imperfect competition, self-fulfilling prophecies, gender differences in
efficiency-wage effects, see Altonji and Blank (1999) for an overview and chapter 6 of
this thesis on efficiency-wage effects) are able to explain that discrimination cun be
persistent under strengthening competition, but they seem not able to explain that
discrimination may even increase under competitive pressure Moreover, (almost) all
economic theories seem to assume that the extent to which employers rely on Stereotypie
perceptions and prejudice does not change when competition increases Both social-
psychological research and observations in countries like Russia suggest that reliance on
stereotypes and prejudices may become stronger when competition intensifies, leading to
an increase in discrimination.
A necessary condition for this to happen is that the situation at hand is seen as an
intergroup situation, i.e., group-level categories must be salient Paradoxically, this can
be the case in hiring situations for predominantly ingroup occupations when outgroup
members apply, especially when anti-discrimination laws exist, as this directs the focus
towards groups rather than individuals. Flat hierarchies where teams are involved in
hiring decisions can strengthen this perception of the situation as a group situation
An integration of the social-psychological concepts into microeconomic
theorizing can have other implications than those described above as well, and some
special cases can lead to predictions very different from those of standard economic
models. For example, anti-discrimination laws and policies promoting outgroups as equal
or even, in some aspects, better than ingroups for a certain setting can lead to stronger
perceived identity threat for the ingroup, and hence lead to the opposite result of what
they aimed at.
The organization of the rest of the chapter is as follows In Section 3 2 the basic
assumptions are described, section 3.3 deals with the persistence of wrong stereotypes
The basic integrated model is developed in section 3.4 with respect to psychologic«!
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questions, the employer will in both cases get a larger sample of confirming answers for
the hypothesis he is testing than for the contrary, even if the contrary is true, and he will
thus conclude that the man is better than the woman (see Fiedler, Walther & Nickel,
1999b) This approach helps to understand why stereotypes can be very persistent even if
there is evidence to the contrary of the stereotype. This can happen without any
motivational distortions, with (boundedly) rational information-processing agents, who
just do not have the mcla-knowlcdge about samples from the real world and how to
interpret them with respect to making conclusions about the population.
Of course, there are other factors influencing the stereotypical perception AW
and the emotions correlated with it, e.g., socialization, the media etc. Fmotional aspects
arc probably more difficult to change, as they partially work unconsciously, and thus can
contribute to persistence of biased behavior and of stereotypes, when people try to justify
their negative feelings about a certain group.
However, even when wrong Stereotypie perceptions 4AJV tend to persist, the
oiM^tion n-mnin«! whv ip»m members rrlv on such wronß stereotypes in their hiring
decisions in the first place. Why do team members not use more reliable individual
information on candidate team members from the ingroup and outgroup, e.g. from hiring
tests, and why do they react group-based at all? These questions are addressed in the next
sections.
3.4 Basic model: psychological benefits
Consider a firm which consists of a team of n team members. These team
members receive equal profit shares in addition to a fixed base wage. Accordingly, they
take democratic decisions about hiring a new team member from the ingroup or the
outgroup.'" Their preferences with respect to these decisions are implied by a utility
function with respect to number of ingroup members / and number of outgroup members
O in the team of the form*'
" - eo. {/"f/ity > o. t/"i7JH> < ft £> o (3. i)
* We abstract here from Ihe question of the voting mechanism applied to come to a democratic decision by
assuming homogeneous preferences and values of variables among all learn members This assumption
implies thai all team members »ill lake identical decisions The assumption can be relaxed, bul is not
likely to »fleet the outcomes of the model in an essential way
" This represents a particular specification of a utility function proposed by Arrow (1973, pp. 6-7).
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under the restriction / +1> • n Here c is a discriminatory-taste parameter and /J>i
denotes each team member's expected profit share. This expected profit share is a
function of / and O since team members rely on Stereotypie perceptions of the average
productivities of the ingroup and the outgroup in their expectations This leads to an
expectation zü/P, of a difference in productivity between an individual candidate team
member from the ingroup and an individual candidate member from the oulgroup
Hence, team members expect a difference in generated profits tf equal to the output price
/> times ztV//', This implies for each team member an average disutility of hiring an
outgroup member instead of an ingroup member which is given by (7"'(n/»)/'AA//;//i,
where the average AA//; is taken over all possible pairs of candidates.
In addition, each team member expects a disutility f from hiring an outgroup
instead of an ingroup member as a consequence of a prejudice against outgroup
members. The total average disutility i>6' of hiring an outgroup instead of an ingroup
member is then given by
D(/«t/"'(n/n)/'AAf/!/n + r. (3.2)
This corresponds to the taste for discrimination as conceived by Becker (1957; 1971)
when he says that it incorporates both prejudice and ignorance about the absence of an
actual (average) productivity difference between the discriminated and non-discriminated
groups. However, since Arrow (1971) economists have reserved the term 'discriminatory
taste' for the prejudice part e of OL' in eq. (3.1).
The discrimination coefficient of the team D, or the amount of profits the team is
willing to sacrifice on average to avoid the disutility of hiring an outgroup instead of an
ingroup member, is then equal to n times Dt/ divided by {/"'(Fl /»). and so
(3.3)
How is expectation zlA//', of a difference in productivity between an individual
candidate team member from the ingroup and an individual candidate member from the
outgroup precisely formed? The team members base their expectation zlW, partly on
stereotypes since this saves on search for information on actual productivity differences,
e.g. from individual hiring tests (which is also quite often ambiguous and requires effort
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, is defined as follows. Assume that 5 is continuously variable between 0 (no use of
stereotypes) and / (full use of stereotypes). Full use of stereotypes leads to a Stereotypie
perception 4A//>, which, as explained in section 3.3, can be substantially positive even in
the absence of actual differences in average productivity. Less than füll use of
stereotypes (S «" /) means that expectation i4/W, is also based on information on actual
differences in /m//v;t/uu/ productivity for a part /-.V. The latter information may be
obtained from individual hiring tests, among other sources of individual information.
Expectation AW, will then be given by
AW, = S AW * f/ -S; AW', = 5 fAl/P - AW/»',) + AW*",, (3.4)
where AW*, denotes the productivity difference estimate from the hiring tests and other
sources of individual information " This estimate will generally differ from zero, but
assuming unbiased tests, the average estimate for a large number of candidate pairs will
tend to zero. This implies that the average AA/f; over a large number of candidate pairs
tends to 5 /LW " Hence, the stereotype part of the discrimination coefficient £> in eq
(3.3) is given by /* times the stereotype-based part SAMP of expectations /LW, Further
assuming a symmetric ex ante distribution of AW^, , it follows that the individual
estimates AWP^, will mostly be lower than the Stereotypie AWP.
Use of stereotypes is also linked up, as described in section 3.1, with
identification with a group a person belongs to. The degree of identification with an
ingroup / can be interpreted as the degree to which the specific ingroup identity is salient
as compared to the personal identity (see section 2.5.2)." Therefore, we assume that
(analogously to 5") / is continuously variable between 0 (zero weight of ingroup identity)
and / (100% weight of ingroup identity and zero weight of personal identity).
" The variable .V corresponds to the coefficient (/•>>; of average ability or in eq (3 2) of the statistical-
discrimination model with performance tests of Aigner and Cain (1977) It is determined by the perceived
relative reliability of JA//' and 4W/'',. and hence by the amount of money, time and cognitive resources
spent on collecting individualized information (eg by job interviews and hiring tests) We model this
spending, and hence .S\ here as an endogenous choice variable The hiring tests are only used for selection
in hiring, but not as performance tests on which to base individual variations in wages since the hiring tests
are supposed to be too unreliable for that purpose
" Hence, note that the average of perceptions of individual productivity differences 4W, is lower than the
Stereotypie perception of an average productivity difference .AW for X • / Thus, the Stereotypie
perception is assumed to be insensitive to learning about individual productivity differences (see section
.V3). The model allows for cases wiiere J\//', and even .AW are negative
" For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is only one ingroup with which team members identify.
This is a reasonable assumption at a certain point in lime, in a certain setting, where one certain
categorization is salient
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Identification with an ingroup reduces feelings of uncertainty and also enhances a
persons's self-esteem Moreover, identification raises the use of stereotypes in the
formation of the perception AW/', , which makes the world seem less uncertain
Conversely, a lower use of stereotypes seems only possible if the identification with the
ingroup is reduced.
We model this functionality of relying on stereotypes and identification and their
interactions as follows. The extent of using Stereotypie perceptions .S' and the degree of
identification with an ingroup / have the joint benefit of reducing feelings of uncertainty.
Thus, 5 and / can be said to compensate for a lack of sei f-relevant certainty (' in arousing
feelings of (seeming) certainty (and self-esteem) V. Hence, 5 and / are assumed to be
substitutes for C in 'producing the basic commodity' V (Stiglcr and Becker. 1977).
Hereby C is conceived as the subjective perception by the team members of the
probability that the team profits /7, and hence their profit shares /7n. will he non-
negative Furthermore, since .V and / seem to reinforce each other in arousing feelings of
certainty V, they are assumed to be complements in producing V.
J.^.i Formaf/on o/t/wer/mmatoo' ""'e £
In many real-life situations stereotypes and prejudice go together (Kinder &
Sears, 1981). Whereas Stereotypie perceptions are cognitive, prejudice represents a
negative emotional evaluation Psychological research also shows that the extent to
which stereotypical perceptions and prejudices actually lead to discriminatory behaviour
against an outgroup positively depends on the degree of identification with an ingroup
(see section 2 5 2) Contrary to the equation of prejudice to the discriminatory taste r (see
eq. (3.1)) in economic literature, we therefore make a distinction between prejudice and
discriminatory taste, i.e. the disutility of hiring an outgroup member due to prejudice.
Prejudice or negative emotional evaluation £ may be assumed to emerge as a
psychological by-product of the stereotypical perception <4A//', but it may also represent
a more general dislike as in the conception of Becker (1957; 1971) Its intensity is likely
to be positively correlated with conditioning variables like ingroup identification / and
amount and intensity of negative experiences (which are 'counted' into the value
judgement), among other variables.
Discriminatory taste f can be assumed to be related to £, and hence to / and other
conditioning variables Z, as
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, > 0. £* > 0." (3.5)
Here 7' is the extent to which prejudice is used in the formation of the discriminatory
taste f (ranging from 0 (no use) to / (full use)). We consider 7 as an endogenous choice
variable. Since it increases with /(see section 2.S.2), we assume that 7" is complementary
to / in producing feelings of certainty V.
There also seems to be an interaction of the use of prejudice 7" with the use of
stereotypes 6': A particular psychological benefit of 5 is that it may serve as a means to
justify discriminatory behavior and beliefs, in particular to rationalize discriminatory
tastes (see also Arrow, 1973). We model this by assuming that 7" is complementary to 5
as well in producing feelings of certainty V.
Use of stereotypes 5, ingroup identification /, use of prejudice 7" and perceived
self-relevant certainty (' are assumed to be simultaneous 'choice' variables. This means
each team member is supposed to maximize an expected (meta) utility £(7 with respect to
5, /, 7" and C This optimization may be more or less controlled or conscious. Especially
with respect to / and C it will be uncontrolled and unconscious, but still it seems
plausible to assume that / and C take on optimal equilibrium values (see below).
Expected utility £t7 is a function of two 'basic commodities': feelings of certainty V
and economic profit share #T/». The latter is affected by perceived economic costs of S, f
and C which will be analysed in the next sections.** The utility function £t/(H",n/n) is
assumed to be separable in Vand /7n, i.e.
£t7 - £(7(H',n/n) = (7''(4')+ £f/"(n/n), (3.6)
where C'CP) is not stochastic and has positive and diminishing marginal utilities with
respect to H*. Certainty feelings H* is given by a production function of 5, /, Tand C
V-H'(S,/.r,C), (3.7)
" A component of this discriminatory laste could be the disutility of a loss in ingroup identity of an
ingroup member when he has to work with an oulgroup member (sec Akerlof and Kranlon, 2000, p 732).
ll is plausible that this component increases when the identification with the ingroup / rises, as implied by
oq.(J.S).
* Economic profits /7are also affected by an economic benefit of using stereotypes S due to economizing
on financial resources, e.g. for individual hiring tests, but this is neglected here since it does not essentially
change the model.
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with positive and diminishing marginal products except that ¥, is zero for
/ = / • between 0 and / and negative for / > / *. Thus, we assume that il is not generally
optimal in terms of feelings of certainty (and self-esteem) to identify fully with an
ingroup at the expense of a zero weight of personal identity (/ /). It seems more
plausible to suppose that for a certain /* between 0 and / there is an optimal balance
between ingroup identity with weight /* and personal identity with weight /-/*. Iliis is
modeled by *f(S./.7\O reaching a maximum with respect to / for /-/•. Each team
member is assumed to reach such a psychological equilibrium /* at which her certainly
feelings (and self<steem) are maximal with respect to /.
Perceived self-relevant certainly C is also modelled as an endogenous 'choice'
variable since social-psychological research shows that subjective perceptions of self-
relevant certainly are not fully determined by objective conditions (like fierceness of
competition), but can be somewhat adjusted upwards by individuals in order to raise their
feelings of certainly H*. On the other hand, limits to this form of self-deception arc set by
economic considerations (see the next section). Therefore, individuals also rely on .V. /
and r as substitute means to raise their feelings of certainty M*. The complementarity of
5, / and 7" and their substitutability for C in producing ¥ are expressed by the following
(inequalities for the cross-second-order derivatives of production function (3.6):
"•"» >o. Tw >o. "*V >o. T« =0, HV=O, *,, =o. (3.8)
Here the positive signs indicate Edgeworth complementarity of the variables involved in
producing T. For example, V, > 0 means that a rise in ingroup identification / leads to a
rise in the marginal productivity Tj of using stereotypes 5 in producing certainty
feelings «P.
Substituting production function (7) into (7*(T) yields
(/*(*) = (7*(f(.s,/,r,C))=ty''(5,/,r,C), (3.9)
with positive and diminishing marginal utilities with respect to 5, /, T and C given by
l/*s-O'T^S. e*c. This implies that the cross-second-order derivatives of utility
function (3.9) are given by
t/% =(7'%4'„ +(/%*'*', V,•, etc. (3.10)
Here the first term on the right-hand side is positive by virtue of the pertinent inequality
in (3.8) and the second term is negative. We assume that the Edgeworth complementarity
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of 5, / and 7" in producing M*. as expressed by the inequalities in (3.8), is so strong as to
make the first term dominant, and hence C% etc. positive. Thus, 5. / and 7" are
Edgeworth complements in producing utility J* as well." For example, t/*'s>0
means that a rise in ingroup identification / leads to a rise in the marginal utility (/*.v of
using stereotypes, which pushes the equilibrium 5* (see the next section) to a higher
value.
On the other hand, the equalities in (3.8) imply that (/V etc. are negative as a
result of the diminishing marginal utility of V. Thus, 5. / and Tare Edgeworth substitutes
off in producing (/* For example, (/J <0 means that a fall in perceived self-relevant
certainty C leads to a rise in the marginal utility (/,* of identification, which pushes the
equilibrium /* to a higher value. This property plays a key role in the effects of
competition, which arc elaborated in section 3.6. The underlying psychological
mechanism by which the substitution is triggered is that a fall in f leads to a fall in
certainty feelings ¥, which raises the marginal utility (7% of f, i.e. fulfilment of *P
becomes more important relative to the profit-share motive /7'n for the well-being of
team members (see eq. (3.5))." By virtue of the relation (/*; ={7*'"r¥, this raises the
marginal utility t7* of identification, leading to substitution of/ for C, and hence to a
compensating rise in certainty feelings M*. We can now summarize the complementarity
and substitutability relations found above as
U.J>0. ^Sr>°. ^*>°. l/i<0,l/J<0, l/£<0. (3.11)
If each team member's expected utility £(/ were only given by the psychological
utility benefits (7*14*)in eq. (3.9), its maximization with respect to 5, /, 7" and C would
result in the maximal S=/, 7"=/ and C=/, i.e. full use of stereotypes and prejudice and
maximal perceived certainty, and /=/*, i.e. partial identification with the ingroup By
virtue of equation (3.4), the expected productivity difference 4W, would then be
" The concepts of diminishing marginal utilities and Edgeworth complementarity in producing (7*
presume thai utility is cardinal We make this assumption for at least three reasons First, we need it
anyway when we consider expected utility in the presence of risk in the next section Secondly, it allows an
easier and more intuitively appealing formahzation of the psychological processes involving X A 7. and C*
than assuming ordinal utility Thirdly, it allows us to give a cardinal meaning to expressions for the
disutility />(' in eq (.V2), and hence to consider the effects of competition on the size of/M' in section 3 6.
" This corresponds to the deprivation-domination principle in the needs theory of Maslow (1943),
according to which the most deprived need is the most important in a person's motivation
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maximal and equal to the Stereotypie JA//*. However, using stereotypes (.S'J in the
formation of JA/P, has also economic disadvantages for team members This also holds
for using prejudice (D in the formation of one's discriminatory taste c and having an
unrealisticall> optimistic perception (O of self-relevant certainty These costs are
elaborated in the next session
33 Basic model: economic costs and equilibrium outcomes
When using stereotypes, team members run the risk of mistakenly expecting •
productivity difference AW, while the actual productivity difference is much smaller (on
average zero). This would then go at (he expense of the profits of the team, and hence of
the members' profit shares ITIIS risk is likely to be higher as more use is made of
stereotypes in the formation of AV//°, since then less money, time and cognitive resources
are spent on collecting individualized information in, e.g. hiring tests. The team
members may know this more or less consciously and take it into account in the extent to
which they rely on stereotypes in their perception AW,. A measure tor the perceived
reliability of zLW, is given by the standard deviation 3 of the subjective probability
distribution /W of the productivity difference A', of which AW, is the expected value
£A", (after the perception AW, has been formed). In line with the arguments given above,
this standard deviation a can be assumed to increase with 5.
This assumption has implications for the expected utility £(7 of each team
member. This £(7 does not only depend on psychological benefits ¥< but also on each
team member's profit share /Z </» Here ; refers to the case where one of a particular pair
of candidates from the ingroup and outgroup is hired Suppose now that the expected
additional revenue PzLW, from hiring the candidate from the ingroup instead of the
outgroup is higher than or equal to the additional payment A//J (market discrimination
coefficient) for the ingroup candidate as determined in the labor market " The latter
candidate will or may then be hired, and /7, n is related to the stochastic productivity
difference between the ingroup and outgroup candidates -V, as /?/» - f/7+ /%
" Additional revenue f dW/>, can be higher than MO due to a poanve 4W', from individual information
or when productivity differences between the particular pur of candidates are perceived differently by
different teams (cf the assumption of heterogeneous discriminatory tastet in the employer-dmcnminafion
model of Becker. I9S7. 1971) An analogous analysis with the same conclusions can be given for the case
where /' <ttf/', is lower than or equal lo Af/; and the outgroup candidate it hired
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Mere /7is team profits in the absence of differences in productivity and payment between
the ingroup and outgroup candidates To derive a tractable expression for £(7 "^77, />i/ we
approximate (/ 'V/?//i> by its second-order Taylor expansion with respect to A", around its
expected value zlW, (as usual in risk analysis). This Taylor expansion is given by
(312)
Applying the chain rule to the first and second-order derivatives and using
£*, - AW, and £/(*, - zlM/»,// - o^. we obtain
£(/ "(77 /»^ - y "ff/Z /»; • '/»1/" ?£/7 /«; P* aV. (3.13)
Since t/"fE/35/«> is negative for the assumedly risk-averse team members, the
last term in this equation represents the expected utility loss due to the perceived risk that
the actual productivity difference between the ingroup and outgroup candidates will rum
out to be lower than expected on the basis of stereotyping and individual-specific
information. This loss is higher as the standard deviation a of the subjective probability
distribution of the productivity differences between the ingroup and outgroup candidates
is greater. Hence, since it is plausible to assume that more use of stereotypes (a higher 5)
leads to a greater expected a , the utility loss will be greater as 5 is higher.
Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that a is linear in 5:
o; = <x" + tr'S, o°>0. <r'>0. (3.14)
Moreover, we can approximate (/"(f/Z/ty = t/"/(/7+/»4MP/-MD;//i/ by
1/ "(/W and (/ "7£/7A) by (7 ""(W/i).*" Substituting these approximations and eq.
(3.14) into eq. (3.13), it then follows that the utility loss ineq. (3.13) is quadratic in 5.
3.5.2
Using prejudice (7") in the formation of one's discriminatory taste e is not costless
since team members have to pay a money price to indulge their discriminatory taste. This
price is given by the market discrimination coefficient A/D and will be paid if and only if
it is advantageous to hire an ingroup member, i.e. if and only if the team's discrimination
coefficient as given by eq. (3.3) with JA/P, instead of AA/f; is greater than or equal to
* These approximations and assumption (3 13) are not essential for the main implications of the model
The approximation of ('"(/://, nj by (' "f/Zn; eliminates a perverse incentive to use more stereotypes
from the model This incentive results from the fact that a higher .V mostly leads to a higher expected iW('„
and hence to a higher expected profit share (/7- /'JAW, MM n However, this represents a form of self-
deception which is likely to be corrected to a certain extent when team members are aware of it.
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A/0 Substituting eq. (3.3) into eq. (3.3) it then follows thai the cost W£) is incurred on
average if and only if
r2ü"'(n/nXA<D-/'SaMP)/(ii£(/.Z)). (3.15)
Thus, for T satisfying this inequality there is a utility cost of 7" given by
t/"'(n/n)iWD. We assume that team members take this utility cost into account (more or
less consciously) in 'choosing' their optimal extent 7' of using prejudice in the formation
of«.
Having an unrealistically optimistic perception (O of self-relevant certainty hH
also a cost from a higher nsk of o\ crest i mal ion of the probability that the prolit than
/Jn will be non-negative ('risk of having the wrong belief, see Camerer and Weber,
1992, p. 326). This overestimation may be due to an unrealistically high expected value
of sold output (? or of an unreal ist ical I > low subjectively perceived variance of y. I cam
members are assumed to be vaguely aware of these possible biases, leading to a higher
perceived variance of their subjective probability distribution of the expected value or
variance of y (a second-order probability distribution in the terminology of Camerer and
Weber (1992), see section 2.5) For the risk-averse team members this higher perceived
(second-order) risk leads, analogously to the economic cost of 5, to an expected loss in
utility of profits. This utility loss is not formalized here, but will be higher as perceived
self-relevant certainty C is (unrealistically) higher.
Although insights from social-psychological research suggest that a fall in C ii
compensated for by rises in /, 5 and Tin arousing certainty feelings V(see section 3.4.4),
they also suggest that there is a reinforcing feedback from the rises in /, .V and 7' towards
a higher perceived self-relevant certainty C (due to a more biased view of the world, see,
e.g., Mullin & Hogg, 1998). Such a feedback can be modeled by assuming that rising /, 5
and T suppress the awareness of team members of possible biases in their perception of
self-relevant certainty, and hence lower the expected utility loss of a higher C
3.5.3 £<7U//iftrmm ou/comf J
The team members are supposed to maximize £(7 as given by eq (3.6).
By virtue of eqs. (3.9) and (3.14) and the analysts in the previous subsection, this can be
written as a function of 5. 7, 7~and C alone:
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S,7\C)" (3.16)
Since the economic-cost part -(£[/"XS.T.C) of £t7 is discontinuous with
respect to 7" at the value of 7" given by the right-hand side of eq. (3.15), we do not have a
first-order condition with respect to r However, plotting benefits6'*(5, /,7\C) and the
utility cost of 7' as functions of 7", it is easily seen that there are two local maxima of £(7,
namely at the value of 7" in eq. (3 15) and at 7W. Which of these local maxima is the
global maximum, depends on, among other things, the level t/"'(n/n)M) of the utility
cost of T When this level is sufficiently high, the lower value of 7" is the global-
maximum point 7°* The team members then do not fully use their prejudice against
outgroup members, and hence do not hire ingroup members, because of the high
economic cost involved.
However, the equilibrium value 7°* is simultaneously determined with the
equilibrium values .V*. /• and ('• of 5, / and C via the complementarity and
subslituiahility relations (3 11) and via eq. (3.15). With respect to 5. / and C the
following first-order conditions for maximization of £(7 can be formulated:
J ",C)=0 (3.17a)
(3.17b)
C) = O (3.17C)
Condition (3.17b) leads to /=/*(see analysis under eq. (3.7)). Condition (3.17a)
can also be written as
l/.;T(S./.7\O—<£f")s(S.r,C). (3 18)
The left-hand side of this equation gives the marginal benefits A/ß for each team
member of more use of stereotypes in the selection of a new team member, whereas the
right-hand side represents the marginal cost A/C of more use of stereotypes due to higher
risk for profit shares. Diminishing marginal utility of using stereotypes (condition under
eq. (3.9)) implies that A/Ö falls as a function of S. On the other hand, AYC is obtained by
applying the chain rule to eqs. (3.13) and (3.14)", yielding
A4C . = - ^{/"jsßr.Q = . (/"*f77/ty pVr<r° +<T' S;/n*. (3.19)
" We abstract from (he dependence of (£(/") on/via eq. (3.15).
" We abstract from the dependence of (£(/") on S viaeq. (3.15).
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Since (y"7/7/n> is negative, this equation implies that Aft" is positively linear in
5. Both A/J9 and A/O as functions of S for given /, Tand (' are drawn in Fig. I. Utility is
maximized at 5*. where AW = A4T. By virtue of eq. (3.4), this implies an equilibrium
value AW,* of expectation <±W, of a difference in productivity between particular
candidates from the ingroup and the outgroup The ensuing stereotype part of the
discrimination coefficient £>* (see eq. (3.3)) is then given by /> times the stcrcoiypc-
based part S» JAfP of expectations -4A//V
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Figure 3.1: Change in the equilibrium value of the eitent of using stereotypes S due to an
increase in competition in the production market.
However, the equilibrium value 5* is simultaneously determined with, and hence
conditional on, the equilibrium values /*, 7"* and C*. The equilibrium value C* is
determined, analogously to eq. (3.18), by equality of marginal benefits and marginal
costs of perceived self-relevant certainty C. This leads to a graph similar to fig. I, but
now there is also feedback from rising 5, / and 7", which lowers the marginal cost curve,
and hence leads to a higher C (see the previous subsection).
The equilibrium values T* and /* imply, via eq. (3.5), an equilibrium value e* of
the discriminatory taste of each individual team member (assumed to be homogeneous).
This determines the prejudice part D,. of the discrimination coefTicient D* according to
eq (3 3) for r = f* Substituting eq. (3 4) for 7"=T* and / = /• into this equation, the total
discrimination coefficient D* is then given by
" 0.20)
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The empirical finding that prejudice is a better predictor of discriminatory
behaviour than stereotypes are (eg. Stangor et al, 1991; Dovidio et al. 19%) suggests
that prejudice is more difficult to suppress, and hence that /V can be large relative to
DSMMT
On the other hand, there are also indications that people try to justify or
rationalize their negative 'gut feelings' about a certain group by more stereotyping (see
sections 2.3.1 and 3.4.3). In the present context this may mean that the discriminatory
taste f* is full) or partially rationalized into a higher .^*.LU/' Whereas a prejudice A' can
contribute to the persistence of a wrong stereotypical perception AW/' (sec section 2.3.1).
the use of prejudice 7"* may raise the use S* of such a stereotypical perception rather than
enlarge the stereotypical perception itself This is modelled by the interaction of 7'and 5
in utility function (3 9) as expressed by the positive sign of its second-order
derivative(* according to inequalities (3.11) This raises the marginal utility of using
stereotypes l/J, i.e. the marginal benefits A/fl of S, implying an upward movement ol the
A/ß curve in Fig. I. This leads to a rise 4S* in the equilibrium value 5*. and hence to an
increase /IDSMW = /* 4SM/W in the discrimination coefficient OVMUT
The increase /1/J.s•.«.«• can be expected to be lower than or equal to the
discrimination coefficient D,- due to £*, i.e. .dD.v^up = aü^ with 0 • oJ/ The cases
a < / and a = / may then be said to correspond to partial and full rationalization,
respectively, of the discriminatory taste f* as an increase 4S* in the use of stereotypes.
Now it seems plausible to assume (as a first approximation) that neither partial nor full
rationalization affects the value of the total discrimination coefficient £>* in eq (3.20).
This implies that after rationalization ; ,, . . .,.;.
O* = DSMM» + r/-O* Of = PSMMP + <7-# n 7"» £ff*.Z/ / (/"f/Di/ (3 21)
Thus, in the case of full rationalization (/-a= 0J no separate contribution off* to
£>* is left, whereas the case of partial rationalization (/-a > 0) still allows some separate
contribution of f* (which may work unconsciously). ' • •<
The corresponding formula for each team member's total average disutility O(/of
hiring an outgroup instead of an ingroup member (eq. (3.2)) then becomes
(322)
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3.6 Effects of competition
What happens with the discrimination coefficient D* and the disutility £>£/• when
competition intensifies, i.e. when team members' average profit shares /7TJ fall? On the
one hand, there is a psychological effect due to higher self-relevant uncertainty (see
section 2.5.2). Sticking to the 'old' perception C of a relatively high probability that
profit shares will be non-negative then bears an increasing risk of overestimation. This
raises (he perceived marginal costs of C, and hence leads to a lower equilibrium value C*
of perceived self-relevant certainty C. By virtue of the negative signs of the second-order
derivatives (/J , l/J. and (<',7 according to inequalities (3.11), the marginal utilities of
ingroup identification /, using stereotypes .S'. and using prejudices 7 then rise. This pushes
/. S. and possibly T towards higher equilibrium values, i.e. the lower perceived self-
relevant certainty is substituted (or compensated for) by stronger ingroup identification
and use of stereotypes (and prejudice) in order to arouse sufficient feelings of certainty
T In particular, the lower perceived self-relevant certainty raises the marginal benefits
AYfl for each team member of more use of stereotypes in the selection of a new team
member (see eq. (3.18)). This implies an upward movement of the A^B curve in fig. 3.1,
and hence a new equilibrium at a higher 5*. Thus, in the formation of perception /IMP,*
more use is made of stereotypes, leading to a higher zlA//>,'
This effect is reinforced if the stronger group identification /* also enlarges the
stereotypical perception 4AYP itself. On the other hand, the rises in /, 5 and possibly r
feed back to a higher perceived self-relevant certainty C (see section 3.5.2), which
somewhat suppresses the rises in /*, S* and 7"*. Furthermore, the appendix shows that,
under plausible conditions, maximization of the team members' expected (utilities of)
profit shares implies that under increasing competition the number of team members n
may rise, and hence the expected marginal team productivity of the last team member
AYP may fall. The expected difference in average marginal team productivity between
last ingroup and out group members zLW may then fall accordingly (consider e.g. a
Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing returns to scale'"). The total effect of
increasing competition on 4V/P then is ambiguous. Finally, in the expression for the
discrimination coefficient DSMW = /* S*4M/> increasing competition implies a fall in />.
The overall effect of increasing competition on Dsvmp, and hence on the total
" With decreasing returns to scale there exists • unique profit-maximizing level of output.
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discrimination coefficient D* (see eq. (3.21)), may then still be positive, but this is
uncertain. In addition, when there is a discriminatory taste r* which is only partially
rationalized as a higher 5*. rises in n. JT* and £Y/*.ZJ due to the rise in /* raise the
discrimination coefficient D,*. and hence the total discrimination coefficient />*,
according to eq (3 21). Thus, most of the positive effects on /)* explained above are a
consequence of the stronger and higher-valued identification with the ingroup as a means
to reduce the higher perceived self-relevant uncertainly due to stronger competition.**
On the other hand, when team members' profit shares //n fall there is also an
economic effect due to changes in -l/"7fiWV/i' in expression (3.19) for the marginal
costs of stereotyping A/C Minus the second-order derivative f "7/7^ can be given an
economic interpretation by rewriting it as
-l/"7/7i> = r-(V""f/7•«/• (7"?/7 >!>; £/"f77/ty - ///In; (/"r/7/ty. (3 23)
where rf/Jty is Pratt's measure of risk aversion. It is well-known that when we
approximate the utility function (y"f/7<H> by the power function
*/Ä, Ä < /. * *0, (3 24)
. fl = 0,
r(/Zty rises as the profit shares /In fall (Nicholson. 1998, pp 225-226) This
means that team members become more risk averse as their profit shares fall, which is
intuitively plausible. In addition, the marginal utility of profit share (/"?/7-^ also rises
as /7n falls. On the other hand, these rises are counteracted by the fall in A** in expression
(3.17) for A/C when competition intensifies. The latter effect holds since the fall in A"
directly lowers the expected difference in revenues PAW,' from an ingroup versus an
outgroup member (i.e., less is at stake in money terms).
To see which of the last two effects may be more likely to dominate, we again
approximate the utility function 1/^/7/ty by the power function (3.24). This implies (7
"(77/>i; = (/7/nJ *' for all Ä < / Pratt's measure of reto/ve risk aversion is then equal
to the constant /-/? Empirical evidence is generally consistent with values of /? in the
range of-3 to -1, and it is easily shown that for Ä S'O a fall in Z' and the ensuing fall in /7
together lead to a net rise in
** In addition, the me of «Icreotypei 5*. and hence /)*. may nie with increaang competition unce the
disutility of Financial costs c of individual hiring lesu. which n given by f/"7/7 n; c, run3 An Integrated model
-{/ "*J77 /n^V in expression (3.19) for A/C (see appendix for a derivation). This
implies that if team members are not much less risk averse than generally measured, the
marginal cost of stereotyping MC rises as competition increases. This results in an
upward movement of the A/C line in fig. 3 1, and hence a new equilibrium at a lower 5*.
This would lead to a lower perception AW,* as well as a lower discrimination
coefficient D.v^o> = /* SMA/P provided /IMP does not rise too much (see above). In
addition, when there is a discriminatory taste f* which is only partially rationalized as a
higher .V*. (he rise in r'"'f/7 >i> suppresses the discrimination coefficient D^>, and hence
the total discrimination coefficient D*, by virtue of eq. (3.21). This represents an income
effect of falling profits (Comanor, 1973), according to which falling profits make it
relatively more expensive to indulge one's discriminatory taste, and hence suppress the
amount of money one is willing to spend on it. The rise in (/"'(Fl/n) may also suppress
D^> in an indirect way by pushing the use of prejudice 7"* from full to partial (as given by
the right-hand side of eq. (3.15)) due to a rise in the utility cost l/"'(n/n)A/D of T
The signs of the net changes in 5* and D* due to the combination of
psychological and economic effects then are ambiguous, and should be measured in
experiments or empirical research. On the other hand, the net changes in each team
member's total average disutility DL' of hiring an outgroup instead of an ingroup
member (eq. (3.22)) seem somewhat less ambiguous since they differ from the team's
discrimination coefficient D* by a factor t/"^/7/n/'n, and especially the rise in (/"f/7
/W may tend to render the net changes in D(/ positive. The factor t/"f/7/n> in eq. (3.22)
can be interpreted as the subjective importance of perceived differences in profit shares
in the hiring preferences of each team member. When competition intensifies, this
importance rises and thus more than compensates the suppressing effect of a falling
output price P on DU under the assumptions made above.
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3.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter an integrated model of discrimination in the labor miket was
developed. The model aims at explaining the persistence and possible strengttning of
discrimination in the labor market in spite or even because of competitive Tcssure,
making use of psychological concepts. Using the assumption of firms being strutured in
teams, it looks at employer as well as employee discrimination. Furthermore, w wanted
to create an empirically testable model, and a model on the basis of which well-iformed
policy recommendations can be made. In this last section we discuss in ho\ far the
model proposed reaches these aims.
Endogenizing the use of stereotypes, prejudice and identification, the mdel can
explain how in certain situations discrimination can persist or even get stronpr when
competition strengthenes. However, it also leaves some important aspects opcn(>n one
hand, it shows that in cases where the psychological effect is stronger, discriminnon can
persist or get stronger when competition gets stronger. On the other hand, i is also
possible that the economic effect k strnBer,r..nn^..tbfr\,&srÄimionOn~wiii'\ior persist.
This shows, that the predictions of the model are still ambiguous, and it is not yet clear
under what conditions which effect will be stronger.
A second open question pertains to what happens when, e.g., the stereotype of the
outgroup in some aspects, which are relevant for the work situation, is positive, and these
aspects are made salient. For example, a strong case could be made - as it currently is -
for the importance of interpersonal skills for the success of a firm, and these skills are
stereotypically stronger in women. Would in that case a more Stereotypie perception of
the outgroup lead to more hiring of women? Or do men see this as a threat, which leads
to stronger identification and stronger use of prejudice against women? Or will men
make other aspects of the female stereotype salient, which point again to a negative
evaluation of women?
More from a psychological point of view, the question remains how the interplay
between the cognitive and emotional factors works, and what happens, when they are
conflicting, e.g., when there is prejudice against a group, but cognitive evaluations of this
group are clearly favorable
Rigorous empirical testing, in experiments as well as in field studies can probably
give answers to the first two questions. Basically, the model allows for this kind of
testing. However, a problem of the model for experimental testing is that in some aspects
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it might be over-determined - cognitive and emotional factors can lead to discriminatory
outcomes, when there is enough identification - and they all can lead to discriminatory
outcomes on their own, following psychological theory Moreover, the situation in the
real world is over-determined as well, in the sense that with 'real-life-categories' many
more facets of the stereotypes and the history of group relations arc linked, which make
the situation much more complex. In future research, it could be fruitful to extend the
model such as to include specific contents of stereotypes.
The theoretical model shows the possibility of an interaction of economic and
psychological effects of strengthening competition The results of the experiments
described in the next chapters can help to answer the question when one or the other of
the partial effects gets stronger.
Appendix: Derivations of effects of competition
Once team members have 'chosen' their optimal extents of using stereotypes 5,
identification /. and using prejudice 7', their choice of the optimal number of team
members n is determined by maximization of their expected utility of profit share.
Suppose first that all team members belong to the ingroup. In thai case their
discriminatory tastes do not play a role, implying that the team members maximize their
expected profit share. The number of team members /> then is the highest integer that is
lower than the real number fl such that, in continuous approximation, /" A//' = W » /Wl,
where both the marginal team productivity A/P and profits /7 are functions of /I and
where W is the equilibrium base wage for ingroup members. 1'his means that the
additional revenues from the last team member have to cover his base wage as well as the
prevailing profit share. Profits /7are equal to P £) - (f Ä - AT, where ß is output quantity
and AT is non-wage costs. The above condition for profit-share maximization can then be
rewritten as A/P = (?/fl - AT/^P»/ Hence, » is determined by the intersection of a
downward-sloping A/P curve (decreasing returns to scale) and a curve representing the
right-hand side of this equation. Moreover, when competition becomes stronger, C./J., and
hence the output price /> falls, the latter curve moves downward. This implies a higher A
as well as a lower A//>. However, when the non-wage costs AT are sufficiently low and/or
the marginal team productivity A/P falls sufficiently steeply for increasing /I. the integer
number of team members n will not change within a certain range of variation in
competition There will then be no downward effect on A/P, and hence on AW Under
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plausible conditions, these results can also be shown to hold when some or more
team members are outgroup members.
Another result mentioned in section 3.6 is that for power functions (18) wi
0 a fall in /> and the ensuing fall in /7 together lead to a net rise in -(7
This follows from
when /> falls since /»//7 = />/(/> ß - »Cn - AT> = //fC- fW» + *"y/V then rises.4 Experimental test of the model
4 Experimental test of the model""
4.1 Introduction
The current chapter describes a series or experiments conducted to test whether
the psychological predictions of the integrated model (chapter 3) find any support in an
economic setting, and how economic and psychological mechanisms interact under
certain conditions To our knowledge this is the first attempt to directly analyze
discrimination in the labor market in a laboratory experiment.
Such an experimental test laces several difficulties. First, the part of the model to
be tested has to be translated into an experimental design and the important variables
have to be operationali/ed validly A complex theoretical model cannot be translated
one-to-one into an experiment. It is always necessary to make certain simplifications
when designing an experiment The challenge is to do it such that the design captures the
important aspects of the model, but docs not become too complex to implement. I lie
same holds for the operationalization of variables. The choice of a certain
operationalization has to be made such that it is possible to measure or manipulate
variables in a simple way, and at the same time as close as possible to the concepts of the
model to be tested. In this chapter, different ways of doing tins have been explored in
several experiments.
First, two smaller paper-pencil studies were done to test the psychological
mechanism in a competitive team setting (teams representing firms), without introducing
a monetary cost for discriminatory behavior. Two teams competed against each other,
and competition was varied in strength using different rules to determine the outcome for
each team The structure of the game was a social-dilemma game inside of teams, with a
cooperative and an explicit non-cooperative option, i.e., a public and a private account.
The two paper-pencil studies mainly differed in the operationali/.ation of several
variables (see below)
After establishing in the first two experiments that the degree of competition does
in fact influence preferences, the two consecutive computerized experiments were
conducted to test this effect more thoroughly and to see whether 'discriminatory'
"This chapter is based on a paper jointly authored with M Vcndnk and P de Gijiel (2002) The power of
competition Reducing or reinforcing discrimination''" preliminary version published in "Stability and
Dynamics of Power" Conference proceedings of IAREP/SABE. 346 - 3524 Experimental test of the model
behavior is still found when there is a direct monetary cost connected to it. The structure
of the game again was a social-dilemma game inside of teams, but without an explicit
non-cooperative option. Team outcome represented the production of a product sold on a
market, which was either very competitive, represented by low output prices, or not that
competitive, represented by higher output prices**
The monetary cost implemented here was established to test, whether subjects
really believe so strongly in the stereotypes they have about the categories that they are
willing to pay for them, l-'urther, we wanted to see whether this is influenced by the
psychological factors assumed. Willingness to pay would imply that subjects perceive the
productivity differences between the categories to be so strong that the payment is
compensated by the expected gains from having a more productive new team member.
The suppressing economic effects of competition on this payment, as found in the
theoretical model, could, as no search for individual information was possible in the
experiment, only work via prejudice, but we do not assume that the artificial categories
used here (see below) will evoke high amounts of prejudice.
In all four experiments subjects were categorized artificially. Artificial categories
were used to avoid uncontrolled effects of existing stereotypes, such as a stereotype
becoming salient which is not relevant here, but which influences behavior, e.g., the
belief that economics students are greedy. Further, the use of artificial categories helps to
reduce social-desirability concerns. All four experiments used a real-effort task, and the
dependent variable (discrimination) was measured by asking participants whether they
preferred a person of their own or the other category as a new member for their team, or
were indifferent. In the computerized experiments participants were also asked whether
and how much they were willing to pay for getting the preferred new member with a
higher probability than 50:50, which was the default the computer 'offered'.
The design of the experiments borrows from economic and psychological
experimental methodology. This leads to some difficulties, as economic and
psychological principles of experimentation differ in certain respects (see, e.g., Hertwig
& Ortmann, 2001, and section 2.8.2 of this thesis). Economic experiments usually test
questions about the extent to which economic actors behave 'rational' in certain (market)
situations, how they decide about allocations, whether revealed preferences have certain
desirable logical characteristics, etc. In all those cases it is feasible to pay subjects
* More detailed explanations of specific operational izations are given in the resp sections.
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depending on their performance, and there is generally no need for deception of the
subjects. Furthermore, the concepts measured, e.g., effort, or revealed (or stated)
preferences, are often relatively straightforward to operationali/e In psychological
experimentation, often situations are studied were performance-based payment is not
feasible, because there is no clear performance criterion In some cases deception of the
subjects about certain aspects of the experiment or the real purpose of the experiment is
necessary, because otherwise measurement of the variables of interest is not or Imrdly
possible. Finally, the operationah/alion of many complex psychological variables like
"subjective self-relevant uncertainty" is not so straightforward.
In the two computerized experiments it was possible to pay subjects performance-
based, though not for the most important decision for this study, the 'hiring' decision, but
for general performance. It was, however, not possible to completely avoid deception: To
avoid getting only social-desirable answers, and to link the experiments with the existing
research on social-identity theory, artificial categories were used This, however,
constitutes deception about relevance of these categories, and in the first two experiments
also about the way the categorization is done in general. Deception was restricted to the
minimum necessary and subjects were debriefed carefully at the end of the experiment
This chapter first describes how the experiments are linked with the thcorcticul
model, how the hypotheses are derived, and what basic experimental design follows from
this. Then, the specific designs and the results of all four studies are described in detail.
The chapter concludes with a general discussion of the results of the experiments
4.2 General design, link with the theoretical model, and hypotheses
4.2. /
All experiments described here are rather exploratory in character. This means,
they are not designed to test the integrated model conclusively, but rather to explore how
questions derived from the general framework and the integrated model can be tested in
experiments
The four experiments reported here are supposed to look at the psychological
mechanisms of identification in a competitive setting, and to analyze how competition
influences the strength of the effects of these psychological mechanisms As these
experiments are just a first step in testing the model, the 'economic effect' is not yet
included into the design. The general functioning of the psychological mechanisms for
different strengths of competition is tested in different ways. The focus is on variable*.
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which play an important role in the integrated model: Strength of competition, ingrour
res. oulgroup status of the new member, stereotypical perceptions about the two groups
(except the first paper-pencil study), strength of identification with one's group and
feelings of uncertainty. The prejudice aspect of discrimination is not measured in these
experiments, as it is not very probable that prejudice plays an important role with
artificial categories.
Discrimination is operational!zed as any preference for a new member based on
belonging to a category in a situation where no real productivity differences between
categories exist. Usually, such a preference is expected to be ingroup bias, but this is not
necessarily so, as the general framework shows (see figure 2.1): If only stereotypes play
a role, and the ingroup is supposed to perform worse than the outgroup, outgroup bias is
possible. This operationalization represents the construct of discrimination as described
in the introduction (section II) relatively well, as categories do not provide relevant
information in the experiment, and therefore, having a preference for the ingroup (or the
outgroup) is discrimination in the sense that 'equals' with respect to the existing
knowledge about productivity are treated unequally'". The fact that participants do not
have any individual information about the possible new members and also cannot acquire
it is a deviation from the situation the theoretical model describes in chapter 3 and is -
along with the fact that prejudice is not assumed Jo pity' J rate - .Vivr seconrf reason why
no economic effect of competition in the sense of the theoretical model can work here.
However, this was the easiest way to guarantee that subjects have the .same average
information about members of both groups'". Giving information about individual
members of the two groups could lead to evaluative differences between the categories,
which of course would distort the mechanisms assumed'*''. At no point an explicit and
clear link between performance and category membership is drawn, such that subjects
could not even know what kind of productivity-related information might be inferred
from the categories.
" Of course there might be individual differences between the subjects with respect to productivity, but
these differences cannot systematically be related to category membership, and they are not known
" This is necessary to be able to test for discriminatory preferences by testing whether some participants
prefer one to the other category as a new member If all subjects have the same information on both
categories, differences in preferences for one or the other category can only result from differences in
discriminatory preferences, and not from differences in information about members of the two groups
" This could happen in an experiment with artificial categories and no a priori evaluative differences
between the categories, because subjects would start to develop a picture of the categories in the
experiment based on the individual information they get. This is not relevant for real-life situations, at least
in the short run, as described in section 2.3.1. . : ,
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Competition as the main independent variable was opcrationoliicd dilTcrently in
the paper-pencil and the computerized experiments In the paper-pencil studies, teams
actively competed against each other This comes close to the 'process' definition of
competition as described in chapter 2. To vary the strength of competition between
treatments, in one treatment only the 'winning' team got any points ("winner takes all",
WTA). This represents strong competition, as the 'looser' does not get anything and
therefore it is very' important for each team to become the 'winner'. In the other
treatment, both teams got points corresponding to their relative performance
("proportional representation", PR). In that case it is less important to win or to do better
than the other team, and therefore, this treatment is assumed to represent weaker
competition. Pretests were done where subjects got descriptions of both treatments and
were asked to rate in which treatment competition is stronger. Participants in fact did
perceive differences in strength of competition as intended
In the computerized experiments, competition was opcrationoli/cd more in the
tense of the definition used in the integrated model, as either high or low output prices.
High output prices can be a result of weaker competition, while low output prices can
result from strong competition (on (he supply side) Teams still had lo play the game at
good as possible to get as many points (money) as possible, so that competition still wai
an activity, even if there was no specific other team against which they were competing.
Still, in a situation of high output-prices it is not so necessary for the team to do well and
to 'produce' as much as possible, because already for low output a relatively high
amount of money is earned. On the other hand, when output prices arc low, a lot of
output is necessary to make some decent earnings. In fact, the two opcralionalizations of
competition were not that different, because the situation of subjects in WTA and PR
implied expectations of lower or higher earnings (in experimental points), just like lower
or higher output prices did (translated into lower or higher chances of getting a cinema
voucher in the first experiments). As in WTA the variance of points which could be won
also was much higher than in PR, in the paper-pencil studies stronger competition also
implied higher risk, which probably has an even stronger effect on self-relevant
uncertainty than low output prices do.
Uncertainty in all experiments existed in the sense of'risk of getting no (or low)
rewards' in experiments 3 and 4 resp making a lower chance to win the cinema voucher
in experiments I and 2. The operalionalization of the other variables measured is
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described for each experiment separately below, because the variables used and their
operational nations differ slightly between the experiments.
While the paper-pencil studies were designed to investigate the general existence
of a psychological effect of competition on discriminatory preferences in the absence of a
monetary cost, the computerized experiments more closely tried to test some of the
predictions of the (psychological part of the) theoretical model from chapter 3, especially
testing also for discriminatory behavior"'. They did so by allowing for the psychological
mechanisms to work while modeling different degrees of competition by different levels
of output prices. In addition, it was made costly to implement discriminatory preferences,
such that it could be seen whether the stereotypical perceptions developed were seen as
so trustworthy that getting the 'better' new member would compensate for the cost
subjects incurred. Note again that this does not imply the 'economic effect' of
competition with respect to stereotyping, according to the theoretical model, as this effect
can only work when it is possible to search for individual information about candidates
(see chapter 3 and below in this chapter).
4.2.2 /.M tvi//r //><•
In order to avoid effects of socia/ly desirable answers, each team's discrimination
coefficient D* was not measured directly in the computerized experiments. The
discrimination coefficient D* is now given by output price /> times the stereotype-based
part S*AW of the perceptions AW,* of productivity differences between particular
pairs of candidates from the ingroup and the outgroup. The use of artificial categories
made an emergence of strong emotional prejudices less probable, which allowed us to
neglect the second component in expression (3.20) in chapter 3 for the discrimination
coefficient D*.
Since there is no individualized information on actual productivity differences in
the experiments, non-zero perceptions AW,* can only be based on a Stereotypie
perception AW of differences in average productivity between ingroup and outgroup.
However, since the categories are artificial and do not provide relevant information on
productivity differences in the experiments, subjects may not fully rely on their
Stereotypie perceptions and hence give a weight smaller than one to these perceptions in
the formation of their AW/",*. Such a weight can be considered as a proxy of S* in the
" This is done because experimental psychologists often doubt whether there is a direct link between stated
'attitudes' and behavior (see, e g , Eagly & Chaiken, 1998)
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theoretical model. Thus, in the experiments perceptions 4A/P,* arc assumed to be given
by SMAfT», i.e. by eq (3 4) in Chapter 3 with AWP*, - 0.
When the intensity of competition varies both 5* and J.W may change, but in
the experiments we could only determine the direction of the total change in .dW/',* -
SMAf/" This direction was inferred from differences in the amount of money that
subjects said they were willing to pay as a team for getting a preferred new member with
a higher probability than the initial 50:50. Since we wanted to measure the direction of
change in S*AW = Ü* /* rather than that in D* itself, the amounts of money /) that
subjects were willing to pay for getting a preferred new member with a higher chance
had to be expressed as fractions or percentages of the output price /*.
The relation between the experimental £>//> and the theoretical £>*/ /> can be
derived as follows Assume that the subjects choose Ö/P approximately in such a way
that it maximizes the expected profit gain of their team from getting a preferred new
member or not, £IAÄ- D|- £A/f- D." Here A/? is the perceived additional revenue from
getting a preferred new member or not over the three rounds that are played with (he new
member, i.e. AX - 3PAMP, » 3PS * AMP when a team member from the preferred category
is assigned to the team, and AA = 0when a team member from the other category is
assigned. Thus, A/? is stochastic. The probability /? of getting a new member from the
preferred category depends on D/P as
p-0.5 + £D/P for D/PSD_/P«l/(2£), (4.1)
/J = I for D/P£D_//»«IA(2£),
where /? is a positive parameter.
Hence,
EAÄ - D - j>3PS • AMP + (1 - p)0 - D - 3(0 5 + 00/ />)/>S • AMP - £» -
(3/fc • AMP - I)D +1 5PS • AMP
" Stnctly speaking, subjects should maximize £l(l/5)AÄ-(l/4)D) ancc revenues we shared amono the
five members of the extended team including the new member, whereas the payment /3 it shared among
the four old member» However, we assume that subjects do not lake thii minor complication into account
in their choice of /)
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for £>//>£l/(2£), and £AÄ-D-3/>S• AAff-D for D/PSl/(2£). The latter
function is decreasing in 5, while function (4.2) is linearly increasing or decreasing in
D, dependent on the sign of the expression in front of D. Thus, we have three cases:
(i) 3£S*AA//> < / or S*AAY/> <
(ii) J^S'AJW = / or S»AAY/> =
(iii) J£S*AM> > / or S*AA/A> >
In case (i) function (4.2) is linearly decreasing in D, implying that £AA-£> is
maximal for D//>=0, so perception AW,* = SMMP is not large enough to make it
advantageous lo pay an amount of money to raise the chance of getting a new team
member from the preferred category. In case (iii) function (4.2) is linearly increasing in
0, implying that £AÄ-D is maximal for D//>»D^, //>»l/(2^), so perception JA/P,*
- S'AWP is large enough to make it advantageous to pay the amount of money necessary
to raise the chance of getting a new team member from the preferred category to one. In
the intermediate case (ii) function (4.2) is constant with respect to D, implying that
£AÄ-ß is maximal for all values of D/P between 0 and ///•?/?) Plotting the optimal
/)//" as a function of 5• AM" = £>//", we then get the stepwise graph in figure 4. J.
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D/P
Figure 4.1: Tbt optimal D/ /> as a function of s«
However, we can safely state that the subjects in the experiment chose their
not on the basis of such a precise calculation, but in a much more intuitive way. ()n the
other hand, we may assume that their intuition led to choices of D/P which form a
smooth approximation of the stepwise graph in fig. 4.1. Such an approximation ii
indicated by the bold smooth sigmoid curve in fig 4 I A curve of this shape implies that
the experimental D//> is a monotonously increasing function of the theoretical D/P for
not too low and not too high values of D/P Conversely, this means that a higher value
of D/P found in the experiments implies a higher value of the underlying
D*//' = 5*AAtf'. Thus, under the assumptions made above, a significant direction of
change in D/P found in the experiments gives an unambiguous indication of the4 Experimental test of the model
direction of change in the perceptions AW,* = S*AV/P. However, since we could not
determine the j/re of change in AW,* = S*AW, we could not combine this with the
information on the imposed variation in the output price P to find the direction of change
in the discrimination coefficient D* = PS • AMP.
Another implication of the sigmoid shape of the curve in fig. 4.1 is that the
variation in D/P as a function of D/P is the strongest for values of D/P around
//fi$. Therefore, in order to make the probability of significant differences in D/ P, and
hence in D/P, under different strengths of competition as high a possible, we chose the
value of/Jin such a way that ///i/J) is roughly equal to an a prior/ guess of the order of
magnitude of the average value of D*/P = S*AM> under the different strengths of
competition. In the context of the experiments our guess of this order of magnitude was
0.5 (point), implying a value of /?of 1/1.5 = 2/3. The maximal valueD^, /P = l/(2^)in
fig. 4.1, for which p«l (see eq. (4.1)), is then equal to 1/(4/3) = 0.75. Thus, by paying
15% of the output price (D/P-0.15 in eq. (4.1)) the probability p of getting a new team
member from the preferred category was raised by (2/3)15-10%. This is indicated in
table 4.1 below.
Payment in % of output-price












Table 4.1: Relationship between payment and probability of getting the preferred new
member
The strength of preference subjects indicate in the experiments before indicating
their willingness to pay represents the disutility D(7* of hiring an outgroup member, as
given by eq. 3.22 of the theoretical model. The higher the preference subjects indicate,
the higher they perceive their disutility DL" of hiring a new member of the non-preferred
category instead of a new member of the preferred category. Dl/* depends on two factors
which are assumed to be influenced by competition: (i) The expected productivity
difference S*AW and (ii) the subjective importance of S*AW in their preferences,
f/"'(n/n)P = (/"'(n/(Pn)), i.e., the marginal utility of real profit share (see section
3.4.1). Competition is assumed to influence both in the same direction - the use S* of the
Stereotypie percetion AV/P goes up due to the psychological mechanisms assumed, while
an 'economic' mechanism leads to higher marginal utility of the real profit share (or the
share in points), i.e., to a higher t/"'(n/(Pn)).
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Not all hypotheses listed in the following are tested in all four experiments. The
first two experiments deal with 'stated' preferences, i.e.. subjects have to indicate a
preference for a certain new member, but they don't have to 'act' accordingly later, while
in the computerized experiments, a distinction is made between stated and revealed
preferences Subjects first have to indicate a preference, and in a second step, (hey have
to 'take action' in that they have to pay for enactment of this preference This distinction
is made because experimental psychologists often doubt whether there is a direct link
between stated attitudes'' and behavior (see, e.g. Hagly & Chaikcn. 1948) Having to
pay for the enactment of a preference is 'stronger' than just having to slate a preference
The first hypotheses deal with the psychological 'background' factors, their
interrelationships, and how they are influenced by competition. The last two hypotheses
then deal with the relationship between competition and discriminatory preferences and
behavior, abstracting from these 'background' factors
HI) Subjective self-relevant uncertainty gets stronger when (perceived) competition gels
stronger (re/a//oruA;/> a;).
H2) Identification gets stronger when uncertainty gets stronger (c p.) (re/u/<o/j.v/H/j W)
HI and H2 together imply that identification gets stronger when (perceived)
competition gets stronger.
Krom SIT it is known that identification leads to more use of stereotypical
perceptions towards the outgroup and often a general ingroup bias (i.e., a general
preference for the ingroup as opposed to the outgroup, including more positive
perceptions, emotions, and sometimes preferential behavior). Because of artificial
categories we do not expect a (strong) influence of prejudice here. Therefore, it follows:
H3) Under strong as compared to weak competition, a new member from the ingroup is
preferred (more strongly) over a new member from the outgroup. fre/a/fo/u/ryv c^ and «^
H4) Under strong as compared to weak competition, more payments are made for
members of the ingroup (re/ai;ofti/i;/w c| <#, ej aru/a/1/eca/en/.s). '
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are assumed to hold because due to identification and
stereotyping the ingroup is perceived as performing better on average than the outgroup.
Now used in (he more general sense, no! jusl as an emotional evaluation
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(Self relevant) bj ^ Identification
uncertainty
Competition (Stereotypical) d) •Discriminatory
discriminatory preference payment
Marginal utility of points earned
Figure 4.2: Assumed relationships between variables - straight lines represent positive
relationships, dashed lines negative relationships.
4.3 The paper-pencil studies
As the first two experiments were rather 'preliminary studies' for the
computerized experiments, aiming just at testing whether the psychological relationships
assumed apply at all, they are reported rather shortly together.
In expenmenf /, 53 undergraduate students (20 male and 31 female, two of
unknown sex) at the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of the
University of Maastricht participated in groups of 8 respectively 10 people. Participants
in experwne« 2 were 60 (24 males, 36 females) undergraduate students from various
faculties at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. .
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The first experiments were paper-pencil studies. In uperim«>tf /. the task to
distribute subjects into categories was taken from the minimal-group paradigm (Tajfcl et
al, 1971). Subjects had to estimate the number of points on slides presented to them
shortly, and then were categorized in over- and undereslimators" I Tic real cIVort task
teams had to do consisted of a concentration test (ram clinical psychology, the "d2-test"
(Brickenkamp, 1962), which does not require specific skills apart from concentration
In expenme/M 2, the categorization task was a questionnaire on "cognitive style"
(constructed similar to the "Paragon educational consulting student learning style
inventory"). The task in the game was now skill-dependent - logical problems taken
from an intelligence test, the "CFn" (Cattell & Weiss, 1971) The fact that now both the
categorization task and the real-effort task were cognitive in character, made it possible
to link belonging to a category with performance on the task even if there did not exist
any real link, as categorization was in fact done randomly (see footnote 5.1)
In both experiments subjects got two pages of the task in each round, one for a
'private' account and one for a 'team' account. They could decide themselves whether to
contribute rather to the team account or to their private account. The structure of the
game thus was inter-team competition combined with an intra-team social-dilemma
game. This structure was mainly chosen because in real-effort tasks subjects always can
choose not to exhibit much effort for the team, whether there is an 'explicit' non-
cooperative option or not (they can just sleep, for example). We decided to use an
explicit non-cooperative option here to detect free riding.
The 'discrimination' measure consisted of one question asking subjects whether
they would prefer a new member to be rather from their own or the other category (i.e.,
over- vs. underestimator in experiment I, cognitive style K vs. P in experiment 2). This
question had to be answered by making a cross on a line between the two extreme points,
such that making a cross in the middle indicated indifference (see appendices I - III for
the complete instructions).
Uncertainly, perceived strength of competition, and identification were measured
in experiment I and 2 using either self-constructed items or items from existing scales: In
experiment one. perceived competition and uncertainty were measured at two points in
time, using self-constructed questions ("How strong is the competition between the teams
" This categorization was deceptive, as all subjects playing in the main team« were told to be
overestimalors Categonzaiion »as the only instance of deception in the first experiments
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in your perception?", "How do you feel about your final result (points) in this game?").
Questions about identifcation with the category were adapted from Mullin & Hogg
(1998) ("What do you think, how much you might like other overestimators?" "How
similar do you think you might be to other overestimators in terms of general attitudes
and opinions?" "How much would you like to get to know other overestimators?" "How
much do you feel to belong to other overestimators?"). Three items adapted from Mullin
& Hogg (1998) assessed social awareness, a proxy for social-desirability concerns among
participants. ("How much aware are you of the presence of others?" "How much do you
feel observed by others?" "How much do you feel observed by the experimenter?").
For experiment 2, questions were translated into German. Uncertainty and
competition were measured only at one point in time, using some more questions than in
experiment I, to try to capture the complexity of both constructs (competition: "How
high is in your opinion the chance in this game that one team has to leave after half-time
evaluation?"", "How high is in your opinion the chance in this game that both teams can
be content with their amount of points (team points!) after half-time evaluation''", "How
high is in your opinion in this game the chance that you personally are content with your
points (tram and private points) nl half-time evaluation''" "Flow important for wining in
this game is it that all team members do their best?". "How strong is in your opinion in
this game competition between the teams?"; uncertainty: "How certain are you that you
can reach your aims in this game?" "How certain are you that your effort was sufficient
to let the team continue after half-time evaluation?", "How certain are you that the other
team members did exhibit enough effort so that the team can continue after half-time
evaluation?", "How certain are you that the team can continue after half-time
evaluation''"). Importance to win the game was assessed using one self-constructed
question ("How important is it for you that your team can continue after half-time
evaluation?"). This variable was measured, as it seemed plausible that subjects who do
not think that it is important to win in the game perceive the incentive structure
differently and thus behave differently. Therefore, it is important to be able to identify
them.
In both paper-pencil studies, the chances of earning money were not equal for all
teams, because the "spare' teams, which were necessary for the 'discrimination measure'
(see below), did not participate in the competition. Payment therefore was not done
" Half-time evaluation is the point al which during the experiment it was evaluated whether each team had
done well enough to continue playing the game (see below for a more detailed explanation)
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performance-based. Participants got 10 Dutch guilders/10 DM for participation, and they
knew this from the beginning. To enhance motivation to exhibit effort in the game, the
best five participants, concerning both team and private points, could win a cinema
voucher.
In both paper-pencil studies, competition between teams had either a strongly
competitive 'winner lakes it all' (WTA) or a less competitive 'proportional
representation' (PR) structure. In WTA, only the winning team gets any points. In PR,
teams get paid according to their relative amount of points This leads to different
perceived strengths of competition and also different strengths ol uncertainty In WTA.
the team is uncertain whether it can manage to get any points at all, while in PR, teams
are 'only' uncertain about the amount of points they will get 1 xpcclcd total points
should be higher in PR than in WTA as well, as has been explained before
In «Mpenmfrt/ /, subjects first read the instructions, and then did the categorizing
task. While an assistant grouped participants into teams, they played a test round of the
game in randomly assigned teams Alter the winner of the test round was determined,
subjects Tilled in a questionnaire about their perception of the situation, containing the
first competition and uncertainty measurement. Then, subjects got information about
team composition. They learned that all members of their team were of the same
category. On average three people formed a team, and two teams competed in each
session. Two more people were playing in a third team, which was needed for the
discrimination measure. This 'spare' team did not participate in the competition, but
played the game as well. It was necessary because in the discrimination measure subjects
made a decision which kind of new member they wanted lor their team To be able to
make participants believe that this decision would be implemented later, potential 'new
members' were necessary. They should have some experience with the game as well,
because otherwise they could be expected to perform worse than 'old' members To
achieve this, the 'spare' team was used. A further advantage of the 'spare team' was that
it was less obvious for subjects with whom they were playing, as more participants were
in the room.
After the first 'counting' round of the game was played, participants filled in the
'discrimination measure'. They further answered questions measuring identification with
the team and the category they belonged to, social awareness and perception of the
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situation, especially with respect to uncertainty and competition (see above and appendix
I for these questions). After this, the experiment was ended, participants were debriefed
and paid, and they got their lottery ticket' for the cinema voucher.
The procedure of «per/me/si 2 was essentially the same. The main difference was
the way of categorizing participants, as described above. Subjects also played more
rounds - apart from the test round, three rounds were played before the discrimination
measure was administered. Competition was strengthened for the WTA treatment, to
achieve a more pronounced effect: A team had to reach a minimum of 30 points per
person on average in the team task at the point of a half-time evaluation (after two
rounds, but that was not known to participants), otherwise, the third, spare team would
replace it. In the PR treatment this requirement was fulfilled easily, but it was hard to
reach in WTA. As participants could not be sure that both teams were equally strong and
moreover were not precisely informed, after how many rounds half-time evaluation
would take place, there was uncertainty about probabilities, i.e., ambiguity.
The paper-pencil studies were analyzed aggregated by teams, as within teams
individual data are not independent because subjects got feedback about their
performance as a team. Aggregating the data resulted in a relatively small number of
observations per treatment, which is normal for exploratory experiments. However, the
number of observations became even smaller, as for several reasons it was necessary to
exclude some teams from the analysis. In the //rs/ ex/x/7/nenr five teams had to be
excluded because of language problems" - teams with more than one fourth of
participants not having English, German, or Dutch as a mother language were
excluded". In the «com/ «perimeni we controlled additionally for 'importance of
winning the game', and teams scoring in the lowest third were excluded. This resulted in
the/irsf experime/t/ in a sample often teams for analysis, six in WTA and four in PR, and
in the «com/ exper/me/M in a sample of 13 teams, six in WTA and seven in PR. Because
of the small number of observations, treatments were compared using non-parametric
Man-Whitney-U tests. For significance testing, the standard levels of significance were
used, including the 'marginally significant' 10% level. Marginally significant results
" The Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of the University of Maastricht is an
international faculty offering courses in English Students come from all over the world with different
mastery of English
* Students with these mother languages usually have a thorough knowledge of English
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have to be interpreted carefully because the risk of falsely rejecting the null-hypothesis
(alpha-error) is high. We decided still to report results significant on this level, as, on the
other hand, with small samples the danger exists - especially when using non-parametric
tests - that results do just not get significant, even if there is an effect (beta-error)





































































Tablt 4.2: DcKriptivr statistics
//>po//w5i5 /J (rWa»/o/jj/iip a^ /n /igwe •/..?/ No significant difference in
perceived uncertainly between the two treatments could be found, neither at time 1, nor
at time 2. Uncertainty (at time one and at time 2) does also not correlate with percr/vet/
competition at both times.
//vpofAttu 2y fre/af/oro/np W m /igure 4.?/' No significant difference in
identification with the own category between the treatments was found Identification
with the own category correlates marginally significantly with perceived uncertainty
measured at time I (r - .60, p - .067 (2-lailed))", but not with perceived uncertainty
measured at time 2 and not with the combined measure of uncertainty (the average of
both times). This means, the less certain someone is at time I, the more he identifies with
his category (to reduce the feeling of uncertainty f). Thus, at time 2, the remaining high
uncertainty is not related to low identification. This confirms hypothesis 2
To test the corollary from hypothesis I and 2, identification was correlated with
perceived competition. Identification does correlate significantly with perceived
competition (aggregated over both times of measurement), such that the stronger
Correlations »ere always calculated using Pearson corrdation-coefTKienti (r)
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competition is perceived, the stronger subjects identify with their category (r - .62, p
.026 (1 -tailed)).
JJ fre/af/ons/i^w c^ am/e^ in/?gure 4.2/' The difference in preference
for a new member between the treatments is not significant (Z = -1.23, as. sign. = .221
(2-tailed)'*). But, in PR (when competition is weak) preference for a new member differs
significantly from indifference (5), which is not the case in WTA. The direction of this
preference is surprising: It tends towards outgroup bias (PR: t = -3.97, p= .029, WTA: t •
-104, t- 359 (2-tailed))
£xp/orefory ana/ysej; A surprise was that in experiment I hardly any free-riding
was observed.
To check whether the manipulation of 'strength of competition' worked,
jwce/v«/ strength of competition was compared for the two treatments. No significant
difference was found, though it tends in the direction expected, being higher in WTA (Z
- -.98, as sig. = 164 (1-tailed)). The manipulation check thus unfortunately does not
confirm that the manipulation of competition worked as intended. This does, however,
not constitute a bigger problem, as it is still possible to correlate the relevant variables
with perceived competition to test the predictions made.

























































Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics
WvpofA«« 0 fre/aiiofwAip a^ m y?gwe 4.2^: No significant difference in
subjective uncertainty exists between the two treatments, but perceived competition is
** This has been tested two-tailed, as already the means showed that the effect would not be in the direction
expected
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correlated with uncertainty: The higher perceived competition, the higher is uncertainty,
which confirms hypothesis 1 (r - .79, p - .001 (1-tailed))
//>pofAefu .?J frWa/io/uAy) ft) m/igure •/.,?/• Identification with the group does
not significantly differ between the treatments It also dues not correlate significantly
with uncertainty Hypothesis 2 thus could not be confirmed
This also implies that the combination of hypotheses 1 and 2 does not hold as
expected, i.e., identification does not correlate significantly with perceived competition
typofArj« i> f/r/a/Kvu/iipj c) anrfe) m/igwr -f..?>: The difference in preference
for a new member between the two treatments is marginally significant (/. - -1.86, p ~
.063 (2-tailed)) Contrary to experiment 1, in this experiment it seemed to make some
sense to link performance in the task and category membership. The result is then also
partially the contrary of the result in experiment I: Only in WTA preference for a new
member differs significantly from indifference (t - 3.59, p - 016 (2-loiled)), again
towards outgroup bias. In PR subjects are indifferent between the two categories (t • •
.91, p-.400(2-tailed))
As the difference in perceived strength of competition between the two treatments
is not very strong, we also tested whether perceived competition correlates with (he
discrimination measure. Perceived competition is significantly correlated with preference
for a new member, in a direction which is expectable from the preceding analysis: The
stronger competition is perceived to be, the more an outgroup member is preferred (r -
.60, p-.031 (2-tailed)).
£xp/orafory a/ia/yj«. Similar to experiment 1, in experiment 2 hardly any
freending was observed.
The difference in perceived competition between treatments becomes marginally
significant in the expected direction (Z - -1.42, as. sig. - .077 (1-tailed)), i.e., the
manipulation check this time confirms that manipulation of competition between the
treatments worked.
Despite of the small sample, expertm«!/ / showed a slight difference in subjects'
preferences between the two treatments. In WTA, subjects on average were indifferent
between the categories, whereas in PR subjects positively discriminated for new
members from another category. This is basically the opposite from what was expected.
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The most probable reason Tor this effect is the use of artificial categories, which could
not be linked to performance in the task. Therefore, belief in the informational content of
the categories was very low In PR, subjects might have been curious whether outgroup
members might differ from them, they showed risk-seeking behavior, because there was
not much at stake. In WTA, where it was more important to have a good team, subjects
did not want to take the risk to make a mistake when choosing - in the sense of Camerer
& Weber (1992), they did not want to take the risk of having the wrong belief about the
probability distribution of productivity differences - and risk-seeking behavior
disappeared. That discrimination against the outgroup was not observed at all is probably
due to the artificial categories, because overall identification is low with such categories.
Differences in the psychological factors between the two treatments were not
very strong. But, it became visible that perceived strength of competition does play a role
in the way expected: Identification with the category correlates with perceived
competition and uncertainty at time I. Strong perceived competition, i.e., strong
perceived uncertainty, in the beginning thus probably makes subjects identify with their
group, which reduces perceived subjective uncertainty measured at later times.
£x/>en/nem / showed* that in situations wrVre cftoosmg surmrumr /ram ftVf
opposite category seemed to have some advantage, subjects tended to do so - but only
under strong competition. The fact that categories were generated such that one could
assume that they have some informatory content with respect to productivity turned the
pattern to the contrary of experiment 1's - strong preferences in WTA, no preferences in
PR. This can be interpreted as a 'weak' kind of statistical discrimination: Subjects
wanted members of the group they thought would perform better in the task, but this
performance estimation was based on stereotypical perceptions, not on real, known,
differences between the groups. With a rather complicated cognitive task it obviously
made sense for the participants to think that maybe someone of the opposite cognitive
style would do the task even better. When competition, and thus importance to make a
good decision, was low, subjects were indifferent.
The correlation of perceived competition with preference and with uncertainty
partly confirms the hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms behind
discriminatory behavior, but discrimination in WTA also followed a 'rational' motive of
performance, when subjects believed in the informational content of the categories. This
shows rather 'economic' thinking of the participants; it constitutes a weak kind of
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statistical discrimination, which - different from assumptions of standard statistical
discnmination theories - only occurred when competition was strong.
That no correlation of perceived uncertainty with identification was found might
result from a floor effect: Identification with the categories was very low (mean - 4.6,
std.dev = .54)" Obviously, subjects did not perceive identification with tlie artificial
categories as useful to reduce subjective uncertainly.
The paper-pencil studies thus indicate that strengthening of competition has an
effect on preferences Taken together they also indicate that this elTect might be linked to
uncertainty evoked by competition. The direction of the effect competition has on
discriminatory preferences is determined by (belief in) the informational content ol the
categories with respect to performance in the task Kxpenment 2 showed that 'weak'
statistical discrimination (i.e., statistical discrimination based on wrong"' beliefs) can be
reinforced by the strengthening of competition, when subjects believe in the
informational content of the categories Standard economic theories of statistical
discnmination do not mention that this form of discrimination can become stronger when
competition strengthens, and surely not, when it is based on wrong beliefs The reason
for this finding here probably is that, given the psychological mechanism of strengthened
use of (and belief in) the categories as a source of information, the economic mechanism
of statistical discrimination works with more force As in an experiment the importance
of decisions in general is relatively low, and therefore, the importance of productivity
considerations is low as well (as the theoretical model predicts), no statistical
discrimination occured in PR.
4.4 The computerized experiments
For the computerized experiments the design was slightly changed. After it had
been established in the first two experiments that competition docs have an effect on
preferences, and that subjects use artificial categories as a basis for decision-making,
especially when they can be linked with performance, the idea was now to test more in
detail some of the psychological predictions of the integrated model from chapter 3 I o
do this, an experimental design more closely related to the integrated model was used
(see also section 4.2.2). This also implied a different operationalization of competition,
Identification was measured on a 9-poinl scale ranging from 'not very much' to 'very much'.
*" Beliefs were wrong in lhat subjects had no information about the two group* apart from the
information, and category information is not performance-related4 Experimental test of the model
using now high and low output prices as a proxy for weak and strong competition (see
below).
Subjects again played a real-effort game in teams. The explicit non-cooperative
option (the private task in the first two experiments) was abandoned, to make the
experimental situation less complex overall. After hardly any free riding happened in the
first two experiments, it did not seem necessary anymore to have such an explicit
noncooperative option.
The computerized experiments were designed such that it would be possible to
control the effect the stereotype of the categories had, i.e., participants were provided
with a stereotype of the two categories blue and red, the (evaluative) content of which
could be known. In experiments I and 2, it was impossible to know for the experimenter
what subjects thought about the two categories - whether they, for example, liked the
concept of an 'underestimator' for whatever reasons more than that of an 'overestimator'.
liven if one could expect that on average this should not play a role, more control can be
reached when it is possible to know the evaluative content of the categories. Artificial
categories were used again, but a stereotype about the category members was induced,
following the mechanism proposed by Fiedler (e.g., Fiedler et al. 1999a; see also section
2.3.1).
In the first two experiments, a preference for one or the other category of new
members was financially inconsequential. To test whether preferences were really
important for the subjects, they were asked in the computerized experiments to pay for
their preference (see also section 4.2). There was thus an immediate cost linked with
discriminatory behavior based on group membership. A 'rational', profit maximizing
employer should therefore not be willing to pay for this preference, if he would not
believe that there was a productivity difference between the two groups large enough to
compensate for the cost of'discriminating'.
4.4. /
Sutyec«
80 students (54 males, 26 females) from various faculties of the University of
Amsterdam participated in teams of four members in four sessions of five teams each.
The two experiments were computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
1999) and were conducted in the experimental laboratory of CREED at the University of
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Amsterdam. All instructions of the experiment were given on paper, but all tasks were
done using the computer. The Dutch instructions are provided in appendix III Division
into categories (blue and red) was done by random assignment of subjects to computers
The real-effort task consisted of multiplying two numbers randomly generated by the
computer as fast as possible.
Procedure
Upon arrival, subjects got randomly assigned to a computer, which defined their
category - blue or red - and got the first instructions. The first part of the experiment
consisted of a stereotype-generation task designed following Fiedler et al. (1999a, b).
Subjects had to practice the real-effort task they had to do later (the multiplications), and
then got selective feedback about the performance of members of the two categories:
From all results of the practice period some were selected and presented sequentially on
the screen, such that for the blue category 16 instances of good and eight instances of
poor performance were shown, compared to eight instances of good and lour instances of
poor performance for the red category. Fiedler et al. (1999a, b) show how such a
distribution can lead to the impression that the blue category performs better (sec section
2.3.1). In essence, subjects thus got information about the two categories, but with
respect to mean performance this information was the same for both categories. Thus, if,
as Fiedler et al (1999a, b) show, subjects really develop the stereotype that the category
which they got more information about performs better, this is a 'wrong' stereotype,
which 'rationally' should not play a role in decision-making. The information was
presented on the screen in the following way: "Calculation number three: someone with
the category blue did this correctly" or "Calculation number five: someone with the
category red did this wrongly".
After this stereotype-generation task, subjects were distributed into three
homogeneous 'blue' teams and two 'spare' teams (one red-only team and one mixed
team), which were necessary for the discrimination measure, as in the experiments
before. The difference with the first experiments is that now some of the members of the
'spare' teams were really 'added' to the old teams following the preferences indicated,
and three more rounds were played The remaining members of the 'spare' teams played
the last rounds in one extra team.
Teams first played two rounds of the real-effort game. In the strong-competition
treatment, they were told that 'output prices', i.e., the money they got for each correct
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multiplication made, varied between 0.75 and 1.25 guilders (€ 0.34 - € 0.57). In the weak
competition treatment, these output prices were said to vary between 1.25 and 1.75
guilders (€ 0.57 - € 0.79). Output prices were given as a range to enhance uncertainty, but
still give subjects some information so that they could develop expectations. Further, this
models a situation of competition with imperfect information a bit more closely. Teams
had one minute for 'production' in each round. Each team started with a minus of 4
guilders (€ 1.82), as each team-member costed I guilder (€ 0.45) per round. This was
supposed to represent costs a firm incurs for wages. Any gains teams made were
distributed equally among all members. Subjects got feedback on group performance of
the own group (not on output prices) after each round.
After two rounds, members of the blue teams were asked to choose a new
member for their team, which they would get from the spare teams. They could indicate
(the strength of) their preference for either a red or a blue new member using a scrollbar.
Those who had indicated a preference were then asked how much they were willing to
pay to enhance the probability of getting the preferred member. The initial probability
was said to be 50:50 for a new member of either category. Subjects could choose to pay
15%, 30%, 45%, 60% or 75% of the output price of the last round to raise the probability
of hiring the preferred member by successive steps of 10%. Thus, by paying 75% they
got the preferred member for sure (see table 4.1 in section 4.2). The four-person team
together had to make this payment, not the individual subject, which means that each
subject privately only had to pay one fourth of the money.
After all subjects had made their decisions, the computer randomly chose one
team member of each team whose decision was implemented. New teams were formed
and payments were made if applicable. Three more rounds were played in the new teams.
After the fifth round the experiment was concluded with a questionnaire, asking about
age, sex and subjective evaluations of each category. Subjects were asked which category
they think performed better on the task. The same kind of scrollbar was used as for
measuring the preference for a new member. Furthermore, identification with the own
category was measured using one question ("How strongly did you identify with your
category (blue/red)?"), and uncertainty was measured by one question as well ("How
uncertain did you feel with respect to your results in this experiment?"). Both questions
could be answered using vertical scroll-bars ranging from zero to four. Experiment 3 thus
used different, shortened, questions compared to experiments 1 and 2 to measure
identification and uncertainty. This was done because in experiment 3 (and 4) these4 Experimental test of the model
psychological 'background'-relationships no longer were the main focus of interest The
psychological variables were measured at the end of the experiment, to avoid that making
these factors conscious would influence behavior, but thereby not allowing for clew
causal inferences with respect to discriminatory behavior
Finally, subjects were paid individually, based on their performance liiere was
no show-up fee paid, but subjects could expect from the announcements to earn
something between 15 and 30 Dutch Guilders (f 8 and f 15 in experiment 4) They
further knew that CREED usually pays at least a small amount of money for
participation, if no earnings are made. Of course, it was obvious that in the strong-
competition treatment more effort had to be exhibited by the team members to make
decent earnings than in the weak-competition treatment.
Experiment three was analyzed using aggregate data on a team basis, as members
of one team got the same feedback and thus were not independent All teams could be
included in the analysis As the sample still was rather small, non-puramctric Man-
Whitney-U tests were used for comparisons between treatments With respect to
significance testing the same applies as for the first two experiments If not indicated
otherwise, significance tests for correlations were performed I-tailed, following the
specification of the hypotheses. In the following, we refer to SCT when talking about the
strong-competition (or low-output-price) treatment and to WCT when talking about the
weak-competition (or high-output-price) treatment. Descriptive statistics of the results






































































Table 4.4: Dneriptive fUtistics
»is
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/> frWa//o/«*;p a> m_/?g«re 4.2/- There is no significant difference in
perceived uncertainty between the two treatments (Z = -1.62, as. sig. = .105 (2-tailed)).
The test was performed 2-tailed after the means already showed that the tendency goes in
the opposite direction from what was expected, namely higher uncertainty in WCT than
inSCT.
m ./igure 4.2J: Identification does not differ
significantly between the two treatments (Z = -.98, as. sig. = .163 (1-tailed)). Perceived
uncertainty correlates significantly negative with identification, i.e., the stronger
someone identifies the more certain this person is (r = -.83, p = .001 (2-tailed)).
//ypo/Aem 3^ fre/<M/o/w/np c^ a/«/ e> //» //gure 4.2/- There is in general no
significant difference in preferences between the treatments (Z = -1.44, as. sig. = .150 (2-
tailed)). Still, there is a difference between treatments with respect to which preferences
become significantly different from zero: Preference for a blue new member differs
significantly from zero in WCT, but only marginally significantly in SCT (WCT: t =
2 62, p = .023; SCT: t = 1.51, p = .095 (1 -tailed)'''). Preference for a red new member, on
the other hand, differs significantly from zero in SCT, but not in WCT (WCT: I = 1.0, p
- . 182; SCT: t = 2.17, p = .042 (1 -tailed)).
//V/W/AMM <J f«p. re/ai7o/w*;/w c> aV anrf W '« /»gwe 4.2/- There is no
significant difference in payment between the treatments (Z = -1.35, as. sig. = 178 (2-
tailed)), hut after excluding one outlier", the difference becomes marginally significant,
i.e., significant on the 10% level (Z = -1.91, as. sig. = .056 (2-tailed)). Subjects are
willing to pay slightly more in SCT than in WCT. If payment is split by whether subjects
want to pay for a red or a blue new member, there is a marginally significant difference
in payment for a red new member between the two treatments, payment being higher in
SCT (for red: Z = -1.80, as. sig. = .072; for blue: Z = -.73, as. sig. = .465 (2-tailed)).
The total amount of payment (i.e., payment for blue plus payment for red
category members together) does differ significantly from zero in both treatments, and
more so in SCT (WCT: t = 2.45, p = .035; SCT t = 3.38, p = .01 (both 1 -tailed as the test-
value is zero and values below zero are impossible). Payments for both categories
" This lest was performed I -tailed as values below zero were not possible. This holds for all similar tests
of difference from zero
" Outliers were identified following the standard definition given for boxplot diagrams in SPSS as values
between 15-3 box length away from the median The box length corresponds to the interquartile range,
i.e., the difference between Ihe 75* and 25* percentiles
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separately differ also significantly from zero (payment for red: I - 2.16, p • .025; Tor blue
I - 2.24, p - 02 (I-tailed». Split by treatment, payment for a blue new member differs
marginally significantly from zero in both treatments, whereas payment for red does not
differ from zero in WCT. but it significantly does so in SCT (WCT: Payment lor red: t -
1.0, p - 187; for blue t - 1.75, p - .070; SCT: For red I - 2.24, p - .035; for blue t -
1.58, p - .085 (all I-tailed)) Table 4.5 shows descriptive statistics and U-tests for these
results
Treatment N Mean Sid Uev Sid Err Mean
WCT Preference for blue new member 6
Preference for red new member 6
Strength of preference in general 6
Payment for red new member 6
Payment for blue new member 6
SCT Preference for blue new member 6
Preference for red new member 6
Strength of preference in general 6
Payment for red new member 6


























































Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of the variables analyzed and Mann-Whitnty-l' trsti for
differences btlwetn trtatmtnts in these variables.
To relate the results to the model described in 4.2, it must be noted that the
variable 'payment' here represents D//" and not D*. Differences in 'payment' therefore
do not necessarily mean that D* has become larger, because P differs between the two
treatments, such that it is on average smaller in SCT than in WCT 'Preference' on the
other hand represents £>(/, i.e., the stronger the preference for any of the categories, the
stronger the perceived DU of participants can be assumed to be.
/•urrAer «p/oratory a/w/w«
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/?e/a//o/isA/p o/pre/erence a/tt/poymenf./b/- a certam category w/YA per/brmance
eva/i/a/zon: To test the underlying assumptions of hypotheses 3 and 4, one has to look at
the subjective evaluation of the performance of the categories as measured in the
questionnaire - even if it has been measured only at the end of the experiment, it might
give an indication of (the influence of) performance stereotypes. A significant
correlation between evaluation of the categories and preference (r = .65, p = .012) was
found. When analzyed separately for WCT and SCT however, this holds only in WCT,
which is rather surprising (WCT: r = .90, p = .016; SCT r - .41, p = .416).
Payment for a red new member correlates significantly with the evaluation of red
category members (r = .572, p = .026 (1 -tailed)). Evaluation of blue category members
does not correlate with payment for a blue new member. Analysed for WCT and SCT
separately, payment for a red new member continues to correlate significantly with
evaluation in WCT and marginally significantly in SCT. Payment for a blue new member
does not correlate significantly with evaluation of blue category members in any
treatment (WCT - red: r = .82, p = .022; blue: r = -.21, p = .343; SCT - red: r = .70, p =
.061; blue r--.22, p = .340).
/teta/ons/i/p o/per/brmanre eva/uar/<w» o/tfie rwo categories w;YA orter re/evan/
var/aW«: Overall, evaluation of the blue category is significantly different from zero,
while evaluation of the red category is only marginally significantly different from zero
(for blue t = 3 30, p = .004; for red t = 1.71, p = .058 (both Mailed); see table 4.6). This
could be seen as a manipulation check, but as the evaluation has been measured at the
end of the experiment, it is influenced by everything that happened during the experiment
and thus, does not constitute a valid manipulation-check.
N Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean
Evaluation of blue 12 9 9 10 38 3 00
Evaluation of red 12 2 94 5 95 172
Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics of (valuations of the rwo categories
Evaluation of a blue new member correlates marginally significantly with
identification with the (blue) ingroup (r = .48, p = .056), but not with payment for blue.
Evaluation of the performance of both categories correlates significantly with the
feedback the group got in the round before the decision was made (r = .65, p = .021), i.e.,
the better the feedback, the more subjects thought that blue new members performed
better than red new members and vice versa. This feedback also correlates marginally
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significantly with preference (r - 57. p - .053), i.e, the worse the group did, the stronger
is the preference for a red (i.e., outgroup) new member.
For an interpretation of the results several problems have to be taken into
consideration. First, data on the evaluation of the two categories, subjective uncertainty,
and identification with the category were collected at the end of the experiment, to avoid
any influence of making these factors conscious before making the 'hiring' decision.
Thus, it is unknown how people scored on these variables at the time of making the
decision, and in how far these variables, at the time of measurement, were in turn rather
influenced by the decision made before. This could be the case either in the sense of
justifying the decision or being influenced by the experience with the new member
Secondly, feedback about performance of the own team was given alter each
round, and this influenced the evaluation of the categories and preferences, even if the
feedback was absolute and not relative, i.e., subjects did not know whether their team
scored good or bad in comparison to other teams. Subjects also did not know cxuctly how
much money they earned, because they were only told the range output prices could be
in. This allowed them to form expectations, but uncertainty (risk) about the money
earned existed until the end of the experiment
Thirdly, it has not been checked directly whether stereotype induction in the
beginning had worked, to avoid making conscious that there might be a difference in
performance between the two categories, i.e., to avoid demand effects''', before subjects
made the 'hiring' decision. Evaluation of the two categories asked about at the end of the
experiment did, however, differ significantly from indifference for the blue category and
only marginally significantly for the red category. This could indicate that stereotype
induction has worked, but it does not necessarily so because during the game feedback
about the performance of the teams was given This feedback did influence preferences
and could also have influenced the evaluation measure, especially after experience with
'old' blue and new red members.
Lastly, as data had to be analyzed aggregated by group, the number of
independent observations per treatment was quite low. Therefore, non-parametric
'Demand effects' means thai there are (implicit) cue* in the experimental design such that subjects let to
know the h>pothesis and then act like this
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methods had to be used, making it more difficult to detect existing significant effects.
These caveats have to be kept in mind as qualifiers for the intepretation ofthe results.
Overall, the results show a quite complex pattern. The first hypotheses could not
be confirmed. It was confirmed that perceived uncertainty is related to identification, but,
in contrast to experiment I, the more certain subjects were, the stronger they identified
with their ingroup. An explanation for this could be that in experiment I there was a time
lag between measurement of uncertainty and identification, such that those who were
uncertain in the beginning could identify with their category to reduce felt uncertainty
OK). In experiment 3 on the contrary, perceived uncertainty and identification were
measured at the same time, at the end of the experiment, such that those who had
identified strongest thought of themselves also to be very certain.
In the strong-competition treatment, outgroup bias was found, while in WCT
there was also ingroup bias (with respect to preferences), such that hypothesis 3 could
overall not be confirmed. Hypothesis 4 could be confirmed in some respect: There was
more payment in SCT than in WCT, but this payment was not necessarily made for
ingroup members.
({valuation of the categories influenced preferences only in WCT. Payment for
red new members (outgroup) correlated with a positive evaluation of red category
members. Payment for blue new members, however, did not correlate with evalation of
blue category members, and was also not often made. This means, subjects were willing
to pay more for the group they thought to perform better, but this was not the ingroup,
contrary to what was expected.
The outgroup bias found in SCT can be explained psychologically following
Spears et al. (2001): Groups feeling lower in status or performance have often been
found to favor the outgroup, especially if they do not identify very strongly with their
category - which was the case in the experiment reported here. Identification was in
general quite low - measured on a scale from 0 to 4, the mean was 1.23 (std. dev. .59).
Spears et al 's explanation fits also well with the finding that the feedback the groups got
about team performance did influence their preferences: Outgroup bias was stronger
when subjects got more negative feedback about performance of their own group, i.e.,
when they felt to perform worse - even if, as mentioned before, feedback was absolute,
not relative. However, if there is no reason to assume a strong influence of prejudice, and
the stereotype of the ingroup is negative due to feedback, outgroup bias can simply be
explained as economically rational behavior in this situation. ,.
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Obviously, in the more competitive situation, people relied on the information
about performance of the categories they inferred from feedback, resulting in outgroup
bias This did not happen in the low-competition treatment However, in WCT, and
partially also in SCT, there was also ingroup bias with respect to preference for the blue
category (Positive) evaluation of the blue category also correlated with identification
with this category. However, this did hardly result in payment for new members of this
category, which is a good illustration of the proposition that stated (ingroup) preferences
do not always translate into behavior
Experiment 3 provided evidence for an interplay of economic and psychological
factors. The role of economic factors became visible in that under strong competition all
information, which could be seen as diagnostic, was used 'rationally' If subjects
believed that categories contained productivity-related information, this could, as in
experiment 2, be interpreted as weak statistical discrimination, as there were no real
productivity differences between the categories As in experiment 2, this effect appeared
only when competition was strong Of course, subjects in the strong-competition
treatment had the same database as those in the weak-competition treatment, i.e.,
category information was not more informative than in the low-competition treatment,
but obviously it was taken as more informative. This is evidence for the psychological
mechanism assumed. Correlational analyses could confirm only some aspects of the
psychological reasoning about underlying processes, but as the information about
uncertainty, identification and evaluation of the performance of the categories was
collected at the end of the experiment, these results should be interpreted cautiously.
Taken together, this is additional evidence that weak statistical discrimination based on
(wrong) beliefs about category differences strengthens when competition strengthens.
Interesting is that payment was nearly only found in relation to outgroup bias. This
suggests that subjects showing ingroup bias in their preferences are more aware of the
noneconomic' motivations they might have for preferring one category over the other.
A second computerized experiment was conducted without giving group
feedback. That way, the influence of feedback on the perception of the categories could
be avoided, and more independent data were available, as data now did not have to be
analyzed aggregated by teams. Furthermore, by pointing participants explicitly to the
number of red and blue members in the game (enabling them to relate the pieces of
information to group size, if they wanted), it was made easier for them to detect that the
information was in general the same for both groups. That way, subjects should be more
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aware of the fact that category membership is not informative for productivity. This was
done to avoid a kind of demand effect: If subjects held wrong beliefs about the difference
in numbers of 'red' and 'blue' subjects, they could assume that there is a difference in the
amount of information they have about each of the two groups. Preferences would then
not result from a (wrong) stereotype, but from rational economic behavior to favor the
group about which more information is available. Imagine, for example, that subjects
assume that (here are less blue than red subjects. In that case, the information they get
would imply that they have more instances of information about each blue subject than
about each red subject, which implies that they should rationally favor the blue category
members.
72 students from various faculties of the University of Amsterdam (47 males, 25
females) participated in four sessions of 20 res. 12 persons each.
Basically the same material as in experiment 3 was used. Final questions were the
same with one exception: To get a more differentiated measure of uncertainty, a three-
item scale was used ("When you played the game, how well did you understand what
happened in this situation?"; "When you played the game, how uncertain have you been
about what happened in this situation?"; "When you played the game, how well could
you predict what would happen?"). This was supposed to measure uncertainty (C) about
several aspects of the situation, together capturing a broader concept of uncertainty as the
question in experiment 3, but still implying uncertainty about the result. Such uncertainty
gets (of course not very strong) self-relevance from the fact that understanding and being
able to predict the situation is related to earnings in that situation. The experiments also
aimed at developing valid measurements of the variables in question, therefore we
changed the uncertainty-measurement several times.
Procedure
The two computerized experiments differed mainly with respect to the feedback
subjects got after each round: In experiment 4 there was no feedback at all. A further
difference was that participants were explicitly pointed to the number of blue/red
category-members in the game, as described before.
1204 Experimental test of the model
/ton/u
Unfortunately, for one session only twelve participants showed up. But, there
were no signiflcant differences in any of the relevant variables between participants in
this session and those in the comparable 20-participants session The session is therefore
included in the analysis Some participants indicated in the flnal questionnaire that they
already participated in similar experiments, but as their data did not significantly differ
from the other data in any of the relevant variables, it was included in the analysis, too.
This time data was analyzed on an individual basis, because there was no
feedback given to the teams during the experiment. Table 4.7 shows the descriptive
statistics of the most important variables for both treatments
treatment N
SCT Preference for new member 24
Payment 24
Identification 24
Evaluation of category 24
Uncertainty 24
WCT Preference for new member 20
Payment 20
Identification 20












































Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics
/Apo/A«« //• fre/afio/u/Np aj myigur* 4.2/' The three items which were used to
measure uncertainty did not form a very reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha - 61), so it was
not possible to use them aggregated for the analysis. We did some tests using single
items of the scale: There is a signiflcant dilTerence between the treatments with respect to
item I (Z - -1.84, as. sig. * .041 (l-tailed)), i.e., subjects feel more certain with respect to
understanding what happened during the game when output-prices are high.
M/x>//iejM .?/• (re/aiio/u/i/p />> //> /igwe 4.2/ Identification docs not differ
significantly between the two treatments (Z » - 45, as sig - 644 (2-tailed)), nor does it
correlate significantly with any of the uncertainty items.
//>po/Amr J/ f/War/o/uAz/u c> O/K/ e^ m/igure 4.2/- Overall, preferences do not
differ between SCT and WCT (Z = -1.359, as sig. - 174 (2-tailed))
Contrary to the results of experiment 3, in WCT only preference for red differs
significantly from zero (t = 2 886, p - Oil), whereas in SCT, preferences for both
categories differ significantly from zero (red: t - 2 922, p — Oil; blue t - 2 882, p — .011
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(all 1-tailed)") Differences in preference for blue and in preference for red between the
two treatments do not become significant (for preference for red: Z = -.756, as. sig. = .45;
for preference for blue
Z = .44, as. sig. - .66 (2-tailed); see table 4.8 for descriptive statistics).
N Mean Std Deviation Std Error Mean • ' • "
Evaluation of blue 44 7.23 11.99 1.81 - . :
Evaluation of red 44 8 00 15.66 2 36
Table 4.8: Descriptive statistics of evaluations of the two categories
//ypof/iejw 4> f«p. re/ar/o/w/i;/» A), «# anc/ e> wyjgure 4.2J: As expected after
experiment 3, the willingness to pay for a preference is marginally significantly stronger
in SCT than in WCT (Z = -1.61, as. sign. = .054 (1-tailed)). Only in SCT, general
payment for any of the categories differs significantly from zero (t = 2.63, p = .015).
Split by category, both payment for red and payment for blue new members are
significantly different from zero in SCT, but not in WCT (WCT: blue: t = 1.00, p = .17;
red: t = 1.00, p = .17; SCT: blue: t = 1.70, p = .052; red: t = 1.81, p = .042 (all 1-tailed)).
More in general, those who prefer a red new member are more willing to pay for their
preference than those who prefer a blue new member (overall: r = .28, p = .032) - at least
in the low-price treatment (SCT: r = .43, p = .018); see table 4.9 for descriptive statistics
and U-tests).
Treatment N Mean Std. Dev Std Err Mean
Low output prices
High output prices
Preference for red 24
Preference for blue 24
Payment for blue 24
Payment for red 24
Preference for red 20
Preference for blue 20
Payment for blue 20

























Pref. for red Pref. for blue Paym. for blue Paym. for red
Mann-Whitney U 191.00 202.50 17100 171.50
Z -1.30 -1.13 -101 -132 <•
Asymp Sig (2-tailed) 193 260 310 186
Table 4.9: Descriptive statistics and Mann-Whitney-U test for differences between
treatments
' Again, values below zero were not possible. The same holds for payment (below).
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anc/pm-m#m HI/A (AT «VO/MO/IO/I O///*
Overall, preferences are strongly correlated with the evaluation that a certain category
performed bener on the task (r » 77, p = .000). Both the (positive) evaluation of the red
and the blue category separately differ significantly from zero (blue: t - 4.00. p - .000;
red: t - 3.39, p - .001 (both I-tailed)).
(Positive) evaluation of both categories is (marginally) significantly correlated
with payment for each category (blue: r = -.24, p » 056, red: r = .26, p - 042 (1-(ailed)).
Split by treatment, these correlations remain significant in SCT. but hardly in WCT:
Only one subject in WCT wants to pay for a blue new member, and only few for red new
members (SCT: blue: r = -.34, p = 050; red: r = 49, p - .007, WCT: blue: r - -.05, p -
.413; red: r = -.32, p - .082) (Mailed);
/te/afionsA;/7 q/'evu/itaf/on O/(/K co/egon« HI/A ot/wr variaM«: Evaluation of
the blue category overall is marginally significantly correlated with identification (r -
.23, p = .066 (I-tailed)) This correlation is significant on the 5% level in SCT (r - 37. p
= .038 (I-tailed)), and disappears in WCT. Evaluation of the red category does nol
correlate with identification, neither overall, nor in any of the treatments separately.
/tefa/ionjAip o/ptjvme/i/ wi/A i<fcn/i/icu/ion(>vcr both treatments, the stronger
subjects identify with their category, the more willing they are to pay for (heir preference
(r = 34, p = .024). Identification correlates marginally significant with payment for a red
new member (r = .30, p = .065). *. . • <
Sex c/i/Terenc«. We also tested for sex differences, which in fact existed: In
general, women pay more for their preferences (Z = -3.04, as. sig. - .002), and they are
also stronger identifying (Z - -2.21, p = .027 (both 2-tailed)).
In the fourth experiment some results from the third experiment could be
replicated. Again, when competition was stronger, more payments for getting the
preferred member were made, and preferences tended towards outgroup bias However,
as there was no feedback given and the belief that the ingroup was performing badly
could not develop that easily, there was more ingroup bias with respect to stated
preferences in SCT than in experiment 3. Contrary to experiment 3, in WCT only
outgroup bias with respect to preferences was found. In WCT hardly any payment was
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done, and payment for blue new members was not significantly different from zero in
any of the conditions. Hypothesis 2 could not be confirmed, but again payment correlated
positively with identification, and especially payment for preferred red new members.
Identification, however, also correlated with more positive evaluations of the
performance of the blue category, as measured at the end of the experiment. Evaluations
of the categories did correlate with preferences, and this time in both treatments with
both preferences. Especially when competition was strong, new members of the category,
which was seen as performing better, were preferred - even if categories were not
informative about performance in fact. However, again the preferred category was not
necessarily the ingroup. In SCT evaluation of the category correlated with payment.
Hypothesis 3 and 4 again are not confirmed - but, more payments are made for the group
perceived as performing better. This, however, is not always the ingroup.
Overall, the results are again evidence for a combination of psychological and
economic factors playing a role in the determination of discriminatory preferences and
behavior in a similar way as in experiments 2 and 3. In this experiment, however,
stronger competition did also lead to ingroup bias with respect to preference and
payment, also influencing the evaluation of a category. It did, however, when evaluation
of the performance of one's own category and the general level of identification were
low, also lead to outgroup bias, just like in experiments 2 and 3. Low opinion about the
performance of one's own category could in the last experiment not be derived from
feedback on own-group performance, but it could result from the opinion subjects had
about their ^e«ona/ performance. Preferences are thus rather based on stereotypes, and,
as expected, no evidence for prejudice as an important factor was found.
Subjects under strong competition have strong preferences and are willing to pay
for them, and they also choose the group which they believe performs better - at least
when asked about the evaluation afterwards. This is related to the psychological
mechanism of identification, as Spears et al. (2001) describe it for outgroup bias. Of
course, it could also result from dissonance-reduction after having made a decision and
paid for it. Whatever the reason, this does hardly happen when competition is weak.
4.5 General Discussion
Taken together, the four experiments provide evidence for a combination of
psychological and economic mechanisms, as figure 4.3 shows. In all studies, a significant
number of subjects uses the - irrelevant - category information as basis for decision-
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making, and more so, when competition is stronger (apart from experiment I) Subjects
in these situations in general also believe that the category they choose for performs
better than the other one. This can be interpreted as the psychological mechanism of







c) Ingroup bios (prejudice)
(Stereotypical) d) •Discriminatory
discriminatory preference payment
Marginal value of points earned/
risk aversion
£conom/c' mrr/kmum;
Figure 4.3: Relationships found between variables - straight line« represent potittve
relationships found, dashed lines represent ambiguous remits.
A general result therefore is that competition makes subjects believe in the
informational content of the categories and makes them use it, probably even if
consciously (i.e., when asked about the categories) they know that their informational
content is very low. However, this only holds when there is at least some reason tu
believe that categories contain relevant information, i.e., when either categorization is
done in a way that relates it to the real-effort task (experiment 2) or when a stereotype
has been developed about the categories, which suggests a link of category information
and performance (experiments 3 and 4). Experiment 1 has shown that when categories
cannot be assumed to contain any information about performance, people have weaker
preferences when competition is strong, which has been interpreted as them being less
risk seeking. In experiment 2, where categories were seen as a bit more meaningful,
subjects under weak competition were still indifferent between them, while preferring the
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outgroup under strong comptition. In experiments 3 and 4, subjects in weak competition
had preferences for one of the categories, as under strong competition, but they were less
willing to pay for them, probably because they knew that preferences were based on
either just ingroup identification or very unreliable information. This is evidence for a
combination of psychological and economic mechanisms: The psychological
mechanisms determine that people have preferences at all, but economically rational
behavior makes them refrain from paying for 'irrational' preferences - when competition
and belief in the informational content of the categories are weak. When competition is
strong, psychological mechanisms lead to strengthened belief in the usefulness of the
category-information, and 'economic' mechanisms make subjects use this in a 'rational'
way. In general, subjects in the experiments are more willing to pay for outgroup
preferences, which might result from a kind of self-deception: Subjects may realize when
perceiving ingroup bias that this might be a bias, but when they experience outgroup
bias, they seem to believe more in its reasonability. However, some strongly identifying
subjects especially in experiment 4 also were willing to pay for ingroup preferences.
Another reason for the high levels of outgroup bias found could be the fact that
artificial categories were used. Aspects like status of the categories and specific contents
of stereotypes of a category, which have a strong influence in real life, did not exist in
this experimental setting. Furthermore, only performance sterotypes, and not prejudice
about the two categories played a role. The real-world categories labor market
discrimination usually applies to are stereotypically rather linked with good than bad
ingroup performance. Therefore, psychological ingroup effects will not be counteracted
by the 'economic' mechanism linked with negative performance stereotypes of the
ingroup. However, minority groups sometimes do show outgroup bias: A real-world
example for such a situation is discrimination against female or black employees by
female or black employers. When prejudice plays a role, an economic effect of
competition can work, and in real-life settings also individual information search is
possible - which was not the case in these experiments. It would be important to do
similar studies with real categories, and to construct experimental designs where subjects
have the possibility to search for individual information in addition to the category
information, to see in how far they still rely on category-based information. However,
then it will be difficult to prevent individual information from suggesting category
information.
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For discrimination in the 'real world', our results allow the inference that when
information is imperfect, people will make more use of the information they believe to be
contained in a category a person belongs to under strong!er) competition - no matter how
relevant the categories really arc for an estimation of productivity If categories contain
real productivity-related information, the result will be 'strong' statistical discrimination
against individuals. If categories do not contain such information, the result will be group
as well as individual discrimination - the weak form of statistical discrimination.
However, it is still not clear what influence the 'economic effects' of competition on
stereotype use and use of prejudice have in counteracting the psychological mechanisms.
A new aspect with respect to (weak) statistical discrimination is that the
expenments have shown that it can become wronger or just appear when competition
becomes stronger. Usually, it is assumed that statistical discrimination based on wrong
perceptions of productivity differences should disappear when competition gets stronger.
The different finding here can be explained by the fact that psychological mechanisms let
people rely more on category-based information The fact that there was hardly any bias
at all in the weak-competition treatments in all but the first experiments indicates that
categories were too 'empty', but in the real world usually more 'information' is linked
with the most salient categories, such that they might even be seen as relevant under
weak competition.
Costly discrimination probably happens in the real world under weak competition
only when preferences are strong - which, however, probably is the case in most real-life
situations. When competition is strong, and when there is a (small) chance that the
category provides some information about performance, psychological mechanisms
make subjects perceive the cost for 'discriminating' as compensated by the gains that
will result from the (perceived) productivity difference. Whether this leads to
discrimination against the outgroup or the ingroup depends on beliefs about performance
of the ingroup and on beliefs about the requirements of the task. If subjects think that the
ingroup performs badly or outgroup members might perform better, they prefer outgroup
members.
The experiments showed that outgroup bias is possible, which is rarely discussed
in the psychological literature (but, see, e.g.. Spears et al, 2001), especially when
competition is strong and the ingroup is seen as performing badly However,
preconditions for this to happen in the real world are probably (i) that decision makers
assume that their own group performs badly in the task at hand and (ii) that general
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identification with the ingroup is not very high. In the real world, identification with
one's own category is stronger than in the laboratory with artiflcial categories, and this
might be even more so when competition is strong. Precondition (i) also often does not
hold with respect to real categories, as it is not very probable that e.g. men really might
start to think that men in general perform worse than women in a certain, male-
dominated task. Stressing positive aspects of the outgroup or of diversity might help
reducing discriminatory tendencies against outgroups when competition is strong at the
same time. It could, however, also be threatening for the ingroup Such a threat could
then lead to stronger identification, or to focusing on other qualities of the own group -
and in the end, stressing positive aspects of the outgroup might, by these psychological
effects, even lead to stronger discrimination.
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Appendix I: Instructions experiment I
Foinl-cstimation
Dear Participant.
In the following you are asked to estimate the number of points you see at the screen You have only 6
seconds to look at them, and then IS seconds to write down your decision So. do not try to count them,









Estimated number of points
/;ufrv<7/on /
Dear participant.
Welcome to our team-game!
Thank you for your willingness to participate in this study!
Before we start, I would like to ask you to follow the instructions below during the whole game:
• Please do not talk to each other or otherwise communicate during the study!
• Please do not try to find out how the others decide or what they answer!
• It is also very important that you follow precisely the instructions - e g, go on to the next page, if
told so. and wait, if told so!
This is very important, otherwise, the study cannot be evaluated properly!
Thank you for your cooperation!
I hope you will have some fun!
/rutrucrion 2:
Dear Participant,
Thank you for your willingness to take part in our study!
With this study, we want to see how people distribute their effort on different tasks and how this is
related to the situation they are in
You will get one page with two versions of the same kind of task One represents work for your team,
the other work for yourself. For both tasks you get points, depending on how well you do Your team is
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playing against another team, which is with you here in the room, doing the same task. The outcome of
your team thus depends on how both teams do Your personal outcome depends on how you do, how
your team-members do, and how the other team does This is the main structure of the game. More in
detail, the result of the team is figured out as follows:
At the end of each round, the outcomes of the team-task from all members of each team are taken times
2 and added together.
Your final amount of points in the team-task is calculated relative to the result of the other team
More precisely, the points achieved by your team will be divided by the total number of points achieved
by both teams and then taken times 100.
The resulting points of all rounds played will constitute your team's final result, which is divided
equally among the team members
The points you achieved in the personal task are added to your final account of points. They are not
taken times 21
Example;
Imagine you personally achieved 10 points in the first round for the team-task and 10 points for the
private task Your 3 team-members together reached 33 points on the team-task The team thus together
has 43 points These are multiplied by 2, which gives your team 86 points in total
The other team only reached 35 points, which, multiplied by 2 results in 70 points for the other team.
Together, the two teams have 156 points
To calculate the resulting points for your team, the 86 points you achieved have to be divided by the
156 points of both teams, which is 0,551 If one takes this times 100, the result is 55,1
This means, your team gets 55,1 points in the first round, which means 13,77 points for each of the
team members.
Additionally, each team member gets its personal points, which in your case are 10 So, your personal
























13,77+ 10 = 23,77
13,77+ X
11,22 + X
Before you are divided into your teams, you will do a test round of this kind of task with random teams.
But first you can go on to the next page and have a closer look at the structure of the task.
fHT.4 on/y.-J
The winning team gets the amount of points achieved, the other team gets nothing.
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The resulting points of all rounds played will constitute your team's final result and are divided equally
•mong all team members
Your personal points are added to your final account of points
Example
Imagine you personally achieved 10 points in the first round for the team-task and 10 points for the
private task Your three team-members together reached 33 points The team thus together has 43
points These are multiplied by 2. which gives your team 86 points in total
The other team got 35 points on the team-task, multiplied by 2 results in 70 points.
Your team thus won and the 86 points are divided equally among the team members, which means 21,5
points for each of you Additionally, each team member gets its personal points, which in your case are
10 So, your personal result from round I is 31.5 points.
The members of the other team do not get any points from the team-task in this round, but they of



























Before you are divided into your teams, you will do a test round of this kind of task with random teams
But first you can go on to the next page and have a closer look at the structure of the task
Here you see how the task is organized: You have one page with both tasks. Above one of them is
written "team" and above the other is written "private":
The kind of task is always the same, it will differ in detail in each round and for both tasks, the team-
and the private task.
Your can distribute your effort between both tasks, keeping in mind, that only the team-task contributes
to the success of your team in the competition with the other team Points you make in the team-task are
taken times 2 and then count for the result of your team, whereas points in the private task are counted
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once for your personal account. You should work as fast as possible, because you have only two
minutes altogether! You won't be able to finish both tasks in this time, but you can work a substantial
part on both You can switch between the two tasks whenever you want.
If you have any questions, please ask now!
The task will be explained now for all of you together, giving an example as well. When you have
finished reading this please put these pages face down at the corner of your table and wait until the
presentation of the task starts!
//ufrucf/on J.'
After having played the test round now, we ask you to answer two questions on your perception of the
game. Please do not think long about the questions, answer spontaneously!
1) llow strong is the competition between the teams in your perception'' i
Very strong not strong at all
2) How do you feel about your final result (points) in this game?
Highly uncertain | 1 Highly certain
When you have answered these questions, please put the paper face down on your table to signal that
you are done
You will get a paper informing you about your team-members and the form for the second round now.
Please do not start with the task for the second round before told so!
For the next round, each team gets one additional member They have done the practicing task as well,
so they know how the game is played You cannot choose your new team-member, but you can give a
preference The stronger your preference, the closer you make your cross on the line to one of the
edges
The preferences of all team members are analyzed and if there is a clear preference within the whole
team, we try to match the new member with this preference - but obviously, we cannot give a guarantee
that this will be possible!
Whom would you prefer as additional member in your team?
Strongly prefer Strongly prefer
Person I I Person
Underestimates Overestimator
When you have indicated your preference, put the page face down at the comer of your table and go onl
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£W.jno/!»Kwnr on prrrrprron o/fAr jiruanon:
While we check the preferences of the teams, and try to add the new member following your
preference, you are asked to answer some questions on your perception of the situation your team and
you are in:
A) PI*»»* mark your answer by making a cross oa Ih* Ha«!
I) How strong is the competition among the teams in your perception?
Very strong I
2) How do you feel about your final result (points) in this game''
Highly uncertain I
3) How do you feel about the performance of your team?
Highly uncertain I
4) How do you feel about the performance of overestimators in this game''
Highly uncertain I
B) Pitas« make a cross la (be box, wkkb represents your feelings best!
I) What do you think, how much you might like other overestimate«?




Ml very mach 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very maeh
2) How similar do you think you might be to other overestimators in terms of general attitudes and
opinions?
Ml very mach 1 2 ' 1 *
5 6
3) How much would you like to get to know other overestimators?









4) How much do you feel to belong to other overestimalors?
not vtry much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5) What do you think, how much you might like other members of your recent team?





6) How similar do you think you might be to other members of your recent team in terms of general
attitudes and opinions''
not vtry much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 very mach
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7) How much would you like to get to know your recent team?
not very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very UM)
8) How much do you feel to belong to your recent team?
oot very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very mid
9) To what extent would you prefer to belong to this team or to the other team?
•ot very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very mid
10) How much aware are you of the presence of others''
not very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very mid
11) How much do you feel observed by others?
•ol very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very matt
12) How much do you feel observed by the experimenter?
not very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very mwk
Please signal when you are flnished by putting these pages face down at the corner of your tablel When
everybody has flnished, we are ready for the next round I
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/iu<mc/ion 4/
The experiment is finished now! The results of the second round will be published soon!
At the end, we would like to ask you to answer some demographical questions:
How old are you?
What is your nationality?
Are you male/female ?
Thank you very much!
If you want any further information, or if you want to get notified if there are new experiments going
on, please send an e-mail to
c.schwierentii^algec.unimaas nl
You will get your payment now and some information about the present study.
Thank you for your participation!
Have a nice day!
Appendix II: Instructions experiment 2
/njtrucr/o/i /
Liebe Teilnehmerinnen, lieber Teilnehmer!
Willkommen zu unserem Teamwettbewerb!
Bevor wir anfangen, mochten wir Euch bitten, das folgende wahrend des ganzen Spiels zu beachten:
Bitte redet und kommuniziert nicht miteinander!
Bitte versucht nicht, herauszufinden wie andere antworten oder sich entscheiden!
Bitte blättert nur dann um. wenn Ihr dazu aufgefordert werdet!
Es ist fur uns sehr wichtig, dass Ihr Euch daran genau haltet, denn sonst können wir die Daten nicht
auswerten!
Vielen Dank und viel Spassl
Liebe Teilnehmerin, lieber Teilnehmer!
Diese Untersuchung ist Teil eines Projektes das sich damit beschäftigt, wie Menschen in Teams ihre
Aufmerksamkeit auf verschiedene Aufgaben verteilen, und wie dies durch die Situation in der sie sich
befinden beeinflusst wird.
Im Folgenden wirst Du in ein Team eingeteilt, und mit diesem Team wirst Du im Wettbewerb mit
einem anderen Team Aufgaben losen Jedes Teammitglied bekommt jeweils ein Blatt mit zwei
Versionen der gleichen Aufgabenart Eine Version bringt Punkte für Dein Team, die andere für Dich
selbst Du kannst also in jeder Runde entscheiden, ob Du mehr Einsatz fur die Teamaufgabe oder für
die .private' Aufgabe einbringen willst
1354 Experimental test of the model
Dein Team spielt gegen ein anderes Team hier im Raum, das die gleichen Aufgaben zu erfüllen hat
Dein persönliches Ergebnis hangt also davon ab, wieviel Punkte Du selbst in beiden Aufgaben
erreichst, wieviel Punkte Deine Teammitglieder in der Teamaufgabe erreichen, und wieviel Punkte das
gegnerische Team in der Teamaufgabe erreicht
Im Detail wird das Ergebnis wie folgt berechnet:
Am Ende jeder Runde werden die Punkte, die die Mitglieder eines Teams in der Teamaufgabe erreicht
haben zusammengezahlt und verdoppelt. Danach wird der relative Anteil jedes Teams an allen Punkten,
die im Spiel erreicht wurden, ausgerechnet: Die Punkte, die beide Teams erzielt haben, werden addiert.
Dann wird die Punktzahl für jedes einzelne Team durch diese Gesamtpunktzahl geteilt und mit 100
multipliziert Das Ergebnis dieser Rechnung ist dann die Punktzahl fur das jeweilige Team in der
jeweiligen Runde.
Am Ende des Spiels werden dann die Punkte, die jedes Team insgesamt erreicht hat, unter den
Teammitgliedern gleichmaßig aufgeteilt.
Die Punkte, die Du in der „privaten" Aufgabe in allen Runden erreicht hast, werden zu Deinem
endgültigen Resultat addiert, allerdings werden sie nicht verdoppelt. '
Ein Beispiel:
Stell' Dir vor, Du erzielst in der ersten Runde bei der Teamaufgabe 10 Punkte und genauso viele bei der
privaten Aufgabe. Deine 3 Teammitglieder gemeinsam haben 33 Punkte in der Teamaufgabe erreicht.
Insgesamt hat das Team also 43 Punkte Diese werden verdoppelt, was 86 Punkte fur das Team
insgesamt ergibt Das andere Team hat nur 35 Punkte erreicht - multipliziert mit zwei ergibt das 70
Punkte fur das andere Team.
Beide Teams haben insgesamt also 156 Punkte.
Um das Ergebnis für Dein Team zu berechnen, müssen die 86 Punkte Deines Teams durch 156 geteilt
werden. Das Ergebnis ist 0,551. Multipliziert mit 100 ergibt das 55,1. D.h., Dein Team bekommt in der
ersten Runde 55,1 Punkte Geteilt durch die Anzahl der Teammitglieder ergeben sich daraus 13,77
Punkte pro Teammitglied
Zusatzlich bekommt jedes Teammitglied seine „privaten" Punkte - in Deinem Fall kommen also noch
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Im Detail wird das Ergebnis wie folgt berechnet: *
Am Ende jeder Runde werden die Punkte, die die Mitglieder eines Teams in der Teamaulgabe erreicht
laben zusammengezählt und verdoppelt
DM Team, das gewonnen hat, bekommt die Punkte, die es erzielt hat, das andere Team bekomm! keine
Punkte
Am Ende des Spiels werden dann die Punkte, die jedes Team insgesamt erreicht hat unter dm
Teammitgliedern gleichmäßig aufgeteilt
Die Punkte, die Du in der ..privaten" Aufgabe in allen Runden erreicht hast, werden zu Deinem
endgültigen Resultat addiert, allerdings werden sie nicht verdoppelt.
Ein Beispiel
Stell' Dir vor. Du erzielst in der ersten Runde bei der Teamaufgabe 10 Punkte und genauso viele bei der
privaten Aufgabe Deine 3 Teammitgheder gemeinsam haben 33 Punkte in der Teamaufgahe erreicht
Insgesamt hat das Team also 43 Punkte Diese werden verdoppelt, was 86 Punkte fur das Team
insgesamt ergibt Das andere Team hat nur 35 Punkte erreicht - multipliziert mit zwei ergibt das 70
Punkte fur das andere Team
Dem Team hat also gewonnen und die 86 Punkte werden gleichmäßig unter den Teammitgliedern
aufgeteilt D h , jedes Mitglied Deines Teams bekommt 21.5 Punkte
Zusätzlich bekommt jedes Teammitglied seine ..privaten" Punkte - in Deinem hall kommen also noch
10 Punkte hinzu Dein Gesamtergebnis für diese Runde ist deshalb 31,5 Punkte
Die Mitglieder des anderen Teams bekommen in dieser Runde keinerlei Punkte von der Teamaufgabe.





























Bevor die Teams eingeteilt werden, werden wir eine Testrunde mit zufallig zusammengestellten Teams
spielen Auf der nächsten Seite kannst Du sehen wie die Aufgabe genau aussieht!
Hier siehst Du. wie die Aufgaben aufgebaut sind Du bekommst ein Blatt mit beiden Aufgaben Eine
hat die Überschrift „Team", die andere „Privat".
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Team Private
Die Aufgabenart ist immer gleich, die Aufgaben werden sich nur im Detail andern. Die Aufgabentypen
werden gleich kurz erklärt. Grundsatzlich handelt es sich um „Denkaufgaben". Du kannst Deinen
Hinsatz zwischen der privaten und der Teamaufgabe aufteilen Denk' allerdings dabei daran, dass nur
die Teamaufgabe zum Frfolg Deines Teams im Wettbewerb mit dem anderen Team beitragt
Punkte, die Du in der Teamaufgabe machst, werden verdoppelt und fur Dein Team gezahlt, wahrend
Punkte in der „privaten" Aufgabe einfach für Dein persönliches Resultat zahlen.
Du musst so schnell wie möglich arbeiten, denn Du hast insgesamt nur I Minute Zeit! Du wirst in
dieser Zeit natürlich nicht beide Aufgaben fertigstellen können, aber Du kannst durchaus bei beiden
Aufgaben Punkte machen Du kannst zwischen den beiden Aufgaben jederzeit wechseln
Die fünf besten Teilnehmer am Teamwettbewerb bekommen einen Kinogutschein!
Wichtig:
Nach einigen Runden wird eine Zwischenbilanz gezogen Wenn eines der Teams bis dahin weniger als
30 Teampunkte pro Teammitglied erreicht hat, scheidet es aus und das dritte Team im Raum spielt an
seiner Stelle mit
Wenn Du Fragen hast, wende Dich bitte an die Versuchsleiterin!
Wenn Du diese Seiten gelesen und verstanden hast, drehe sie bitte um, damit deutlich sichtbar ist, dass
Du fertig bist Wenn alle fertig gelesen haben wird die Aufgabe genau erklärt und eine Testrunde
gespielt
/».r/rucrion J:
Bevor das Spiel weitergeht, wird jetzt Zwischenbilanz gezogen Sollte eins der beiden Teams in den
ersten drei Runden weniger als 30Teampunkte erreicht haben, scheidet es aus und das Team, das bisher
nicht mitgespielt hat. tritt an seine Stelle (da es ein kleines Team ist. wird fur dieses Team etwas anders
gezahlt - aber das wird spater noch ausführlich erklärt) Sollten beide Teams mehr als 30 Punkte
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erreicht haben, werden die Mitglieder des "Ersatzteams" auf die bisherigen Teams aufgeteilt Darum
bitten wir Dich, jetzt schon eine Präferenz anzugeben, wen Du als neues Teammitglied mochtest, falls
das Ersatzteam aufgeteilt wird
Wir werden die Präferenzen aller Teammitglieder auswerten, und wem es eine starke gemeinsame
Präferenz im Team gibt, werden wir versuchen, das neue Teammitglied dementsprechend zu wählen.
aber garantieren können wir das natürlich nicht
Um Deine Präferenz anzugeben, musst Du den Punkt auf der Linie mit einem Strich markieren, der
Deiner Präferenz am meisten entspricht.
Wen wurdest Du als neues Teammitglied vorziehen?
Starke Präferenz fur Starke Präferenz fur
kognitiven Stil P |_ | kognitiven Stil K
Wenn Du Deine Präferenz angegeben hast, bitte drehe die Seite um, so dass sie eingesammelt werden
kann, und fange an. den Fragebogen auszufüllen!
/««ruedon 4
Wahrend wir Zwischenbilanz ziehen und gegebenenfalls die neuen Mitglieder ihren Teams zuordnen,
bitten wir Dich, ein paar Fragen zu Deiner Wahrnehmung der Situation zu beantworten
A) Bitte markiere den Punkt auf der Linie, der Deiner Wahrnehmung am besten entspricht, mit einem
Strich!
1) Wie groß ist Deiner Meinung nach in diesem Spiel die Chance, dass ein Team nach der
Zwischenbilanz ausscheiden muss''
Sehr groß I I Sehr klein
2) Wie groß ist Deiner Meinung nach in diesem Spiel die Chance, dass beide Teams bei der
Zwischenbilanz mit ihrem Punktestand (Teampunktet) zufrieden sein können''
Sehr groß I I Sehr klein
3) Wie groß ist Deiner Meinung nach in diesem Spiel die Chance, dass Du personlich bei der
Zwischenbilanz mit Deinem Punklestand (Team- und Privatpunkte!) zufrieden sein kannst?
Sehr groß I I Sehr klein
4) Wie wichtig ist es um in diesem Spiel zu gewinnen, dass alle Teammitglieder ihr Bestes geben fur
das Team''
Sehr wichtig I I Sehr unwichtig
5) Wie stark ist Deiner Meinung nach in diesem Spiel der Wettbewerb zwischen den Teams?
Sehr stark I I Sehr schwach
6) Wie sicher bist Du Dir, dass Du Deine Ziele in diesem Spiel erreichen kannst''
Sehr sicher I I Gar nicht sicher
139I Experimental test of the model
7) Wie sicher bist Du Dir, dass Dein Einsatz ausreichend war, damit das Team nach der
Zwischenbilanz weiterspielen kann?
Sehr sicher I I Gar nicht sicher
8) Wie sicher bist Du Dir, dass die anderen Mitglieder Deines Teams genug Einsatz erbracht haben,
damit das Team weiterspielen kann?
Sehr sicher I I Gar nicht sicher
9) Wie sicher bist Du Dir, dass Dein Team nach der Zwischenbilanz weiterspielen darf?
Sehr sicher |__ I Gar nicht sicher
10) Wie wichtig ist es für Dich, dass Dein Team nach der Zwischenbilanz weiterspielen darf?
Sehr wichtig I I Gar nicht wichtig
B) Mitte mach' ein Kreuz in das Küstchen, das Deine Wahrnehmung am besten wiedergibt!
I) Was glaubst Du, wie sehr Du die anderen P mögen würdest?
Überhaupt nicht gem 1 2 |3 4 5 |6 7 g | 9 Sehr gern
2) Was glaubst Du, wie ahnlich Du den anderen P in Bezug auf allgemeine Einstellungen und
Meinungen bist?
Oberhaupt nicht ähnlich I |2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 9 Sehr ahnlich
3) Wie sehr hast Du das Gefühl, dass Du zu den anderen P gehörst?
Überhaupt nicht 3 Sehr stark
4) Was glaubst Du, wie sehr Du die anderen Mitglieder Deines Teams mögen würdest?
Überhaupt nicht 1 2 3 4 |5 6 7 O 9 | Sehr gem
5) Was glaubst Du, wie ahnlich Du den anderen Mitgliedern Deines Teams in Bezug auf allgemeine
Einstellungen und Meinungen bist?
Überhaupt nicht ahnlich 1 2 3 4 5 6 |7 8 9 1 Sehr ahnlich
6) Wie sehr hast Du das Gefühl, dass Du zu Deinem momentanen Team gehörst?
Überhaupt nicht 1 2 3 |4 5
7) In welchem Masse wurdest Du lieber zum anderen Team
Überhaupt nicht 1 2 3 4
8) Wie sehr ist Dir die Gegenwart anderer bewusst?
Überhaupt nicht bewusst 1 2 3 4
9) Wie sehr fühlst Du Dich von anderen beobachtet?







10) Wie sehr fühlst Du Dich von den Versuchsleitern beobachtet?


















Bitte drehe diese Seiten um, wenn Du fertig bist, damit wir erkennen können, wann alle fertig sind.
Dann geht es mit den neuen Teams weiter!
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Appendix III: Instructions experiments 3 & 4
tasirucfio/? /
Beste deelnemer.
Dit experiment bestaal uit verschillende onderdelen In dit eerste gedeelte krijg je de kans om de taak te
oefenen die je later met je team gaal uitvoeren om geld te verdienen Vorder krijg je informatie over
andere deelnemers.
Wat ga je überhaupt in dit experiment doen' Je wordt later in en groep ingcdceld en dan moel elk
groepslid rekensommen maken Van net aantal goed uitgevoerde rekensommen hangt de leambcloning
af, die gehjkmatig onder de teamleden verdeeld word WIJ gaan meerdere motten speien Hoc dat
allemaal precies gebeult verteilen WIJ je later nog Nu komt eerst dc ronde waarin je kunt ocfenen
De deelnemers in dit experiment zijn willekeurig in verschillende groepen ingcdeeld l-r zijn "blauwe"
en "rode" groepen en ook nog "oude leden" en "nieuwe leden" In net begin geeft de computer je de
informatie over je eigen calegorie(en) Je moet verschillende keren tijdens het experiment aangeven, bij
welke categories je hoort Dat is belangnjk voor dc groepsindeling
In dit eerste gedeelte nu kun jc met het soon rekensommen kenms maken en een beetje ocfenen Jc her»
straks 3 minuten de tijd om zoveel mogelijk rekensommen te maken Als de 3 minuten om zgn. krijgen
jullie nog de gelegenheid om je een beeld te vormen hoe de anderen gepresteerd hebhen Pas daarna
worden jullie in teams ingedeeld en begint het spel
Probeer dus zoveel mogehjk berekemngen te doen, en daarvan ook nog zoveel mogelijk goed te makcnl
Maar realiseer je dat je in de spelperiodes waarin om geld wordt gespeeld voor foute resultaten van de
sommen geen stral'puntcn krijgl
Je mag geen rekenmachine gebruikenl
Voor het hele experiment is het belangnjk dat je, als je vragen hebt, een teken gee ft aan de leider van
net experiment Zij komt dan naar je toe en beantwoordt je vraag A ub met met andere deelnemers
praten!
En nu veel plezier!
/rufrucrion 2:
Nu begint het eigenlijke spel Jullie worden nu in teams ingedeeld Elk team representeert een bednjf
dat op een markt moet overleven Het bedrijf produeeert een product (het resultaat van de
rekensommen) en verkoopt het voor en pnjs, die door de markt bepaald wordt Met bednjf (het team)
maakt I gulden kosten voor elk teamiid, dus een vierpersoonsteam begint met een min van 4 gulden te
speien Voor de "productie" hebben jullie in elk ronde I minuut de tijd Het totale aantal goed gemaakte
rekensommen van net team wordt dan met de marktpnjs vermemgvuldigd, d w z met een factor, die at
random door de computer wordt vastgesteld op een waarde tussen 0,75 en 1.25 gulden (in stappen van 5
cent) (1,25 en 1,75 gulden) Deze waarde wordt elke ronde opnieuw vastgesteld. maar wordt pas aan het
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eind van het experiment aan jullie verteld. Van de totale teamopbrengst worden dan 4 gulden
afgetrokken en het overblijvende bedrag (de winst) wordt gelijkmatig onder de leamleden verdeeld. Om
winst te maken moeten jullie dus samen meer dan 4 gulden per ronde verdienen.
Om een voorbeeld te geven: Als je nu 4 rekensommen goed maakl, en de andere leden van je team ook
ieder 4 rekensommen goed maken, dan hebben jullie samen 16 punten Dit aantal punten wordt met de
marktprijs vermenigvuldigd Als die bijvoorbeeld f 0,90 bedraagt, is de totale teamopbrengst 16 • f 0,90
= f 14,40 in deze ronde Daarvan worden f 4,- afgetrokken Dit resulteert in een teamwinst van f 10,40,
d.w.z. f 2,60 voor ieder team I id
Jullie gaan in totaal S ronden spelen, elke ronde met een opnieuw vastgestelde marktprijs
We beginnen nu eerst met twee rondes, dan komt een andere taak. en dan volgen de laatste dne rondes.
Als je nu nog vragen hebt, geef a.u.b en teken aan de experimentleiderl
Je ziet nu straks op het scherm tot welke categorie je teamleden behoren. Als je klaar bent om te
beginnen, klik de "ok"-button! Als niemand meer vragen heft, begint de eerste ronde
In het volgende kun je een keuze maken voor een nieuw teamlid. Elk team van "oude"
feden knjgt een nieuw lid. Dus, de laatste dne ronden worden met teams van 5 personen
gespeeld.
De computer biedt aan elk lid van elk team dezelfde 2 mogelijke nieuwe leden Elk lid, dus ook jij,
moet dan aangeven. of hij/zij een voorkeur heeft voor een van de aangeboden mogelijke nieuwe leden
Als er gcen voorkeur aangegeven wordt, kiest de computer een van de nieuwe leden voor het team met
en kans van 50%.
Als je een voorkeur aangegeven hebt wordt je gevraagd om ook nog aan te geven hoeveel je bereid bent
te betalen als team om de kans te verhogen dal het door jou geprefereerde nieuwe lid gekozen wordt
Dit bedrag wordt als percentage van de marktpnjs van de teamoutput aangegeven Deze outputpnjs is
de prijs die geldt voor de ronde die jullie net gespeeld hebben
Nadat elk lid van elk team zijn beslissing heeft genomen wordt at random de beslissing van een van de
teamleden gekozen om uitgevoerd te worden Als er een voorkeur genoemd en een bedrag aangegeven
is, wordt dit bedrag van het team betaald (dus van het tegoed van elk "oude" lid word '/< van dit bedrag
afgetrokken).
Daama worden de laatste drie ronden in de nieuwe teams gespeeld en het experiment word met een
vragenlijst afgesloten.
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Hieronder ae ie en voortxdd. hoe ron beslissiny emit zou binnen zien'
Je hebt een voorkeur voor en bepaald nieuw lid aangegeven Nu moet je beslissen:
Hoeveel ben je bereid te betalen om de kans te verhogen dat het door jou geprelereerde nieuwe lid
gekozen wordf (Het geld wofdt door het hele team betaald')
Bedrag in % van de outputprijs













Dus, als je b v ervoor zou kiezen. 30°« van de outputpnjs te beulen, en de oulputprijs in de lautste
ronde was f I 50 (f I 00), dan moet het team dus f 0,45 (f 0.30) gulden betalen voor die voorkeur Van
het tegoed van elk teamhd wordt dan '/< van dit bedrag afgetrokken (dus f 0.11) (dus f 0 075) Met
geprefereerde nieuwe lid wordt nu met een kans van 70% aan jouw team toegewezen Ook als het
geprefereerde lid toch met aan jouw team wordl toegewezen. moet je dat bedrag betalen
Met de nieuwe teams worden dan de laatste drie ronden gespeldl
De laatste drie ronden worden met teams van vijf personen gespeeld l)e "nieuwe leden". dus ook jij,
worden nu aan de "oude" teams aangeboden. en ZIJ mögen zeggen of ze een voorkeur voor en "blauw"
of "rood" meuw lid hebben
Uiteindelijk bepaalt de computer wie aan welk "oud" team toegevoegd wordl Diegenen die aan geen
"oud" team toegevoegd worden, speien dan in een eigen vijf-personenleam verder
Dus.jullie moeten nu even wachten tot dat de "oude" leden nun beslissingen hebben genomen
Als de "oude" leden nun beslissingen hebben genomen, hören jullie bij welk team jullie verder gaan
spelen.
Met de nieuwe teams worden dan de laatste drie ronden gespeeld
How old are you?
What is your sex?
What do you study?
Which group has. in you opinion, performed better on the multiplication task?
How strong did you identify with your category (red/blue)''
How uncertain did you feel with respect to your results in this experiment?
When you played the game, how well did you understand what happened in this situation''
When you played the game, how uncertain have you been about what happened in this situation?
When you played the game, how well could you predict what would happen?
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5 An empirical test in a business-simulation game'
5.1 Introduction <•' r*,- -,-:,- ; • ^.' s, .*' ;>«.-»,
As the EU becomes an ever-closer community, and globalization of firms
increases, more and more people work in foreign countries, and people of different
nationalities have to work together. Everybody knows about stereotypes of and prejudice
against people of other nationalities. Some stereotypes are negative with respect to work
behavior, some are positive, and there is reason to assume that they influence behavior.
However, despite its relevance for today's world, discrimination by nationality is a topic
rarely addressed in economics literature, compared to other kinds of discrimination, e.g.,
discrimination by race or gender. This chapter explores in how far the economic and
psychological mechanisms the integrated framework uses to explain discrimination in
general, which have been tested so far using artificial groups, influence discrimination
against people of a different nationality.
For the purpose of this study, group discrimination is defined as a preference
against having an additional member in one's group only because it belongs to a national
outgroup. This holds only if the outgroup can be assumed to be on average at least
equally productive as the ingroup. Based on the general framework (chapter 2) and the
theoretical model described in chapter 3, the independent variables assumed to influence
the amount of discrimination analyzed here are competition, (self-relevant) subjective
uncertainty, and identification with the own group. As described in chapter 3,
competition is, following the psychological mechanism, assumed to enhance self-
relevant uncertainty, which leads to strengthened identification with the group one
belongs to. Hence, it raises the use of stereotypes and prejudice against the outgroup. The
economic mechanism assumed in this chapter differs from the one modeled in chapter 3:
Statistical discrimination is supposed to play a role now, and not only the weak form, as
in chapter 4, but a strong form, as stereotypes about the national groups in question are
congruent with real differences in average group performance. Following such an
economic mechanism, competition should not allow for discriminatory preferences
against the (stereotypically) better performing national group to translate into behavior,
when people are interested in the rewards they get from doing well in the game. The
" This chapter is based on a working paper jointly authored with U Glunk (2002) "Nationality-based
discrimination in a business-simulation game" Paper presented at (he EURAM, Stockholm, 2002.
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theoretical model of chapter 3 implies that the importance of high productivity of new
employ«* in the team's hiring preferences becomes higher when competition
strengthens (see the next section» In the business game this study uses (see below), it
might even be that participants perceive productivity of a new member as not important
at all when competition is low, because there is not much at stake and they might have
other aims in the game, such as having fun with their team. However, when they perceive
competition to be strong and get involved in this competition, we assume they should
also focus stronger on (average) productivities in choosing new members for their teams,
A business simulation game done as part of the regular curriculum for first year
'International Business' (IB) students at the University of Maastricht is used to quasi-
cxpenmentally analyze certain aspects of discriminatory behavior between nationalities.
The Faculty of Economics and Business Administration at the University of Maastricht ii
an international faculty, where the working language in most courses is Inglish The two
largest national groups are Dutch and German students The two groups hold strong
Stereotypical views about each other, as a pilot survey among 550 first-year students
atewtd (Glunk & Olie. 2003). The Dutch are portrayed as being more open-minded, but
also more arrogant than the Germans, whereas the Germans are said to be more
ambitious and hard-working - which is also supposed to lead to better results Partially,
these stereotypes seem to reflect reality, as German students often have better results in
their exams, but this does not hold for all courses and in all years, as a comparison of
study results of the two groups over several years showed In more recent years,
however, the difference becomes more pronounced than in former periods: In the cohorts
of the two management games analyzed here, 2000 and 2001, a larger difference between
the two groups than in earlier cohorts exists. German students being better than the Dutch
on average. Still, in the 2U00-cohort, this effect is only pronounced with respect to
methods courses (see table 5.7.4 in appendix I).
The management game provides the opportunity to test some of the predictions of
the theoretical model in a more realistic setting than laboratory experiments are. Of
course, it is still an artificial situation, but it has many of the features which characterize
the real-life situations this research is concerned with: Teams, which work together on a
task, have to decide over the composition of the team The task has some importance for
the team as a whole and for each of the team members alone, as students get study points
for the management game. The situational context is a simulation of firms on markets,
which compete against each other for market share. Last but not least, the categories in
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question are real, meaningful categories, and emotional aspects (prejudice) can influence
behavior.
The chapter is structured as follows: First, hypotheses are developed. Secondly,
the design of the study is described. Then, the results are presented, and in the last
section these results are discussed and a conclusion is formulated.
5.2 Hypotheses
The hypotheses are derived from the integrated framework described in chapter 2,
and are related to the integrated model described in chapter 3. However, they do not
mirror the integrated model, as the situation at hand here is a bit different from the one it
has been developed for: The integrated model refers to situations where the outgroup is
both stereotyped negatively with respect to work performance and disliked (at least
because of its outgroup status). In the present case, however, this can hold only for part
of the situation, namely for German teams having to decide whether they want a Dutch
new member in their group. In the other case, Dutch teams having to decide whether they
want a German new member in their group, the outgroup member belongs to a group,
which is positively stereotyped with respect to work performance - and these stereotypes
are partially in agreement with real average differences between the groups.
Another difference with the integrated model is that in the business game there
are no monetary costs: Teams don't pay their members, there is no monetary cost for an
implementation of preferences, and teams also don't earn money, but get grades. Finally,
there is no individual information, such that use of stereotypes 5 = I with respect to
(valid) performance steretoypes. Therefore, no suppressing economic effect of
competition can work on S. The usual cost of imperfect information can be incurred
when making the wrong choice for a new team member. In this case, this is not related to
monetary profits, but to better or worse grades for team members. The cost of imperfect
information becomes a cost of discrimination when preferences are not based on
performance-based stereotypes, but on general dislike for an outgroup member, which
belongs to a stereotypically better performing nationality. Making a choice based on
general dislike for the better performing nationality can lead to lower performance of the
own team, and thus reduces the expected grade the team gets for performance in the
game. In terms of economic theory, one could speak here about taste-based
discrimination as opposed to statistical discrimination.
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The economic mechanism working in this setting is close to the 'strong' version
of statistical discrimination: German new members are supposed to be more productive
(stcreotypically, and for the cohorts at hand this is confirmed by reality), and therefore,
'economically' should be preferred over Dutch new members, when no individual
information is available This economic mechanism and a psychological mechanism
based purely on performance stereotypes would lead to the same result - and thus cannot
be distinguished. Therefore, this mechanism is referred to as the 'psycho-economic
mechanism' in the following. However, a psychological ingroup/outgroup ell eel (in the
following referred to as 'ingroup-bias'), including prejudice, should in this situation lead
to a different result, especially as there exists a negative general altitude'* towards
Germans among many Dutch people (see. eg. Dekker, 1999), which could strengthen
ingroup bias For German groups deciding about Dutch new members, ingroup bias and
productivity-related (stereotypical) perceptions work in the same direction.
In this context it is also important. tWi/rA stereotypes are Ibcused on - the
productivity-related ones, or other stereotypes, e.g.. about one nationality being more
social than the other. Use of such stereotypes might lead to different evaluations of
members of the nationality than productivity-related stereotypes and can influence
behavior, especially when students do not see success of their firm as the main aim of
participating in the business game. Different from the theoretical model, such stereotypes
are introduced here as another determinant of the discriminatory taste e, besides
prejudice.
To link the predictions for the business game with the theoretical model (chapter
3), one can say that two main cases can be distinguished:
1) The less performing national group (Dutch) has outgroup status ->
((/"'(n/(/*n))^A//^' and e** reinforce each other and add up to a preference against
Dutch new members.
2) The less performing national group (Dutch) has ingroup status -> e works against
Germans (the outgroup), w"'(n/(fii))4M/' works in favor of them. l/"'(n/(/»*))
and E counteract each other.
* Not only in the sense of emotional evaluation, but also in the »erae of (not-produc&vity-felatcd)
stereotypes
" Now the productivity stereotype refers to nationalities instead of ingroup/outgroup
" The discriminatory taste now is a result not only of prejudice, but also of not-productrvrty-related
stereotypes
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According to the theoretical model, strengthening of competition not only influences
the psychological mechanism of ingroup bias ('taste-based discrimination'), but is also
expected to affect statistical discrimination. However, as the two mechanisms are
assumed to counteract each other in the case when Dutch teams decide about new
members, weak competition allows teams to enact the 'psychological' or 'taste-based
preference', as productivity-related considerations are seen as being of less importance.
Strong competition is expected to reduce the influence of the psychological mechanism
in favor of the 'statistical-discrimination effect', because, following the theoretical
model, when competition is perceived as strong productivity considerations should play a
larger role when choosing a new member. I.e., (/"'(n/(/>n)), which gives the subjective
importance of AW in formula 3.22 for Dt/ with 5=1, goes up. Following the
psychological mechanism, the taste-based preference e can also increase with
competition. Figure 5.1 illustrates this.
• T • E (against outgroup members)
Competition I Preference((/"'<n/(/>n)).dM/>. e)
(of real productivity-related stereotype) (against less performing group)
Sfa/M/ica/ d/.KT//m/iaf/on /*//•/
Figure 5.1: Link with the theoretical model. Straight lines represent positive links, dashed
lines negative links. C = self-relevant certainty, e = discriminator)' taste parameter, I =
identification with ingroup, (y"'(n//*n) = marginal utility of real profit share, AMP = expected
difference in productivity.
To summarize the different predictions for the business simulation game: The
psychological mechanism predicts that identification with the ingroup (in case of
strong/increasing competition) leads to ingroup bias in decision making, which also
implies more use of prejudice and (not-productivity-related) stereotypes. Use of
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productivity-related stereotypes can in specific situations also lead to outgroup bias (see
chapter 4). Therefore, one should expect a general preference against new members that
belong to the national outgroup. but also a preference against members of the
stereotypically worse performing nationality The latter prediction can be based on an
economic mechanism: When competition is stronger, and the categories do provide real
information about group productivities, members of the group which performs better on
average should be preferred, i.e.. in this case German new members. T.conomically
seen', emotional factors and not-productivity-related stereotypes (general ingroup bias)
should not play a role. Therefore, if Dutch students prefer Dutch new members, this
indicates a purely psychological mechanism. If Dutch teams prefer Germans, the psycho-
economic mechanism (based on use of productivity-related stereotypes) can explain this.
If Germans prefer Germans, it can be the result of both, the psycho-economic or the
psychological ingroup mechanism. A situation which cannot be explained, neither with
the psycho-economic mechanism, nor with a psychological ingroup effect, would be
Germans prefering Dutch new members (outgroup bias in favor of the stereotypically
worse performing group). From this reasoning together with the assumption that no
significant differences between national groups with respect to general liking of new
members exist'''', the following hypotheses, assuming two main effects and one
interaction efTect, are derived:
Hla): There is no difference in strength of preferences between teams of different
nationalities.
Hlb) Germans are preferred over Dutch fimim e/fcc< o/ «7w pjyc/io-econom/c
iwec/wnwm; re/of/onj/»p cV i/i/fgure 5.2/
Hlc) Ingroup members are preferred over outgroup members (Vn/eracMo/i <#&«*',
/wyc*o/og;ca/ /nec/wn/sm; re/af/onsA/p o> myigj/re 5.2/
Two more hypotheses assume a moderating effect of competition - either for the
psycho-economic mechanism or the psychological mechanism of ingroup bias. If the
psychological effect of ingroup bias and the psycho-economic effect of stereotype use
(statistical discrimination) work in the same direction, both effects cannot be
distinguished.
Even if the specific Dutch-German situation might lead to stronger ingroup bias among Dutch students,
this is not expected to significantly influence general liking for new group members from the rational
ingroup and outgroup
* This referes to the interaction of nationality of the team and nationality of the new member which it
expected, and which represents the ingroup/oulgroup efTect in an ANOVA.
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H2a): The stronger competition, the more there is a preference for German new
members over Dutch new members (psycho-economic mechanism of stereotype use
f'jtaf«</ca/' rfHcnmwifl/io/i; reta/o/uAi/w *# - ty- c^ m_/?gure 5.2/
H2b) The stronger competition, the more are ingroup members preferred over
outgroup members, no matter what nationality they have fjivyc/io/og/ca/ e#fec/;
re/afionjAi/M e) -^J - a^ //»yfgwe 5.2/
A precondition for hypothesis 2b) is, that an increase in competition, and hence in
self-relevant uncertainty, led to stronger identification with one's ingroup, as the
integrated model (chapter 3) assumes:
H3): The stronger (perceived) competition, the higher (self-relevant) uncertainty,
and hence the stronger identification with one's team/nationality fre/a//o«r/H/w ej c$/) m
5.2/
The following figure shows the relationships assumed:




Strong competition Use of (productivity related) stereotypes
Pref for
b)/ ^ Germans
Importance of marginal productivity of new member
/•jrycAo-fco/ioim'c e^ec/ - jfatfsA'ca/ durriminarian -
Figure 5.2: Assumed rtlitionships bttween variables in the quasi-experiment - straight
lines represent positive relationships.
5.3 Design of the quasi-experiment
5. J. / 77ie managemem game
The INTOP 111 management game is a simulation of firms in a competitive
market. More precisely, (he game represents a supply oligopoly with polypolistic demand
(see Raetge, Fischer, & Kunbcrger (1998) for a more detailed description of the game).
Two products are produced (vacuum cleaners and radios) at different quality levels.
Teams of maximally six players represent one firm, which is competing with four other
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firms in one game. Players have to make decisions concerning the amount of production,
diversification of products, expansion to a foreign market, marketing strategies etc., i.e.,
strategic decisions concerning business objectives and operating principles (Baetge.
Fischer, & Kunberger, 1998) Lach player is supposed to be mainly responsible for one
area of decisions. The game is played over six rounds. It is played computer-based, and
students get help from tutors when they have problems with the tools, but they have to
make their business-related decisions without help A computer calculates market
processes. Human resource management or other labor-relaied questions are not touched.
However, the game requires team skills of the participants Competition usually is
perceived as strongest in the third round, as then all difficulties are introduced and all
participants usually have understood the game correctly. However, if a Firm has done
very' badly in round one, it is difficult to catch up again later.
This game provides a unique environment for a quasi-experimental study. The
setting simulates a business environment, participants have to make business decisions,
and they have to do this in interdependent teams, Furthermore, there is something at
stake in this game, not monetary profits, but grades for the course. Still, the setting is
relatively controlled such that it is close to a laboratory experiment in a more complex
setting. However, as the game is played for certain educational purposes, it is not
possible to control for all factors one would like to control for. 1 or example, how teams
structure their decision-making process is up to them, and free communication is
allowed. As several teams play in the same room, inter-team communication is in
principle possible (but not very probable).
5.3.2 Scrmp/e
The sample of they/«/ game consisted of 57 teams. Four teams including non-
Dutch, non-German students, and two teams with equal numbers of Dutch and German
students were excluded from the analysis, as there were too few of them for a separate
analysis. Of the 51 teams left, 35 were homogeneous (25 Dutch, 10 German) and 16
included a token person or a minority (six with German majority, ten with Dutch
majority).
With respect to the discrimination measure (see below for details), in total 29
groups answered the question whether a new member may join their group about a
German student, and 22 groups about a Dutch student. For ten groups the new member
was an ingroup membeT (two German new members, eight Dutch new members), for 14
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German and 27 Dutch groups it was an outgroup member. All members of each team
answered the questionnaires, so altogether, 217 students where taking part in the study.
Team size varied between four and six people.
The sample of the second gome consisted of 55 teams taking part in the
management game. For the analysis eight teams with non-Dutch and non-German
members, two half-Dutch, half-German teams, and one team with members of unknown
nationality were excluded. Of the remaining 44 teams, 22 were homogeneous - 11 Dutch
and 11 German - and 22 included a token person or a minority. Five groups had a
German majority, and 17 groups had a Dutch majority.
With respect to the discrimination measure, 42 of the teams included in the
analysis answered the question about either a Dutch or a German student. 17 answered
this question about a German student, and 25 groups about a Dutch student. 15 Dutch
majority groups answered the question for an ingroup member, and 12 for an outgroup
member, while five German majority groups answered the question for an ingroup
member and 10 for an outgroup member. The number of members of one team
answering the questionnaire varied with team-size between three and seven people". In
general, nearly all members of each team answered the questionnaires, so altogether, 297
students were taking part in the study.
5.3.3 /VocttÄwe ant/ fUM/io
Data were collected during two consecutive years. The reasons for running the
study twice were (i) that one management game does not provide enough aggregate data
for analyzing questions of ingroup-outgroup favoritism by nationality with reasonable
sample size, and (ii) that preliminary results from the first experiment raised some
questions, which could not be answered with the data collected. Therefore, some new
items were included in the second questionnaire. Data in general was pooled for the two
years, as one can assume that the sample of both years comes from approximately the
same population, business students at the University of Maastricht. A test whether
samples from the two years differed in the discrimination measure (which measured
liking of a specific new member - see below) was negative (t = .38, p = .707 (2-tailed);
see table 5.7.3 in appendix 1).
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were analyzed with pooled data, whereas hypothesis 3 was
analyzed for the two games separately. This was done because for measuring
" One team consisting of only two people was excluded from the analysis
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identification and uncertainty different questions were used in the second study The
reason for changing parts of the questionnaire was that in the first game it had been very
long, and this led to a relatively high amount of incompletely answered questionnaires.
The scales for measuring identification and certainty therefore consisted of fewer items
in the second game
in both games, the same questionnaire was given to the students at three points in
time during the game. However, for the research reported here only the second
measurement time is relevant. The questionnaire consists of items concerning perception
of the team situation, stemming mainly from widely used and tested instruments In the
second game, apart from shortening some scales, some items were added, but the main
part remained the same Relevant here are the following parts of the questionnaire:
In the first game, thirteen items adapted from Mulhn and Hogg (1998) were used
to measure identification with the team ("1 have positive feelings towards my team
members; I have confidence in my team members, I feel comfortable depending on my
team members. I think the other team members perform well; I think that, with regard to
decision making. I have more in common with members of this team than with members
of other teams; 1 think that, generally speaking, I have more in common with members of
this team than with members of other teams; I think that the members of this team are
well-suited to each other; 1 think it is right, in the view of my individual performance,
that I am a member of this team; I find it pleasant to be a member of this team; I would
like to continue working together with this team; I think it would be nicer in another
team; I am glad that 1 ended up in this team; I have negative feelings about my team
members"). Cronbach's alpha" of this scale is .83. In the second game, only six items
remained in the scale ("I have positive feelings towards my team members; I have
confidence in my team members; I feel comfortable depending on my team members; I
think the other team members perform well; I think that the members of this team are
well suited to each other; I would like to continue working together with this team").
Cronbach's alpha of this scale was .96.
In 2000, five self-constructed questions asked how certain subjects were about
various aspects of their firm's performance and strategy in the game, representing the
construct 'self-relevant (un»certainty' ("How certain are you that you are personally
™ Cronbach's alpha is a coefficient of reliability and measures how well i »el of item» (or variable»)
measures an one-dimensional latent construe! It is a function of the number of test items and the average
interconclation among the items (sec http://www.als.ucU.edu/stafspss/faq/alpha.hUnl)
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doing well in this game?"; "How certain are you that your firm will be doing well in this
game?"; How certain are you about the measures your firm has to take to do well in this
game?"; How certain are you that you will succeed with your strategy?"; How certain are
you that you will reach your personal aims during this game?"). These questions were
constructed such that they covered different aspects of uncertainty - about results in the
game, but also uncertainty about doing personally well and about being able to reach
personal aims in the game, as aims of participants could differ from doing well as a team
in the game.
In the second game only three, reformulated, questions measuring uncertainty
were asked ("When playing the Management Game, ...to what extent do you understand
it?"; "... are you certain about what is happening in the game?" "...can you predict what
is going to happen in the Management Game?"). Cronbach's alpha of the uncertainty
scale was .92 in the first game and .76 in the second game. The reason for changing the
uncertainty measure from the first game despite of a very high alpha was the intention to
shorten the questionnaire. Furthermore, tutors indicated that one important source of
uncertainty could be understanding of what happened in the game. This is a more basic
uncertainty than the one captured with the items in the first game, so (hat it was assumed
that questions pertaining to this aspect could capture student's subjective uncertainty
equally well, in a shorter way. This, however, was not confirmed with respect to internal
consistency of the scale. The aim was of course to represent the construct "self-relevant
subjective certainty" as well as possible, but already the experiments described in the
previous chapter showed that it is difficult to measure this construct validly. Further
research should try to develop a more valid scale.
Only in the second game, one self-constructed item measured whether the efforts
of the team were seen as related to the actual team results ("When playing the
Management Game, to what extent do you see the efforts of your team as related to the
actual team results?"). We decided to measure this, because it would make a difference
especially with respect to the 'economic' mechanisms, whether students attribute the
success in the game rather to chance or to the effort of the team.
In the first game, one self-constructed item measured how important it is for the
participants to do well in the game ("How important is it for you to do well in this
game'.'"). In the second game, seven self-constructed items measured what aspects of the
game were important for the participants: "How important is it for you, ...to do well as a
firm in the game?; ...that your team outperforms the other teams?; ...that everybody of
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your team contributes equally to the success of the firm?; to have fun during team
meetings; ...to socialize during team meetings?; ...to get along well with your team
members?"). This scale was extended from one question to these six questions, to be
better able to rule out an alternative explanation Tor the findings in game one. namely that
Dutch subjects see performing well as less important than German subjects, and maybe
have rather 'social' aims.
Perceived strength of competition in both games was measured with one item
asking team members how strong they perceive competition between the firms in their
game to be ("How strong is in your perception the competition between the firms?").
To measure discrimination, in both years teams were asked, ostensibly by the
block-coordinator, whether they would like to have one additional member in the group.
The potential additional member was described as an one-year older student who wants
to tutor the management game in the year to come, having studied at a dillercnt
university before and therefore being without own experience of this management game.
Either he had a German name and supposedly came from the university of Cologne, or a
Dutch name, supposedly coming from Rotterdam", liach member of the team was asked
to privately answer the question in how far he/she would like to have the new member in
the team (see appendix II for the wording of this question). The measure was constructed
such that the two new members were as similar as possible, varying only in name and
university''' visited before. The story had to be convincing, and that is why it was chosen
for someone from the second study year, as older students often tutor in the management
game. Furthermore, being older, and therefore having more general economic
knowledge, should make the student in general attractive as a new member for the team.
Most items were measured on five-point Likert scales, only the discrimination
measure ('strength of wanting a new member') was measured on a continuous scale
ranging from zero to ten, to allow for more precise expressions of preference The
response rate of the questionnaire at time two (round three) was 75%, equally in game
one and game two.
" This constitutes deception, but it was necessary to have a believable coverttory for the discrimination
measure, as otherwise, social-desirability considerations would have influenced the dala even more
strongly.
* There is a chance that the image of (he university the student comes from influences perceptions as well,
but at least (informalI pretests among students did not show any difference» in evaluation of the two
umvenilies
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As the discrimination measure was collected as a between-subjects (groups)
factor, i.e., each group was either asked about a Dutch or about a German new member,
it is in fact not possible to say whether specific teams 'preferred' an ingroup over an
outgroup member. The question answered is rather whether ingroup members or a certain
national group offered to a team were liked more than outgroup members or the other
national group. If we still speak about 'preference', it has to be kept in mind, that teams
did not get an 'either-or' choice, but were asked about one new member only. This was
done to avoid problems with social desirability concerns, which would have come up
when students were given the choice between two new members from different
nationalities. Furthermore, giving them two equal descriptions of a person only differing
in nationality, would not have been very credible for students, and they would have
guessed that the choice they make is not real. We borrowed from the design of the audit
studies reviewed in section 2.2.
5.4 Results pooled data
Data are aggregated on group level for the analysis. Separate analyses are done
for data of homogeneous groups (HOM) and for data including heterogeneous groups
(with a majority of one nationality; HET). Hypotheses one and two were analyzed using
pooled data, as for these analyses only variables are used which were measured in
exactly the same way in the two years. For the analysis of hypothesis three and some
exploratory analyses, data from the two games were separated. In the following, all
analyses are described first for the homogeneous data alone and then for the data of
homogeneous and heterogeneous groups pooled. In general, t-test statistics were
calculated, as sample size for most tests was reasonably large and the distribution of the
data did not differ significantly from a normal distribution (see tables 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 in
appendix I). Again, also marginally significant results (10% level) are reported, but these
must be interpreted carefully (see chapter 4). Sample sizes might occasionally vary
slightly between the different analyses, as there are missing data for all variables, and the
amount of missing data differs between variables, because questionnaires sometimes
were filled in incompletely.
5.4. / ffipofA«» /a,) - maw e/^rt o/na//o/»a//fv
German teams are significantly more willing to accept new members than Dutch
teams are, and this holds for homogeneous groups separately as well as for all groups
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together (HOM: t - -3.41, p - .001; HET: t - -2.83, p - .006 (2-tailed)) Hypothesis la)































Table S.I: Descriptive measures for liking of new members by nationality of group
5.42 //ypof/k»u /*> fmam e/fecipwc/io-ecwiom/c mec/kiflumj
There is no general difference in being liked between Dutch and German possible
new members in general. Including the heterogeneous teams, there is a marginally
significant difference between the two nationalities in being liked as new members -
contrary to the predictions, the Dutch are liked slightly better (HET: I - I 89, p - .060 (2-
tailed»
Table 5 2 shows that there is a tendency that ingroup members are preferred over
outgroup members as new members for the team in homogeneous teams. However, this
effect is only marginally significant (t= 1.31; sig = 098 (1-tailed)). If one adds the
heterogeneous teams the picture changes: Ingroup members are significantly preferred
over outgroup members now (t = 1.19; p = .027 (1-tailed)"). Thus, hypothesis Ic) is
confirmed by the data for heterogeneous groups.
Data New member is N Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean
HOM
HET
Table 5.2: Descriptive measures for liking of new member with respect to type of i









































' Ingroupoutgroup always with respect to the majority in the learns
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An analysis of variance including both factors, nationality of team and nationality
of the new member, and an interaction term representing ingroup-outgroup status was
additionally conducted to test which effect is strongest.
For homogeneous data alone, the ANOVA shows that only the main effect for
nationality of the team becomes significant, i.e., nationality of the team alone explains
preferences for new members. If heterogeneous data are included, the interaction effect,
i.e., the ingroup/outgroup effect, becomes significant, too. This is in part surprising, as
heterogeneous teams already include outgroup members and one could think that they
should rather tend to less ingroup bias (see also figures 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 in appendix I for a
graphical representation of the interaction effect).











































































































































































Table 5.4: I'shariatt analysis of variaact for the dtptndtai variabtt 'prtftrtnet for • new
mtinixr'; HOM: R' - .22 (adjusted R* - .18); HET: R' - .14 (»djuitrd K' - .11); Typt HI
torn of square«.
Looking at preferences by nationality of the new member for homogeneous
teams, there is no correlation between competition and liking of a new member (for
Dutch new members r = -.16, p = .58, for German new members r = -.28, p = .24 (2-
tailed)).
If heterogeneous data are included, the negative correlation of strength of
competition with liking of German new members becomes significant at the 10% level (r
• -.28, p = .07 (2-tailed)), which is contrary to our hypothesis. Germans are the less liked
as new members the stronger competition is, whereas no such link for Dutch new
members exists (r = -. 15, p = .61).
For homogeneous data, strengthening competition has no significant effect on
liking of an ingroup member, but it reduces the amount of liking of an outgroup member
(marginally significant; ingroup member r = -.38, p = . 14; outgroup member r ~ -.30, p •
.08 (2-tailed)). This partially confirms hypothesis 2b)
If the heterogeneous data are included, none of the correlations becomes
significant anymore (ingroup r - -.21, p - .28; outgroup r - -. 19, p - . 13; (both 2-tailed)).
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5.4.6 £jp/orafory ana/ys/j
After a general efleet of the nationality of the team on preferences for new
members had been found, we also tested whether nationality of the team determines
whether competition influences liking of new members. For homogeneous data alone
there is indeed a difference between German and Dutch teams, in that the negative
correlation between competition and liking of a new member only (marginally
significantly) holds for German teams (Dutch teams:
r = -.24, p = .176; German teams r = -.40, p = .087). Including heterogeneous teams, no
significant correlation for any of the groups is found.
5.5 Results game I and game 2 separately
In the following, the analysis is again done first for homogeneous groups only,
and in a second step for homogeneous and heterogeneous groups (with a majority of one
national group) together.
5.5./ np
Game /: Hypothesis 3 is for homogeneous teams confirmed by the data: Stronger
perceived competition correlates significantly positive with identification with one's
group (r - .34, p - .026 (I-tailed)). Including heterogeneous teams, no significant
correlation between perceived strength of competition and identification remains.
It is not so clear what direction for a correlation of uncertainty with identification
to expect at this point of the game. Theoretically, the less certain someone is, the stronger
should he identify, which would imply a negative relationship. But, when players filled
in the questionnaires, they already had played some rounds in their teams, so it could
well be that students who were uncertain in the beginning identified strongly with their
team and therefore now were more certain, i.e., a positive correlation between identity
and certainty could be expected (see also section 4.3). Therefore, a two-tailed test of
significance was done. Certainty and identity correlates significantly positive with each
other, suggesting that students who identified stronger with their teams got some
'certainty' from this (HOM: r = .47, p = .006). This held for homogeneous and
heterogeneous teams equally (HET: r = .45, p = .002).
Came 2: There is a significant correlation of competition with identification for
homogeneous data (r — .41, p = .036 (1 -tailed)). For heterogeneous data, this correlation
is only marginally significant (r = .18, p = .096). Furthermore, the stronger subjects
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identify with their group, the stronger is also their certainty (HOM: r - 52. p - 000;
HET: r = 31, p = .024 (2-tailed)) Hypothesis 3 is thus confirmed in both games,
especially for homogeneous groups.
5.5.2 £xp/oraro/T ano/vjejybr fAe ftro gam» reparatefy
Äe/a/wuni/? fteftreen iaVM;/icar;c>n and" /iJtmg o/o new member For homogeneous and
heterogeneous teams, in gamr /. identification correlated negatively with the willingness
to gel a new member for the team, i e , the stronger a team identifies, the less it wants a
new member (HOM: r - -.37, p - .036; HET: r --.34, p - .02 (both 2-tailed)).
Split up by ingroup-outgroup status of the new member, it becomes visible that
this is only (marginally) significant for outgroup members (HUM: r - -.36, p - .433 for
ingroup; r = - 37, p = .064 for outgroup, HET: r - -.414, p - .268 for ingroup, r - -.30, p
- .073 for outgroup (2-tailed)).
In game 2. looking at homogeneous data only, there is no significant correlation
between identification and general liking of a new member (r - - 20, p - .42 (2-tailed)).
Including heterogeneous data, the correlation remains insignificant (r - -.22, p • .13).
Correlations between identification and preferences for ingroup res outgroup members
do neither become significant for homogeneous nor for heterogeneous data.
/fe/afionsAi/7 o/ /mportance o/ gooo" per/brmance w///i //*mg o/ a im memfter; In a
further exploratory analysis it was tested, whether there is a difference between Dutch
and German subjects in the variable 'importance to do well in the game' This was done
because the stereotypes about the two groups as descnbed in section 5 I also suggest that
there might be such a difference, and this could influence preferences.
Neither in game / nor in game 2 a significant difference was found between
Dutch and German (majority) groups in any of the variables measuring 'importance to do
well' (game I) or 'aims' students have (game 2).
Äe/af/o/wA//? o/ re/eva/ice q/" feam e$vf w/f/i /i/tmg o/' a new mem/w:Another
explanation for economically not 'rational' preferences with respect to the performance
of new members, i.e., preference for the group performing worse, could be that
participants do not think that team effort is relevant for the results in the game. The
variable measuring 'relevance of team effort' was measured only in game 2. It correlates
negatively with liking of any new member. This correlation is marginally significant for
homogeneous groups and becomes significant at the 5%-level when heterogeneous teams
are included in the analysis (HOM: r - -.41, p = .079; HET: r - -.35, p - .013 (2-tailed)).
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Looking at liking of a specific member, for homogeneous groups the correlation is
(marginally) significant for preference against a German new member, but not significant
for preference against a Dutch new member (Dutch r = -.27, p = .429, German r = -.65, p
= .084 (2-tailed)). I.e., the more important team effort is perceived to be, the less German
new members are liked for the team. On the other hand, if heterogeneous data are
included, the correlation becomes significant at the 5% level for Dutch new members and
not significant for German new members (Dutch r = -.38, p = .044; German r = -.30, p =
.182). Heterogeneous teams having experienced both nationalities obviously do not like
having Dutch new members when team effort is seen as important.
If data is split by whether the new member is from the ingroup or outgroup, no
significant relationship between perceived relevance of team effort and liking of any kind
of new member for homogeneous data was found. Including heterogeneous data, the
correlation becomes only significant for preference against outgroup members (ingroup r
= -.22, p = .369; outgroup r = -.46, p = .043), i.e., the more important team effort is
experienced to be, the more the majority nationality is preferred. Figure 5.3 shows the
relationships found.
Uncertainty 0 ^ Identification
1 i
Strong competition Use of productivity related stereotypes
d) Pref for
Germans
Importance of marginal productivity of new member
/VycAo-fconomic cjfcr/ j/aft'j/i'ca/ c/wcr/mma/io/i - Jtem>f>p«
Figure 5.3: Relationships between main variables - dashed lines represent hypotheses,
which were not confirmed, full lines confirmed relationships". All relationships had been
Miumed to be positive (see figure 5.2).
* The figure docs not represent all results, as the fact that nationality of the team played a main role in
determining behavior »as not represented in the first graph as an hypothesis either.
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5.6 Discussion and conclusion
The results confirm the idea that psychological effects play an important role in
determining behavior in an 'economic' setting.
First, however, an effect was found which was not expected and cannot easily be
explained: There is a significant difference between the two nationalities in how far they
were willing to accept new members German teams are significantly more willing to
accept new members than Dutch teams are
Secondly, ingroup bias was found and was stronger when heterogeneous teams
were included in the analysis. This is surprising, as one might expect heterogeneous
teams to get accustomed to the minority and therefore show less ingroup bias. However,
it seems rather to be the case that heterogeneous teams try to avoid that the minority gets
'stronger'. It might even be that minority members in these teams act the same way as
majority members. Unfortunately, this cannot be analyzed with the data at hand, because
they do not allow for differentiating whether an answer to the 'discrimination measure',
i.e., the question measuring liking of a new member, stems from a majority or minority
member in a heterogeneous group.
There was no specific bias against one national group in general, and in the
ANOVA the main effect for 'nationality of new member' did not become significant,
neither with nor without heterogeneous teams
The finding that in general German students were not preferred as new members,
which is contrary to what the psycho-economic meachnism of performance stereotyping
predicted, could have several reasons, apart from indicating that psychological forces of
ingroup bias can be stronger than more 'economic' forces: The relations between
Germans and Dutch are difficult, as the memory of the Second World War is still kept
strong in the Netherlands (see e.g., Dekker, 1999). For the same reason, Dutch students
would admit faster that they don't like a German member in their group German
students would probably rather not admit that they don't want a Dutch student in their
group
Apart from special German-Dutch factors, another explanation for the finding
that in general German students are not preferred as new members could be that, as
already Roethlisberger & Dickson (1939) showed, overachievers are not liked in teams,
because they enhance the standards to be fulfilled. Still another possible explanation,
inferred from the stereotypes of the two groups, could be that German and Dutch
students have different aims in playing the game, i.e.. it might be more important for
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German students to perform well, and more important for Dutch students to have a good
time with the team. But, German and Dutch teams were not found to differ in how
important they think it is to do well in the game, such that this explanation does not hold.
However, German students showed stronger ingroup bias than Dutch students,
albeit being rather positive about both possible new members. That can be interpreted as
evidence for an interaction of the psycho-economic and psychological mechanisms,
strengthening ingroup bias when the ingroup is the better performing group, and
weakening ingroup bias when the ingroup is the worse performing group.
A possible explanation for the finding that Dutch teams in general are less prone
to accept new members than German teams could be that Dutch students did not perceive
a Dutch student coming from Rotterdam as an ingroup member. For them, living in their
own country, nationality is a less salient category than region, while for German students
studying abroad nationality is a very salient category, so that the student from Cologne
was probably perceived as belonging to the German ingroup.
Strengthening of competition has been found to influence the liking of new
members for the team, but in a different way than the theoretical model predicts. In
general, strengthening competition reduces liking of any kind of new member. More
specifically, stronger competition is not associated nvffe Wronger J/Ar'ng of new members
from the stereolypically better performing group, but with preference against outgroup
members for homogeneous teams, and with preference against German new members
when heterogeneous teams arc included. This means, especially homogeneous teams
rather 'close ranks' when competition gets stronger and do not want an outgroup member
in the team, even if the outgroup is stereotyped in a way that makes them appear more
productive. An explanation for the fact that the link between competition and
discriminatory tendency gets weaker when heterogeneous teams are included in the
analysis could be that these teams do not react so strongly to a change in competition, but
rather show ingroup bias in all competitive situations Again, unfortunately, this cannot
be analyzed for the different national groups within a team separately.
The psychological effect that stronger competition should lead to stronger
identification was confirmed for homogeneous teams in both games, and in game 2
marginally significantly also for the data including heterogeneous teams. Members in
heterogeneous teams might 'assume' (not necessarily consciously) not to get that much
certainty from identifying stronger with their teams - maybe just because teams are
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heterogeneous". However, in general, the stronger subjects identify with their teams, the
more certain they are, which together with the aforementioned hypothesis confirmed
hypothesis 3 for homogeneous teams and partially also for heterogeneous teams
A further interesting finding is that in game I teams who take the game more
seriously are less willing to accept a new member for the team, and this holds for
homogeneous and heterogeneous teams, and to a higher extent against oulgroup
members Majority groups seem to try to avoid more strongly that the (cams get
(additional) outgroup members when they are more inclined to do well in the game.
The finding that teams which believed more strongly that their joint effort is
relevant for the outcome did not want new members, and no German new members as
well, also does not tit with an economic explanation, which would predict a preference
for Germans, as they are the higher performers. A possible explanation is that team
performance is not only determined by the sum of individual performances, but also by
how well the team cooperates. This might in general become more difficult in
heterogeneous teams, and therefore, such preferences can be 'rational' in cases were
team performance is seen as very important. Heterogeneous teams were able to base their
choice on experiences made with the minority in their teams.
From comments we got from our participants we saw that a further, more tangible
factor influencing preferences is language. On some questionnaires people had written
sentences like "it's okay if he enters, but he will have to speak Dutch" If one wants to
have nationally heterogeneous teams, it is obviously important that the language problem
is solved in a way that everybody really feels comfortable with the common language
used.
The study provides some evidence for the importance of psychological
mechanisms in economic settings. Not only expected productivity influences 'hiring
decisions' in a business game, even if performance is important.
The analysis of the economic effects of competition in this study however faces
some problems. The game is not very important for the grade of the students, because
individual grades formed the larger part of the final grade of students in this course
Therefore, 'economic' considerations do not play such a big role, while 'psychologic«)'
considerations can influence behavior more easily.
" There is however no general tendency of heterogeneous group« to identify lew Mrongly thin
homogeneous teams (game 1: t-- 72, p - 477, game 2 I - I 64, p- .109).
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A further problem was the trade-off in measuring discrimination between the
reduction of the tendency to answer the question in a socially desirable way and the aim
of getting as much informative data as possible. A choice was made in favor of an
anonymous assessment of the discrimination measure, which did not allow for testing
whether minorities and majorities in heterogeneous teams decide differently and are
differently influenced by the factors analyzed.
The results of this study are only partially generalizable to real-life settings for
several reasons. First, in this game performance was not that important, as said before.
Secondly, grades and money are different kinds of incentives and may influence behavior
in a different way. Third, it was 'just' a game, and participants were not employers, but
students with limited knowledge and acting in a very stylized business environment.
Still, the study provides some indication from a more complex and realistic
setting as compared to a laboratory experiment that the mechanisms proposed by the
integrated framework play a role in determining preferences for new team members.
Psychological mechanisms have been slightly stronger than economic mechanisms in this
study. Further research should try to extend the analysis to field settings or find
controlled settings were incentives are closer to the ones found in economic reality.
Furthermore, it became obvious that 'real-world' stereotypes are quite complex and can
influence behavior in many ways. Further research therefore should analyse these aspects
more closely, to be perhaps also able to find ways to reduce negative discrimination by
focusing on 'positive' aspects of the stereotypes. But, it should always be kept in mind
that these stereotypes and preferences continue to exist in the heads of the people
involved and might influence cooperation in heterogeneous teams negatively, even if
there is no actual discrimination in hiring.
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Appendix I: Tables and figures
Discrimination Importance to Perceived Certainty Identification








































Tibk 5.7.1: One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for normal distribution: gamr I.
Discrimination Perceived Certaintyldentificationlmporiance Import to



















































Table 5.7.2: One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for normal distribution: game 2.
Game N Mean Std" Std Error
Deviation Mean
Liking of new member first 59 5.15 3.18 .41
second 49 4.91 341 49
Table 5.7J: Comparison of the discrimination measure for the two gamts.







NL D Others NL-% D-% O -% abs %
10858 3876 633 68 6%71.5% 38 6% 15367 67.1%
8293 2964 516 73 3% 76 6% 44.1% 11773 72.0%






NL D Others NL-% D-% O. -% abs. %
10982 2269 621 75 6% 71 1% 73 9% 13872 74.7%
8279 1714 462 79 8% 75.2% 77 0% 10455 78.8%






NL D Others NL-% D-% O. -% abs. %
6956 2676 716 70 8% 716% 65 5% 10347 70.6%
5147 1986 542 73.3% 74.4% 69 4% 7674 73.3%






NL D Others NL-% D-% O -% abs. %
55054139 523 61 8% 71 4% 77.8% 10166 66.1%
4116 3083 388 64.7% 74 5% 80 7% 7586 69 I %
1389 1056 135 41 5% 63 8% 70 3% 2580 58 7%
Table 5.7.4: Absolute numbers of study points and percentages in relation to all possible study points
reached after one year, IB. Source: http://www t'dewb unimaas nl/miso/index.hlm .
• J
Nationality group
Figure 5.7.1: Craphkal demonstration of the interaction effect for liking of new members,
homogeneous groups.
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Nationality o( group
Fifvrt 5.7.2: Graphical demonstration of the interaction tfleet for liking of nrw mrmbtrs, including
htttrogtneom groups.
Appendix II: 'Discrimination measure'
Dear Student,
We were asked by a student, Jaap vanVelde (Andreas Mueller), who will be tutoring the Management Game
next year, whether he could participate this year to get an impression about how it works He did not do it as a
student as he then studied in Rotterdam (Koeln) As I do not want to put him into a group, which feels really
uncomfortable about it, I would like to ask you to indicate your preference below
We chose this procedure, as we do not want to spend a whole lot of time on discussing this question in the
team, and to make sure that everybody dares to indicate his real opinion This could be difficult when asked in
front of the group As the game is important for you and you want to feel good in your team, such a change
should not be made against the will of some team-members
You can give this page to the tutor without a name on it, only with the group-number We will check the
preferences of the groups and then choose a group for him.
Please fill this in right now, so that he can participate from tomorrow on and you can go on with the game!
Thank you!
Group number:
Just indicate your preference by making a cross at that point on the line which represents it best!
I rather do not wait I 1 would like to have
Jaap in my group • Jaap in my group
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Appendix III: Questionnaire game 1
Date: ...June 2001





























2) How certain are you that you are personally doing well in
this game?
3) How certain are you that your firm will be doing well in
4) How certain are you about the measures your firm has to
take to do well in this game?
5) How certain are you that you will succeed with your
strategy''


































7) How strong is in your perception the competition between
the firms?
1 2 3 4 5
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1) To »-hat extent are personality clashes (conflicts) evident in
your team''
9) How much tension is there among the members of your
team''
10) How much jealousy or rivalry is there among the
members of your team''
11) To what extent are there differences of opinion in your
team''










































To what eiteat do yoa trait yoar team members with retard lo..,
13) Reiving on their task-related skills and abilities
14) Sharing your personal beliefs
IS) Relying on their interpersonal style/people skills at work?
16) Sharing your personal feelings''




























18) How often do people get angry while working in your
team''
19) How often do the members of your team disagree about
how things should be done''
20) How often do the members of your team disagree about
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21)1 have positive feelings towards my team-members
22) 1 have confidence in my team-members
23) 1 feel comfortable depending on my team-members
24) 1 think the other team members perform well
25) 1 think that, with regard to decision making, 1 have more in
common with members of this team than with members of
other teams
26) 1 think that, generally speaking, 1 have more in common
with members of this team than with members of other
teams
27) 1 think that the members of this team are well suited to
each other
28) 1 think it is right, in the view of my individual
performance, that 1 am a member of this team
29) 1 find it pleasant to be a member of this team
30) 1 would like to continue working together with this team
31)1 think it would be nicer in another team
32) 1 am glad that 1 ended up in this team
33) 1 have negative feelings about my team-members
34) 1 trust all mpmher«: of mv IWMW j^tuaUj' n<M'
35) We do not seem to understand what one another is saying
during our team discussions
36) The purpose of the team meetings we get involved in are
clearly communicated
37) We really listen to one another and try to understand the
feelings and points of view of each other
38) l-ach of us has the feeling that we can express ourselves on
any issue at any time




























































































40) 1 talk up this team to my friends as a great group to work in
41) 1 am very committed to my team
42) 1 am willing to put a great deal of effort beyond what is
normally expected in order to help this team to be
successful
43) Individual team-members contribute equally to the
decisions made in the team































To what eilent do you agree that your leam member»..
4$) Openly share information with you
46) Treat you on an equal basis with others
47) Can be trusted
48) Do things competently
























• The first two letters of your mother's
first name (e.g.: Maria: MA)
• The date of your birthday, in 2 digits
(eg: January 08, 1980:08)
• The first two letters of your place of birth
(e.g. Amsterdam: AM)
Your personal code is: MA08AM
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Dear Student,
This is the second questionnaire of a set of three. Please answer the questions honestly and




UM the answer-Kale below for the following questions:
Not at ill
1 2 3
When playing the Management Game, to what extent
1) do you understand it?
2) are you certain about what is happening in the game''
3) can you predict what is going to happen in the Management
Ciame?


















































6) In the team, we really listen to one another and try to
understand the feelings and points of view of each other
7) Each of us has the feeling that we can express ourselves on
any issue at any time
8) We freely express our feelings and ideas in meetings
9) 1 have positive feelings towards my team-members
10) 1 nave confidence in my team-members
11)1 feel comfortable depending on my team-members
12) 1 think the other team members perform well
13) 1 think that the members of this team are well suited to
each other
14) 1 would like to continue working together with this team
15) In the team, we treat each other on an equal basis
16) My team members can be trusted to do what they have
promised
17) My team members can be trusted to do things competently




























































19) How often do people get angry while working in your
team''
20) How often do the members of your team disagree about
how things should be done?
21) How often do the members of your team disagree about




















175Please answer Ihe question» below, using the following answer-scale:
Not at all Very much
5
22) To what extent are personality clashes evident in your
team?
23) How much tension is there among the members of your
team?
24) How much jealousy or rivalry is there among the
members of your team?
25) To what extent are there differences of opinion in your
team?





































How important is it for you
27) To do well as a firm in the game''
28) That your team outperforms the other learns'"
29) That everybody of your team contributes equally to the
success of the firm''
30) To have fun during team meetings?
31) To socialize during team meetings''

































• The first two letters of your mothtf s
first name (e.g.. Maria: MA)
• The do/e of your birthday, in 2 dipt
(eg: January 08, 1980: 08)
• The first two letters of your place of*
(e.g. Amsterdam: AM)
Your personal code is: MA08AM
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6 Is it efficiency wages?™
6.1 Introduction
As has been shown in section 2.2, economics is providing a lot of empirical
evidence that women earn lower wages than men, but the estimates ol the wage gap vary
widely with the variables included, the decomposition methods used, the database etc.
(see also Stanley & Jarcll, 1998). In all estimates of the wage gap remains an
unexplained part, which is most often interpreted as stemming from discrimination.
Different economic and social-psychological theories are used to explain discrimination
(e.g., Becker 1957, Phelps 1972. Arrow 1973, Fiske 1998). but one area or economic
reasoning has so far hardly been used to explain the wage gap, even if it seems quite
obvious that it could contribute to an explanation: efficiency-wage theory (see, however,
Haagsma, 1993, 1995)
Efficiency-wage theory basically states that employers do not pay the lowest
possible wage, but rather pay a higher wage (the lowest possible wage in efficiency-
units) to motivate workers to exhibit higher effort, to keep them from shirking or to
attract belter workers (see for an overview, e.g., Katz, 1986; Carmichael, 1990). In
contrast to previous chapters, the focus here is therefore more on effort than on ability,
even if versions of efficiency-wage concepts dealing with the attraction of better workers
also look at ability.
In the framework of efficiency-wage theory, women's lower wages could be
explained by assuming that efficiency wages for women are different or are believed to
be different from those of men. This could be the case in two ways: First, firms could
assume (wrongly or correctly) that women exhibit high effort/do not shirk already for
low wages, i.e., lower wages than for men are sufficient to get the desired behavior from
female workers. Second, firms could assume (again wrongly or correctly) that women do
not react with more effort to higher wages (e.g., because they are not work/career-
oriented anyway), so it might not be worth it to pay them high wages. In that case, firms
would either employ women for the minimum possible wage or not employ them at all.
Both assumptions can be based on stereotypes about women, describing in general men
as more agentic. assertive, and work-oriented, and women as more communal, caring.
* This chapter is based on i paper peejemed a) the Eivopean ESA-meeting in Stmbowg, (2002) "An
enoneous belief Paying women lower wages does not pay"
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and family-oriented (for a review on gender stereotypes see, e.g., Deaux & LaFrance
1998; Glick et al 1995). It is quite probable that gender stereotypes play a role in the
labor market, as gender is a very salient category and thus likely to lead to stereotype
activation. In addition, typical sex roles, which relate to the work/family sphere, can have
an impact on employers' beliefs about the reliability of women at the workplace: As
women most of the times are the ones who take care of the children, they are believed to
be absent from work or quitting work more often than men (for a discussion of gender
differences in turnover rates see, e.g., Viscusi, 1980; Blau & Kahn, 1981; Light & Ureta,
1992; Sichcrman, 1996). If the stereotypical assumptions about female reactions to
incentives are on average correct, paying women lower wages is rational behavior from a
profit-maximizing point of view. However, if the assumptions are not correct, lower
wages for women might be economically inefficient, and a more 'psychological'
explanation for such lower wages might then be useful.
In recent times, psychological research has put forward an explanation for
women's lower wages, which can be interpreted as similar to an efficiency wage: The
possibility that women are worse in negotiating for their salary and ask for lower wages
than men in wage negotiations fsee, e.g., Walters, Stuhlmacher & Meyer, 1998; Pelham
& Metis, -!(H)1) In an efficiency-wage framework one could interpret this as women
credibly promising the effort desired by the firm already for a lower wage than men.
In relation to the integrated framework developed in chapter 2, this chapter
analyses a special case of discriminatory behavior based on stereotypes in a very
competitive setting. I lowever, the experiment here does not look at the details of the
mechanism in team-based firms, but rather looks more in general whether in a
competitive situation individual subjects in the role of firms (employers) make
'discriminatory', i.e., lower, wage offers to women as compared to men. In addition, the
experiment also wants to look at the supply side, to find out whether behavior of the
'discriminated' group explains the wage differences. If efficiency-wage effects based on
different reactions of women and men towards incentives can be found, wage differences
can he economically rational. If, however, the picture is such that purely (financial-)
economic factors fall short in explaining the behavior found, psychological factors might
be necessary to explain discriminatory' outcomes. This would also be further evidence for
the assumption that even in very competitive market settings, psychological factors can
play a role, even without firms consisting of teams
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The present chapter describes an experiment conducted to observe this in a
controlled setting. The main reason for the choice of the experimental method is that it
allows controlling for other factors influencing wages offered to or asked by women,
which are hard to control for in other kinds of empirical studies. Furthermore, it allows
for measuring effort level in a simple way. which is often very difficult in real-world
settings (for a more elaborated discussion of the methodology-choice see section 2.8).
In an experimental double auction both workers and firms can make wage offers
This makes it possible to see whether women get offered lower wages than men, or
whether they primarily ask for these lower wages. Further, it is possible to see whether
efficiency-wage arguments in one or the other direction provide an explanation for the
wage differential. In a laboratory setting stereotypes about female and male work
attitudes should play a smaller role than in 'real life'. However, assuming with social
psychology that stereotypes are universal and also work subconsciously (e.g. Fiske
I998A one should still expect to find an effect - and if an effect is found in a laboratory
setting, the effect in real life is probably even bigger. Double auction markets are very
competitive, and have been used before to test efficiency-wage theory, but also to test
other related questions (see e.g. Davis & Holt, 1993). In similar experimental double
auctions with effort it was found that firms don't pay low wages, and that workers
reciprocate with higher effort when getting higher wages (e.g., Charness, 1998; Fehr &
Falk, 1999; Hannan, Kagel, & Moser 2002). In a double auction dealing with status
differences between traders women made lower profits than men selling 'goods' - just
like subjects who were assigned lower status (Ball, Eckel, Grossman & Zame, 2001).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: First the hypotheses are
formulated. In section 6.3, the experimental design is described in detail. Section 6.4
reports the results, and section 6.5 discusses them and concludes.
6.2 Hypotheses
In summary, the background of the experiment described here is a combination of
efficiency-wage effects with knowledge about common stereotypes of women and men.
Against this background, the following hypotheses can be formulated:
///: Gender ofe/Hp/ove« //t/7ue/icM wag«, M/CA f/wf women rece/v* /OMCT wage; fWJ
»Aan men m /Ae expenme/tta/ <foi/We auc/io/i; ny < >*„
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//2: //•/// no/a!s, // /IOWJ, Aecaiue e^7c/e«£rv-wagc e/?ec/$ w//n «spec/ to fne
wage re/a//oflj/i/p are rf/^ere/i/^b/' wo/ne/» a/irf men; e/ (w^ ^ e„ (w/ AfO var/a/iw,
OH common genaer rtereorvpej, are poss/We:
//2fl^: /4s women are on average more coopera/rve fnan mew, /ne>> exn/0/7 n/gn
e$brf a/read^/or /ow wages: ./or g/vew ^/ow^ w /na/ wow/a" »mp/y e/> e«
//2W: /(J women are on average nor very acnievemen/-or/en/erf, //lev never
exn/ft/f n/g/i e/?br/, no maMer Aow /i/gn rne wage: /or given ffc/gnj w fnaf wow/a"
//3: //•/// no/ai, // no/cfa, aeanue emp/o>vrj expert nvpo/neiw nvo to no/a" wAereaj /n
y!ic/ // ü no/ «n/e fre., *ney rfwcr/m/na/e aga/ns/ women as a growp/- e'/W ^ **• M
//4: (/"/// no/tfa, // no/ai, Aecai/5e women a5/t_/br /ower wages, i.e., crea/Wv promise
wage to eacA/6// //»e amoi/n/ o/ej?br/ aVj/rerf 6y fne emp/o>«r:
6.3 The experiment
6.i. / Parf/cipantt
190 (94 male and 96 female) students of various faculties (the majority from
economics and business) at Universität Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona participated
voluntiirily, for performance-based payment, in the experiment.
The design was adapted from Fehr & Falk's (1999) study of underbidding on the
labor market. The basic structure is a double auction with effort, with excess supply of
workers (four firms and six workers). Rach firm can contract only one worker per period.
Workers and firms can make wage offers simultaneously, following an improvement
rule This means for workers, that each new wage offer always has to be lower than the
last offer made before (by any of the workers). For firms, each new wage offer has to be
higher than the last offer made before (by any of the firms) All offers can be accepted at
any point in time, i c . 'old' offers, which are still standing, can be accepted as well. No
one has to accept an offer, i.e., firms do not have to conclude a contract with a worker,
and workers do not have to conclude a contract with a firm. After three minutes trading is
ended, no matter how many contracts are concluded In a second step, when all contracts
are concluded or three minutes are over, those workers who concluded a contract select
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an effort level (a percentage) which is costly for them and which determines their llnal
payoffs and the profits of their firm Workers can determine the elYort level such that
firms make losses" Films' payoffs *F are calculated as follows:
x» = 120 • percentage chosen by the worker - salary (between 20 and 120)
Workers' payoffs x» are calculated like this:
x» • salary - costs of percentage
If a firm does not conclude a contract with a worker, the firm does not earn any
money in that period. If a worker does not gel a contract, he or she still gets twenty
experimental guilders. Costs for the effort levels (percentages) are defined based on a























Table 6.1: Percentages (effort-levels) and costs
The payoffs in experimental guilders were transformed in €-cent by multiplying
them by two.
The experiment was run with all possible combinations of sexes of firms and
workers, and everybody always knew the sex of workers and firms. In four treatments,
workers and firms were always homogeneous with respect to sex, and in a last additional
treatment, workers and firms were distributed into their roles randomly, regardless of
their sex. This resulted in five different treatments, with four resp three (in the mixed



















Table 6.2: Number of sessions for each constellation.
" The earnings function for the firms differed from that used by Fehr & Filk (1999) in mil the function
used here allows thai firms make losses
" This cost function for effort levels was used to make the results of this experiment comparable with other
related studies, like Fehr A Falk's (1999), which also use this function
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In the following, the treatments will be referred to mentioning always the sex of
the worker first, and then the sex of firm.
The experiment was conducted computerized in the experimental laboratory of
Universität Pompeu Fabra. A program, which Fehr & Falk had used in one of their
earlier double-auction experiments, was adapted. The experiment was programmed in z-
Tree (Fischbacher 1999).
Upon arrival, students were divided into the two roles of firms and workers. In
the sex-homogeneous sessions and the mixed sessions, this was done randomly. All
participants gathered in front of the lab and drew lots with either "firm" or "worker" on
it. Then, 'firms' and "workers' entered the lab separately. In sex-heterogeneous sessions,
this constituted the basic experimental manipulation: Before starting the experiment, the
experimenter said loudly outside of the lab, in front of all participants "The girls (boys)
come with me now, you are firms!" When the 'firms' were seated, he brought the
remaining subjects into the laboratory and said loudly when entering "The boys (girls)
are workers". Then, worker/firm instructions were distributed (see appendix).
Participants in the experiment were seated separately in front of their computers and
could not sec the other participants' screens. Subjects read the instructions and completed
one page of exercises to test their understanding of the payoff structure. From the
moment students were seated in their cubicles, no communication was allowed and
questions about the experiment were only answered privately While participants filled in
the exercises the experimenter watched them carefully and pointed them to mistakes to
secure understanding of the payoff structure of the experiment When everybody had
completed the exercises, the auction started. Ten periods of the double auction with effort
were played At the end of the experiment, subjects filled in a short questionnaire
collecting demographica! data They were paid privately, based on what they earned in
the experiment plus £ 5,- show-up fee. If subjects in the role of firms made losses they
had to back it up with their show-up fee.
6.4 Results
The analysis was done on different levels of aggregation Most hypotheses were
tested using data from period one only, as behavior in later periods is not truly
independent from what happened in earlier periods. Some analyses, however, use data6 Is it efficiency wages?
over all periods, especially (o show differences in trends over time for the treatments. If
this is the case it will be indicated. Average wages are calculated only for workers/firms
who had concluded a contract Because of the relatively small number of independent
observations, non-parametric Mann-Whiiney-U tests were used to compare treatments
Correlational analyses are done using Pearson correlation coefficients, as linear
relationships were assumed. However, as especially in the case of effort and wage
normal distributions cannot be assumed. Spearman's rank correlations were calculated
here as well For significance testing holds the same as in previous chapters - marginal!)
significant (10%-level) results are reported, but have to be interpreted cautiously If not
otherwise reported, significance testing has been done two-tailed
In the following, the results are presented by hypothesis, followed by a
description of some exploratory results. A Final section deals with the mixed sessions
separately.
Hypothesis 1 was fully confirmed: Keeping sex of the firm constant, there is a
significant difference in average wage (aggregated on session-level) in period one
between female and male workers: Females cam significantly less than males (Z - -2.21,
as. sig. - .014 (one-tailed)). Figure 6.1 shows box plots of average wages in period one
The dark line represents the median; the box represents 30% of the data, the lower
boundary being the 25"*" percentile and the upper boundary the 75* perccntile The
vertical lines represent values within I 5 box lenghts from the upper or lower edge of the
box: values further away are defined as outliers (up to 3 box lengths from the edges) or
extreme values. Figure 6.2 shows the development of the average wage over all periods
per constellation.
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middle-category exhibit slightly higher effort, and only those in the highest wage
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Flgare 6.4: Development of mean effort per wage category (mixed session included).
Wwwerr «Mnr /rijgft «rflbrf <m/y very scAtom, m a// wage categories. 77iis couW,
however, be the result of women getting paid less than men in each category. To test for
this, U-tests per wage category were calculated.
Wage category
20 <- wage <- 45







































Table 6.3: Mann-Whitney-l' test of difference in wages between male and female workers
per wage category (period one, individual-level data).
Tables 6 3 and 6.4 show that only one woman is in the highest wage category in
period one, while most women are in the lowest wage category. This is very different for
men - only four men are in the lowest category, most men are in the middle category and
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still eight are in the highest category. This means that one can only rcstrictedly interpret
an U-test between men and women for the highest and the lowest category, because of a
very small N in one of the groups each time. In none of the wage groups, the test finds a
significant difference between men and women - neither for wage level nor for effort
level
Wage category
20 <- wage <- 45







































Tiblt 6.4: M«nn-\Vhllnty-r tut of difTtrtact In effort betwMi malt aod female worktn
ptr wagt caltgory (period out, individual-kvtl data).
It seems as if male and female firms expected (hat male workers would react
positively to higher wages, whereas female workers would not. However, only one linn
tried to pay a high wage (o a female worker, which means, the question whether women
do not react to high wages with more effort cannot be answered with these data. As (able
6.4 shows, men also only change effort when moving to (he highest wage category, and
in this category there is only one woman.
6.
Mann-Whitney-U-tests are calculated for wages asked by women and men, to see
whether women ask for lower wages or just get offered lower wages. All offers made in
the first period were aggregated for firms and workers separately for this analysis. It was
found that offers of firms in the first period are significantly lower when workers are
women than when workers are men (Z = -2.94, as. sig. - .003). On the other hand,
workers of both sexes do no( differ in (he wages (hey ask for (Z = -1.47, as. sig. - .141).
Looking at the development over periods, from period four to six inclusively we also find
a difference in (he offers of the workers by sex - women obviously learn very quickly
that (hey cannot ask for high wages and adjust (heir offers. The result is a significantly
higher wage asked by male workers than by female workers from period four to six. llie
offers of firms remain significantly different for male and female workers until period
four.6 Is it efficiency wages?
For the four homogeneous constellations, over all periods together, a Kruskal-
Wallis test (Chi-Square = 33.41, p = .000) reveals a significant difference in the number
of trades between the constellations. Figure 6.5 shows clearly that the female-male-
constellation resulted in a strongly decreasing number of trades down to zero until the
end of the session, while in all other constellations, number of trades varied only between
three and four (all possible trades). Testing for sex of firms res. workers, there is a
significant difference in average number of trades (over all periods) between male and
female workers: when workers are male, there are on average more trades over all
periods than when workers are female (Z = -3.86, p = .000) - which can also be seen in
figure 6.S.
Constellation
7 a 9 10
Figure 6.S: Development of numbtr of trades per constellation.
Male and female firms differ significantly with respect to number of trades as
well: Female firms trade more (Z - -3.97, p = .000). In fact, male firms often stopp
trading at all when they make losses, whereas some female firms go on trading until the
last period.
The pattern in the mixed group lies somewhere between the other groups - trades
go down as well, not as completely as for male firms and female workers, but stronger
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than in all other conditions (see below for an explanation) Basically in all those
constellations where flrms make losses, trading goes down over the periods.
A result that could provide an explanation for women's lower effort is that the
difference between offers of flrms and wages asked by the workers is higher for female
workers than for male workers (Z * -2.21, as. sig. - .027). A t-test to see whether this
discrepancy differed significantly from zero was calculated for all constellations It
showed that in the male-male-condition, in the male-female-condition, and in the mixed
condition discrepancy is not significantly different from zero in period one In both
conditions with female workers, discrepancy is significantly different from zero. This
means, only when workers are male or there are at least males among the workers, this



































Tiblf 6.5: T-trsl of difTtrrncr from zrro (ttst-valut - 0) for discrepancy, for all
constellations separately (period ont per session).
Table 6.6 shows that men also ask more from female firms than from male firms
(and get offered more from female firms than from male firms), but these effects are not
significant. There are also no significant differences depending on sex of the firm in
neither firm offers, the wages asked by workers nor discrepancy between wages asked






































































































Table 6.6: Dtsrriplivt statistics for offers by firms, offers by workers and discrepancy
between them for all constellations separately (period one, per session).
worfcar and Arm m workar I Arm m
work* and Arm ( worker m inn f
Constellation
Klgurt 6.6: Box plots of discrepancy between wage asked for aad offered per constellation.
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Over all constellations, effort and discrepancy are negatively correlated (r - -.6, p
= .003 (1-tailed, for period one only))", i.e., the higher the discrepancy, the lower the
effort (excluding the mixed category it remains r » -.58. p - .01)". A regression analysis
over all constellations for period one. using wage and discrepancy as explanatory
variables for effort, confirms the importance of discrepancy between wage asked by the
worker and offered by the firm for the effort level chosen. The complete linear regression
model becomes significant (R* = .51, adjusted R* « .44, sig. - .004). and both
explanatory variables become significant as well, but 'discrepancy' is the more important
one, as the beta-weight shows. Excluding the mixed sessions, the complete model
remains significant (adj. R* = .41, sig. = 014). but only the beta-weight for 'discrepancy'
remains significant. Discrepancy seems to be even more important than wage level in the


































Table 6.7: Regression of wage iad discrepancy on effort (period one).
In general, tendencies in the mixed sessions taken together are somewhere in-
between the homogeneous sessions - as one should expect. However, the mixed sessions
varied in their composition, as table 6.8 shows - and this did not remain without an
effect.











" Spearman's rank correlation rho •= -.50, p - 014.
" Spearman's rank correlation rho •= - 53, p- 017
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One could assume that differences between these sessions were similar to the
differences between the homogeneous sessions. More specifically, session 18 could be
expected to be similar to the male-male sessions, while session 17 and 19 should be more
similar to sessions with only female workers. It is of course not possible to compare the
three sessions statistically, as the number of independent observations is too small. Still,
an exploratory analysis, looking at descriptive statistics, was done to get an impression
whether tendencies are as expected (see also table 6.9). The assumptions are partly
confirmed - session 18 is more similar to an all-male session, while the other two
sessions tend more towards male-female or all female sessions. This holds especially
with respect to firm offers. However, session 17 seems to be strange in that the average
wage is quite high, but still effort is low. Looking at the offers firms made, it becomes
clear that in session 17 the discrepancy between wages offered by firms and wages asked













































































Table 6.9: Inscriptive statistics for offers by firms, ofTf rs by workers, wagt, and effort for
Ihr miied sessions separately (period one).
Discrepancy is lowest for session 18 (-6.5) - here workers even asked less than
the firms offered them - and as a consequence, effort is highest. Discrepancy is highest
in session 17 (21.46 compared to 7.5 in session 19), but there is no difference in average
effort between session 17 and session 19 - however, wages are very low in session 19
from the beginning on. Thus, the comparison of the three mixed groups shows the same
tendencies as the analysis of the homogeneous data. Even if no statistical analysis is
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possible, this can carefully be taken as a confirmation of the results from the
homogeneous sessions. It also shows that it might not even be necessary lo make gender
salient to get such effects
6.5 Discussion
To summarize, it was possible to show in a double auction in the laboratory that
women earn lower wages than men. Secondly, the findings show that women's behavior
might have a partial influence on their wages. Women, however, are not too modest, but
might be a bit less inclined to reciprocate higher wages with higher effort than men.
However, this result has to be interpreted carefully, because firms determined wages, and
firms did not make offers to women in the same wage range as to men. Furthermore, the
experiment also points to a new explanatory factor for differences in effort next to the
absolute wage: The difference between the wage asked by the worker in the beginning
and the wage offered by the firm
Men and women pay lower wages to women in the experiment, and they do this
independently from what men and women ask for wages in the role of the worker Male
and female firms basically behave the same. However, from the second period on women
indeed ask for lower wages. One experience of high discrepancy between the wage asked
for and the wage offered by the firm seems to be sufficient for women to adapt their
offers downwards. But, both men and women reciprocate, i.e., men and women react to
low wages with low effort levels and to higher wages with higher effort levels - which
made firms loose money in the experiment. Women did not get the chance to reciprocate
higher wages with higher effort.
Only in the male-male-constellations firms do not make losses. In all other
constellations on first sight the pattern looks like a striking lack of fairness concerns:
Workers go up with their effort levels when they get higher wages, but most of the time
they stay low enough to let firms make losses. Taking a closer look at the differences
between the four conditions, one possible explanatory variable is recognized: Only in
conditions with male workers discrepancy between the average wages firms offered and
workers asked for was low, i.e., not significantly different from zero. This indicates that
in all other conditions, where workers got offered lower wages than they thought they
should get, this was basically seen as an unfair action in the beginning. This evoked a
reaction that hurt the firms. Even in the condition with female firms and male workers,
discrepancy is very close to significantly different from zero, because male workers ask
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very high wages from female firms. This could explain why even here firms made losses.
Firms, which made losses, rationally responded with stopping to trade - even if
adjustment took some time, as figure 6.5 showed. This confirms the economic intuition
that firms do not make losses if they are able to avoid it.
One could argue that the wages asked for and offered in part are strategically
determined, but this does not counteract the argument that these asks and offers were
lower when workers were female than when they were male. There is also a problem of
path-dependency, as even if one looks only at period one, the improvement rule implies
that the first offer made determines all other offers. Again, this does not change the
finding that these paths led to lower average offers made to women than to men.
What does this tell us for real-life situations and for further research? First, it
shows that there is some kind of wage discrimination against women - either individual
discrimination or group discrimination. Unfortunately, this experiment could not test
whether this is based on wrong stereotypical perceptions of women or on correct
estimates of their behavior, as women were not equally represented in all wage
categories. If it were based on correct estimates of female behavior, it would of course be
rational behavior by firms and thus 'only' constitute individual (statistical)
discrimination. If it were based on wrong perceptions, it would constitute group
discrimination as well.
Secondly, if employers think that they can make higher profits by paying women
lower wages, they are wrong - at least in the experiment it did not work out for them: It
lead to lower effort by women and very low or even negative profits by firms. This
seems to be a vicious cycle: Women are paid lower wages, as a consequence they exhibit
lower effort, employers see their stereotypes confirmed - and, as happened in the
experiment, they rationally stop to employ women at all. This is also evidence against the
mechanism Becker (1957) proposes for reducing discrimination, because it is assumed to
work via lower wages for women in initial periods - not considering that this might lead
to 'negative' reactions by the women.
Thirdly, the experiment shows that it is not mainly the absolute wage level, which
determines effort levels, but the discrepancy between starting offers of firms and
workers. It is not the case in this experiment that women ask for lower wages, they just
get them - and therefore, they are in a situation of high discrepancy between their own
idea, what wage they would like to get, and the wages firms want to pay them. Men, on
the other hand, ask women to pay them more than they ask from other men, also leading
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to a discrepancy between wage offers Thus, seemingly expectations - whether right or
wrong - both sexes have about each other lead to discrepancies in »age offers, and to bad
outcomes for firms and workers. Women in this experiment quickly adapt their
expectations - but they also adapt their behavior to the low wages It does not seem very
unrealistic that women with a good education in the 'real world' are confronted with a
discrepancy between their own wage expectations and what firms are willing to pay
them. Meng (2002) found that female economists in their first job (in male occupations)
earn lower wages than their male counterparts with the same education. Iliis does not
change with time; instead, the gap rather grows Although Meng's study does not provide
data about expectations of men and women for their first wage, a study by Blau and
Ferber (1991) indicates that expectations women and men have about their starting
salaries are quite similar - at least in the US.
Further research should test how women do react to high wages, i.e., whether it is
a wrong or a correct expectation that it does not make sense to pay them higher wages
because they don't react with higher effort (see. e.g.. Major, Mcr-'arlin. & (iagnon (1984)
for evidence in the latter direction). Therefore, experiments should be done were women
are confronted with high wages as well, for example using pre-programmed wage offers
by firms, or the strategy method (a method which asks about reactions to all possible
behaviors of the other party).
It would also be interesting to see what happens when employers can choose
between women and men as workers in one auction, and whether they would stop trading
with women and continue only with men if possible. In the mixed sessions reported here
it was not possible to make an offer explicitly to female or male workers only.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to do such an experiment, because if subjects arc explicitly
asked to choose between male and female workers, one runs the danger of getting only
socially desirable behavior.
There might be another explanation for the differences in wage offers, different
from an efficiency-wage effect: It could also be that emotional reactions, i.e.. certain 'gut
feelings' influence the wages offered to women - which is also proposed by the
integrated model described in chapter 3. This, together with the question what
expectations employers have, should be analyzed in further research Again, this is not
that easy, because asking about expectations might lead to socially desirable behavior, as
people become aware of the topic at hand. However, if in the context of an experimental
market subjects are asked about their expectations with respect to the effort -choice, and6 Is it efficiency wages?
gender is introduced in the way it has been done here, such an effect can probably be
avoided. Asking about 'gut feelings' might be more difficult, but there are measures like
the "Implicit Association Test" (Greenwald et al. 1998), which have proven quite useful
in measuring e.g. prejudice against blacks.
To conclude, the experiment gives an indication why discriminatory outcomes for
women on the labor market might continue to exist even - or espec/aWy if it is possible to
pay them lower wages than men, and how the perception that women are less productive
than men can be confirmed by women's reactions to firm's behavior. In relation to the
integration proposed, the experiment here showed that in highly competitive situations
subjects in the role of firms discriminate against women, but also evoke reactions by
doing so, which can confirm the 'stereotype'. As already discussed, the results here could
follow from the influence of 'emotional' reactions (i.e., prejudice) rather than from
cognitive ones, as there was no long thinking before the first offers were made. This
would be evidence for a part of the integrated model not tested more in detail so far, the
emotional aspect. However, these results also show that the 'economic' effect of
competition might not work well, not only because of counteracting psychological
forces, but also because of the reactions of the discriminated group. This is an aspect so
far excluded from the analyses of this thesis, which is obviously very important to
consider. Future developments of the integrated model should try to incorporate these
reactions, as models of feedback effects in economics already do (e.g.. Arrow, 1973;
Coate and Loury, 1993; Farmer & Terrell, 1996)
1966 Is it efficiency wages?
Appendix: Instructions translated into English"
You are a worker
General instructions for workers
You will participate in a scientific research about the labor market Please, read the instructions
carefully During the experiment your earnings are calculated in an artificial unit, called Gulden.
At the end of the experiment
one Gulden is worth 2 f- cent
Your earnings will be paid to you in f at the end of the experiment.
The 10 participants have been divided in two groups, worker (6) and firms (4) You can see
whether you are a worker or a firm in the upper-right part of this page The labor market consists
of 10 days of trading, and one trading day consists of two parts
1* part in the first part, salaries are negotiated Firms can offer salaries to the workers, and
workers can, at the same time, propose salaries Each side of the market can accept ollen
or asks of the other side After 3 minutes, the second part starts
2"* part Now the workers which have accepted an offer or whose offers have been accepted
choose a percentage following certain rules This is done following precisely specified
rules and affects the earnings of the workers and the firms
Overall there are 10 days of exchange For participation In the tiptrimtnl you will receive •
ibow-ap fee of 5 Earos pins the money you «ill nrn during Ihr trading.
Please note: During the experiment, no communication among the participant» if allowed.
Please, use the computers only following the instructions If you do not follow these rules, you
have to leave the experiment
" Te original. Spanish instructions can be received upon request
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Information about the functioning of the labor market
2) At each trading day the computer opens the labor market anew.
3) In the first part of the market firms can make salary offer» to workers. At the same time, the
workers can also propose wages
Each worker can accept one of the offers of the firms and each firm can accept one of the
offers of the workers It is not obligatory to make or accept offers The offers and asks have
to be made in accordance with the following rules
a For you as a worker the rule is that your ask has to be always lower than the last ask
made by a worker which has not been accepted
b For the firms the rule is that the offer, which it makes, has to be higher than the
highest of the offers made by a firm that has not been accepted up to this moment,
c. All salaries between 20 and 120 are allowed (both inclusive) Your proposition of a
salary has to be enter«! in the screen you see below.
The first column contains the field "your salary proposition". To make a salary proposition, first
write your proposition in this field This has always to be a number between 20 and 120 In the
following click with your mouse in the Held "propose" Your salary proposition will appear in
the second column below the title "Propositions of the workers" Note please that your proposals
have to be always lower than the last proposal of a worker, which has not been accepted You can
make as many salary proposals as you whish.
All proposals of workers will appear in the second screen ordered by size If many propositions
are made and the column is "filled", you will only see the last propositions made
Simultaneously, there will appear a scroll bar at the right side of the column With the help of this
scroll bar you can see all the propositions of workers To do this, you have to move the scroll bar
with the mouse
In the third column you can see the salary offers of the firms These appear ordered by size
below the title "offers of firms". If many salary oilers are made and the column is filled, you
will only see the lust wuge offers made in the column "offers by firms" Simultaneously, there
will appear a scroll bar at the right side of the column With the help of this scroll bar you can see
all the offers of firms Therefore, you have to move the scroll bar with the mouse
3) A salary contract is made when a salary has been agreed upon This happens when a worker
accepts an oiler of a firm or a firm accepts the proposition of a worker
You can always choose and accept one of the offers of the firms If you want to accept the offer
of a firm, you first have to choose with a mouse-click one of the offers in the third column,
"offers of firms" If you want to accept it, click with the mouse on the field "accept" In this
moment, you have closed a salary contract with the firm that has made this offer
Always when a salary proposal has been accepted, this salary will appear in the fourth column
below the title "salary contracts" If you have accepted a salary offer of a firm or a firm has6 Is it efficiency wages?
accepted a salary proposition of you, the salary, which you have agreed upon will also appear in
the fourth column below the title "your salary"
No worker is obliged to accept an offer or to make proposals Fach firm can close a salary
contract with each worker and the other way round You can accept any ofTtr of a firm. At the
Mine time, each firm caa accept «ay of your salary proposal! At each day of trade a firm and
a worker can close a maximum of oat salary contract This means, when on a trading day a
salary contract has been closed between a firm and a worker, these two partners cannot
close other salary contracts at this day of trade When you have accepted an oiler of a firm or
one of your proposals of salary has been accepted, all your salary propositions and all salary
offen of the firm with which you have closed the salary contract will disappear automatically.
This implies that these salary -propositions and offers disappear in the second and third column
and are no longer available
Overall, firms and workers have eiaetly 3 minutes for making offers and proposals and
accepting them In the upper row of the screen you can see the remaining time If time is over, no
offers or propositions can be made anymore, and no salaries can be accepted
4) No firm knows with which worker it has closed a salary contract and vice versa.
5) After 3 minutes the second part starts Now the workers, which have closed a salary contract,
have to choose a percentage With this decision these workers influence their earnings and
the earnings of "their" firms This percentage is only communicated at the firm with which
the contract was concluded No other worker and no other firm learn the size of the chosen
percentage
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How to calculate you earnings at one day of trade?
1) If you have not concluded any salary contract, you will receive 20 Gulden at this day of
trade
2) If you have accepted an offer of a firm or a proposition of you has been accepted by a firm,
you will receive the according salary. You have to subtract from this salary the costs of the
percentage you have chosen
3) You chose the percentage by choosing a number between 10 and 100 of the table you can see
below. Number 10 is the lowest percentage, 20 a little bit higher percentage etc , and 100 the
highest percentage
The lower the percentage you choose, the lower are the costs for you. In the table you can see
the costs, which correspond to each percentage.













4) If you have closed a salary contract, your earnings
way:











n Gulden are calculated in the following
of percentage |
In general, the rule Is: The higher your salary and the lower the costs of your percentage,
the higher your earnings.
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How arc the earnings of the firms in a day of trading calculated?
1) Each firm receives from the organizers 120 Gulden per trading day. which the firm can use to
pay salaries These 120 Gulden are multiplied by the percentage you have chosen If for
example you choose a percentage of 90. the firm receives 90 percent of 120 Gulden, i e . 108
Gulden If for example you choose a percentage of 40, the firm receives 40 percent of 120
Gulden, i e . 48 Gulden From this amount the "salary", which your firm "pays" to you is
subtracted The result are the earnings of the firm in Gulden
Karningtof the firm in Gulden: 1120 * (percentage/UK))! - salary
In general, tfct rale is: The higher Iht percratagr and thr lower the salary, the higher art
the earnings of the firm.
It is possible that a firm makes losses. If a loss occurs, the firm has to pay this from the gains
made or from the show-up fee.
2) If a firm does not close a salary contract, it does not have any earnings during that day of
trading
Note: The tarning! of all workers and «II firms arr rakulilrd following the same rule. Kach
firm receives at each day of trading 120 Gulden. Ihr table of costs is Ihr same for all
workers. This is known to all participants. Kach firm cm, therefore, calculate the earning!
of "its" worker at a trading day and each worker can calculate the earnings of "ill" firm.
Your own earnings and the earnings of "your" firm are shown to you al\er each day of trade on
the earaiags screea.
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How to enter your percentage?
The entering of your percentage is done using the following screen
In the first row you can again see all salary contracts of this day of trading In the second row you
can see below the title "your salary" the salary you receive.
Below you can see a table In the first column of this table you can see below the title
"percentage" all possible percentages, which you can choose In the second and third column you
can see the resulting earnings for you and "your" firm respectively, when you have chosen a
certain percentage The earnings, which are shown in this table, are valid only for the specific
salary, which you have received in this day of trade.
Below the table you see the entrance field Here you can enter your percentage now Please note
that only numbers between 10 and 100 in intervals of 10 are allowed
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An example to practice!
1) Assume that the worker (you) accepts an offer of 30 Gulden and chooses in the second part a
percentage of 100
a What are the earnings of the firm''
b What arc the earnings of the worker''
2) Assume that the worker (you) accepts an offer of 30 Gulden and chooses in the second part a
percentage of 20
a What are the earnings of the firm?
b What are the earnings of the worker?
3) Assume that the firm has accepted your proposal of 70 Gulden and at the same time you
chose a percentage of 100 in the second part
a. What are the earnings of the firm?
b What are your earnings''
4) Assume that the firm has accepted your proposal of 70 Gulden and at the same time you
chose a percentage of 120 in the second part
a. What are the earnings of the firm?
b. What are your earnings?























5) Assume that you did not accept a salary offer and none of your salary proposals has been
accepted during the day What are your earnings at this day''
a What are your earnings''
6) S) Assume that no offer of a firm has been accepted and that this firm has also not accepted
any proposition of a worker during the day. What are the earnings of the firm this day?
a What are the earnings of the firm?
7) Assume that the firm has accepted your proposal of 45 Gulden and at the same time you
chose a percentage of 40 in the second part.
a. What are the earnings of the firm?
b What are your earnings''
8) Assume that the firm has accepted your proposal of 45 Gulden and at the same time you
chose a percentage of 90 in the second part
a What are the earnings of the firm?
b. What are your earnings?
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You are a firm
General instructions for firms
You will participate in a scientific research about the labor market. Please, read the instructions
carefully During the experiment your earnings are calculated in an artificial unit, called Gulden
At the end of the experiment,
one Gulden is worth 2 €- cent
Your earnings will be paid to you in € at the end of the experiment
The 10 participants have been divided in two groups, workers (6) and firms (4). You can see
whether you are a worker or a firm in the upper-right part of this page. The labor market consists
of 10 days of trading, and one trading day consists of two parts:
I" part: In the first part, salaries are negotiated. Firms can offer salaries to the workers, and
workers can, at the same time, propose salaries. Each side of the market can accept offers
or asks of the other side After 3 minutes, the second part starts
2"* part Now the workers which have accepted an offer or whose offers have been accepted
choose a percentage following certain rules This is done following precisely specified
rules and affects the earnings of the workers and the firms
Overall there are 10 days of exchange For participation in the experiment you will receive a
show-up fee of 5 Kuros plui the money you will earn during the trading.
Please note During the experiment, no communication among the participants is allowed.
neu«, use the computers only tollowing the instructions If you do not follow these rules, you
have to leave the experiment.
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Information about the functioning of the labor market
1) At each trading day the computer opens the labor market anew
2) In the first part of the market firms can make salary offers to workers At the same time, the
workers can also propose wages. Each worker can accept one of the offers of the firms and
each firm can accept one of the offers of the workers It is not obligatory to make or accept
offers The offers and asks have to be made in accordance with the following rules
a. For you as a firm the rule is that your offer has to be always higher than the highest
of the offers of firms, which has not been accepted up to this moment
b For the workers the rule is that the offer, which it makes has to he ask has to be
always lower than the last ask made by a worker which has not been accepted
All salaries between 20 and 120 are allowed (both inclusive). Your öfter of a salary has to be
entered in the screes yo« see below
The first column contains the field "your salary offer" To make a salary offer, first write your
offer in this field This has to be always a number between 20 and 120 In the following click
with your mouse in the field "offer" Your salary offer will appear in the second column below
the title "Offers of the firms" Note please that your offers have to be always higher than the last
proposal of a firm that has not been accepted You can make as many salary offers as you whuh
All offers of firms will appear in the second screen ordered by size If many offers are made and
the column is "filled", you will only see the last offers made Simultaneously, there will appeal a
scroll bar at the right side of the column With the help of this scroll bar you can sec all the offers
of firms Therefore, you have to move the scroll bar with the mouse
In the third column you can see the salary proposition of the workers These appear ordered
by size below the title "propositions of workers" If many salary proposals are made and the
column is filled, you will only see in the column "propositions by the workers" the last wage
proposals made Simultaneously, there will appear a scroll bar at the right side of the column
With the help of this scroll bar you can see all the proposals of the workers. To do this, you have
to move the scroll bar with the mouse
3) A salary contract is made when a salary has been agreed upon This happens when a worker
accepts an offer of a firm or a firm accepts the proposition of a worker
You can always choose and accept one of the proposals of the workers If you want to accept the
proposal of a worker, you first have to choose with a mouse-click one of the proposals of workers
in the third column, "propositions of workers" If you want to accept it. click with the mouse on
the field "accept" In this moment, you have closed a salary contract with the worker, which has
made this offer
Always when a salary proposal has been accepted, this salary will appear in the fourth column
below the title "salary contracts" if you have accepted a salary proposal of a worker or a worker
has accepted a salary offer of you. the salary, which you have agreed upon, will also appear in the
fourth column below the title "your salary payment*'
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No firm is obliged to accept a proposal or to make offers Each firm can close a salary contract
with each worker and the other way round You can accept any proposition of a worker. At
the same time, each worker can accept any of your salary offers At each day of trade a firm
and a worker can close a maximum of one salary contract This means, when on a trading day a
ulary contract has been closed between a firm and a worker, these two partners cannot
close other salary contracts at this day of trade When you have accepted a proposal of a
worker or one of your salary offers has been accepted, all your salary offers and all salary
proposals of the worker with which you have closed the salary contract will disappear
automatically This implies that these salary-offers and propositions disappear in the second and
third column and are no longer available
Overall, firms and workers have exactly 3 minutes for making offers and proposals and for
accepting them In the upper row of the screen you can see the remaining time If time is over, no
offers or propositions can be made anymore, and no salaries can be accepted.
4) No firm knows with which worker it has closed a salary contract and vice versa.
5) After 3 minutes the second part starts Now the workers, which have closed a salary contract,
have to choose a percentage With this decision these workers influence their earnings and
the earnings of "their" firms This percentage is only communicated to the firm with which
the contract was concluded. No other worker and no other firm learn the size of the chosen
percentage
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How are the earnings of the workers calculated at one day of trade?
1) If a worker has not concluded any salary contract, he will receive 20 Gulden at this day of
trade
2) If a worker has accepted an offer of a firm, or a proposition of the worker has been accepted
by a firm, he will receive the according salary He has to subtract from this salary the costs of
the percentage he has chosen
3) The worker chooses the percentage by choosing a number between 10 and 100 of the taMe
you can see below 10 is the lowest percentage, 20 a little bit higher percentage etc . and 100
the highest percentage
The lower the percentage the worker chooses, the lower are the costs for him In the table
you can see the costs, which correspond to each percentage























4) If the worker has closed a salary contract, his earnings in Gulden are calculated in the
following way
| Earning» of the worker *• Salary - Costs of percentage
In general, the rule is: The higher the «alar)- and the lower the coils of the percentage, the
higher the earnings of the worker.
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How are your earnings in a day of trading calculated?
1) You receive from the organizers 120 Gulden per trading day, which you can use to pay
salaries These 120 Gulden are multiplied by the percentage "your" worker has chosen If for
example he chooses a percentage of 90, you receive 90 percent of 120 Gulden, i.e., 108
Gulden If for example he chooses a percentage of 40, you receive 40 percent of 120 Gulden,
i e , 48 Gulden From this amount the "salary", which you "pay" to the worker is subtracted.
The result are your earnings Gulden:
Karnings in (iulden: j120 * (percentage/l()0)| - salary
In general, the rule It: The higher the percentage and the lower the salary, the higher are
your earnings.
It is possible that you make losses. If a loss occurs, you have to pay this from the gains made or
from the show-up fee.
2) If you do not close a salary contract, you do not have any earnings during that day of trading
Note: The earnings of ill workers and all firms are calculated following the samt rule. Each
firm receives at each day of (riding 120 Gulden. The table of costs is the same for all
workers. This is known to all participants. Kach firm can, therefore, calculate the earnings
of "Its" worker at a trading day and each worker can calculate the earnings of "its" firm.
Your own earnings and the earnings of "your" worker are shown to you after each day of trade at
I he earnings sereea.6 is it efficiency wages?
An example to practice!
1. Assume that you offer a salary of 30 Gulden and a worker accepts this offer and chooses in
the second part a percentage of 100
a) What are your earnings?
b) What are the earnings of the worker?
2. Assume that you offer a salary of 30 Gulden and a worker accepts this offer and chooses in
the second part a percentage of 20
a) What are your earnings?
b) What are the earnings of the worker? _
3. Assume that you have accepted a proposal or a worker of 70 Gulden and at the some time the
worker chooses a percentage of 100 in the second part
a) What are your earnings?
b) What are the earnings of the worker?.
4. Assume that you have accepted a proposal or a worker of 70 Gulden and at the same time the
worker chooses a percentage of 20 in the second part
a) What are your earnings?
b) What are the earnings of the worker?





















5. Assume that you did not accept a salary proposals and none of your salary offers has been
accepted during the day What are your earnings at this day?
a) What are your earnings?
6. Assume that no proposal of a worker has been accepted and that this worker has also not
accepted any offer of a firm during the day What are the earnings of the worker this day?
a) What are the earnings of the worker?
7 Assume that you have accepted a proposal of a worker of 45 Gulden and at the same time the
worker chose a percentage of 40 in the second part.
a) What are your earnings?
b) What are the earnings of the worker?
8. Assume that you have accepted a proposal of a worker of 45 Gulden and at the same time the
worker chose a percentage of 90 in the second part.
a) What are your earnings?
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7 Summary, general discussion, and conclusions
7.1 Introduction
This last chapter summarizes the results of all chapters of the thesis and discusses
them in the light of the whole project. The focus is on which questions could be
answered, which questions could not be answered, and which new questions arose. First,
the main aims of the thesis and the results of each of the chapters are summarized
shortly. Secondly, these results are discussed A general conclusion focuses on the
scientific achievements of this research as well as on possible policy recommendations.
7.2 Summary
7.2./ 7V
The main aims of this thesis were: (i) To get an overview of some related
literature in economics and social psychology relevant for an analysis of discrimination
in the labor market, (ii) to develop an integrated, testable theoretical model making use of
both literatures, and (iii) to test at least part of the predictions of this model
experimentally - to answer the basic questions whether an integration of economic and
psychological approaches can explain discriminatory behavior in the labor market better
than one approach alone; whether an integrated theoretical model can lead to new
testable predictions; and finally, whether experimental tests can provide evidence for at
least some of these predictions.
More in particular, a model was to be constructed which, by inclusion of the
psychological concepts of prejudice, stereotypes, and identification, is able to explain and
predict how discriminatory preferences may develop during a process of increasing
competition. Predictions of this model were tested in experimental and quasi-
experimental studies.
7.72 SAo/7 jummorv o/eacA c/wpfcr
Chapter 1 provided an introduction into the topic of the thesis. The most
prominent economic and psychological explanatory approaches of discrimination in the
labor market were reviewed, and the aim and approach of this thesis were lined out and
explained.
Chapter 2 gave an overview of some related literature on discrimination in
economics and social psychology. First, empirical evidence on discrimination in the
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labor market was reviewed. Then it was shown that definitions or the core concepts differ
within and between the disciplines, but also that there are some important similarities
between disciplines. The differences in the use of the core concepts can pose a problem
for the construction of an integrated model. Therefore, the chapter developed inclusive
definitions of each of the concepts to be used in the further analysis.
The definition of stereotypes used in this thesis is taken from social psychology:
Stereotyping is "...the unconscious or conscious application of (accurate or inaccurate)
knowledge of a group in judging a member of the group" (Banaji & Greenwald 1994, p.
54). The definition of prejudice is taken from social psychology as well: Prejudices are
negative, affective attitudes towards all or most members of a certain group (cf.
Pettigrew, 1997)
The definition of social identity was also taken from social psychology: Social
identification is categorization in terms of and identification with groups one belongs to.
The social identity is part of a person, in addition to the 'personal identity'. Groups one is
part of and identifies with are called 'ingroups', in contrast to 'outgroups'.
The definition of self-relevant subjective uncertainty used is a combination of the
concept of uncertainty social identity theory uses and 'economic' concepts of
uncertainty: Self-relevant subjective uncertainty is defined as a subjective perception of
('objective') uncertainty accompanied by an aversive emotional state, which becomes
stronger, the more self-relevant the source, and the higher the level of uncertainty is. It
can pertain to all kinds of uncertainty, with growing strength: Other things being equal,
risk evokes weaker feelings of subjective self-relevant uncertainty than ambiguity and
fundiuncntul uncertainty The distinction between risk, as a situation with uncertainty
about outcomes, ambiguity as a situation of uncertainty about probabilities, and
fundamental uncertainty as uncertainty about things which cannot be known is adapted
from Knight (1921) and Camerer & Weber (1992).
It was more complicated to choose a definition of competition, which was
applicable to the research questions here and could be related to standard economic
definitions The definition used conceptualizes competition as an activity performed by
firms or other economic agents, who engage in this activity against each other, to reach
certain goals.
Finally, an integralive framework was described which provides a starting point
for the development of a formal integrated model focusing only on certain aspects of the
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framework. Some methodological questions with respect to the approach of the research
to be conducted were discussed at the end of the chapter
Chapter 3 developed the integrated model formally. Social-psychological and
economic insights were used to develop a model that explains how an increase in
competition can induce employers to rely more on Stereotypie perceptions and prejudices
in their hiring, pay, and promotion decisions This was based on the observation in social
psychology that using Stereotypie perceptions (for example, in personnel decisions) has
certain benefits as well as costs (e.g., Fiske 1998). The most important benefit in this
context is that, together with identification with an ingroup (eg. men), the use of
stereotypes and prejudices reduces subjective feelings of uncertainty, which can arise
from competition. This psychological effect of strengthening competition works in the
opposite direction of the economic income effect in the model of employer
discrimination of Becker (1957). Both effects are integrated in the model. The model can
explain the persistence and the rise of discrimination in the labor market in spile of and
due to competitive pressure. This is reached by introducing stereotypes and prejudices as
endogenous The situation analyzed is one of team-structured firms, such that (he model
can explain employer and employee discrimination in such a setting. The model refrains
from an analysis of the influence of specific contents of stereotypes. The content of
stereotypes could also have implications for the relative strength of both effects. The
question in what situations which effect is stronger, however, is an empirical question
and remains open.
Chapter 4 provides a first step towards empirical testing of the integrated model.
The experiments, using artificial groups, provided evidence for the idea thai the
psychological mechanisms influence 'discriminatory' behavior, depending on strength of
competition, as the integrated model predicted. In all but the first experiment, a
significant number of subjects used the - irrelevant - category information as basis for
decision-making, and more so, when competition was stronger Thus, the experiments
showed that one effect of strengthening competition is that subjects make use of any
'information' available. This only holds when categories can be assumed to have at least
some informational content, i.e , when they are constructed such that they can cither
vaguely be linked to the task subjects have to do, or a stereotype about them is
developed. The psychological mechanism obviously determines that, when competition
is strong, subjects believe more strongly in the 'informational' content of these
categories. In this case, they statistically discriminate against the group which they think
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The experiments described in chapter 4 and the study using the business game gave
some empirical evidence for the importance of psychological factors, which determine
together with 'statistical' forms of discrimination the total amount of discrimination. As
the empirical studies did not allow for testing all mechanisms assumed by the integrated
model in detail, it is still not possible to say, how the interplay of economic and
psychological factors exactly works, but certain tendencies became clear. What is clear
now is that competition influences preferences, following the mechanisms predicted by
social-identity theory. The stronger competition is perceived to be, the more people rely
on all information they can find to make hiring decisions - even if this information is not
seen as relevant when competition is weak. This results in a weak form of statistical
discrimination, based on wrongly perceived productivity differences, which only appears
when competition is strong.
Whether this leads to bias in favor of the ingroup or the outgroup, or to bias against
stereotypically more or less productive groups, depends especially on beliefs about own
performance and on the kind of categories. In the experiments with artificial categories,
competition led to outgroup bias when subjects believed that their own group performed
badly, and the outgroup might perform better. In the business game however, ingroup
bias and in part even bias against the better performing group was found, most probably,
because in 'real' situations peopJf do no/ on/) tooJc af product rvrry-rc/a(ed stereotypes,
but other stereotypes and also prejudice play a role.
The integrated model does assume that emotional or prejudiced reactions towards the
groups in question play a role. This was not tested explicitly in any of the experiments,
but the results from the business game and also from the double auction can in part be
interpreted as being the result of such emotional reactions, as ingroup bias resp. bias
against women occurred obviously without being linked to (productivity-related)
stereotypes.
The results of the double auction further reinforce the assumption that strong forces
are at work when real categories are used, as even in this laboratory situation women get
lower wage oilers than men. The experiment also provides an additional argument
against the working of the economic effect assumed in Becker's model: It does not
consider possible reactions by the 'unfairly' paid workers. Chapter 6 showed that this is
on important aspect, which should be incorporated in a model of discrimination in the
labor market. Reactions from the supply side of the labor market are considered in the
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integrated framework, but not yet incorporated into the formal model. This could be a
next step to take.
Some problems of the research were, as expected, related to the differences in
levels of analysis between the two disciplines, but they could mainly be overcome
relying on inlegrative definitions. More difficult to overcome were the operationalization
and measurement problems Not all constructs could be operational wed in a way that
allowed for capturing those aspects of the model that should be captured. Measuring
discrimination avoiding social-desirability problems worked out well in the experiment
described in chapter 6, but it turned out to be more difficult in the experiments of chapter
4 It is unclear in how far it was a problem in the business game In the experiments in
chapter 4, it was not the social-desirable behavior directly which posed the problems, but
rather the fact that the artificial categories, which were used to avoid social-desirability
considerations, were not prone to make subjects identify strongly with them and were too
'empty' to be a good proxy of 'real' categories. In the business game, it is not clear in
how far social desirability influenced Dutch and German students differently - but it
could be an alternative explanation for the fact that German students were in general
more willing to accept new members than Dutch students.
Especially the valid measurement of perceived subjective uncertainty turned out
to be difficult in all (quasi-) experimental studies reported here. Several different, but
related ways of measurement were tried. In experiment I and 3 one very simple, direct
question was used. Experiment 2 and 4 tried, not very successfully, to develop a more
complex scale, being able to cover several aspects of the construct of uncertainty instead
of directly asking participants how uncertain they were (with respect to their results). The
aspects, which should be covered, were uncertainty about reaching specific team results,
but also uncertainty about reaching personal goals. This was included because in such
artificial situations it is very well possible that participants follow different aims than
experimenters want them to follow - and thus, their uncertainty is not covered by asking
about the aim they are supposed to have. This attempt at measuring a more complex
construct of uncertainty was repeated in the first Business Game, using similar questions
adapted to the specific situation. For the second Business game, the questionnaire had to
be shortened. This was taken as a possibility to change the questions on uncertainty such
that they covered a far broader concept of uncertainty, namely uncertainty about the
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game and about what happened in general (like in experiment 4**). This last
operationalization comes closest to the one used by Mullin and Hogg (1998), but does
not really cover the aspect of 'self-relevance'. It is important that further research
develops a more reliable scale, which can be validated and then be used as a standard
measure in related research. .
The research around the integrated framework left many possibilities and also
necessities for further research. First, one should further develop the experimental design
such that the important variables of the integrated model can be measured and analyzed
meaningfully. It should be extended to include the economic effect as well, building on
but avoiding the caveats of the experiments reported here.
Secondly, testing of the predictions of the model in 'real-life' situations is
necessary. The fact that only (quasi-) experimental results so far have been used to test
the model - or rather parts of it - leads to problems of generalizability. Empirical data
about hiring, workforce, and team composition should be collected, controlling for the
competitive situation of firms and measuring identification and self-relevant uncertainty
as well as stereotypes about groups.
The integrated model assumes that emotional reactions towards the groups play
an important role in discriminatory behavior, and this has not directly been tested in the
studies conducted up to now. Therefore, a next step would be to find ways to measure
these emotional reactions and their influence on hiring behavior in different situations,
for example making use of (he Implicit Association Test ((Jreenwald et al, 1998).
Another important topic is that the current research assumed that mechanisms for
all kinds of discrimination are the same. However, there might be differences based on
the contenls of stereotypes and the value-loading of emotional reactions Therefore, a
controlled comparison of different situations, eg gender discrimination, discrimination
by nationality, race, or age, would be interesting to see in how far the mechanisms are
universal, and policy recommendations can be the same for all kinds of situations. One
could also extend the model such as to allow for the inclusion of specific contents of
stereotypes if necessary.
** It did not form a reliable scale here either, but unfortunately data collection for experiment 4 and the
tecond management jowie were around the same time, such that this could not be taken into consideration
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7.4 Final Conclusion
The thesis has shown thai integrating economic and psychological theorizing
focusing on the 'activity' aspect of competition can lead to interesting insights in the
mechanisms of discrimination in the labor market. These insights can contribute to
economic research, as they allow for explanations and predictions of the development of
discriminator)' behavior, which consider the fact that it is human beings «ho act in firms
and on markets It was shown that the assumption of endogenous stereotyping and use of
prejudice leads to predictions different from those of standard economic models The
contribution to social-psychological research consists of introducing psychological
variables in a formal way into a model describing a specific situation, discrimination in
the labor market. This required more precise specifications of important psychological
variables and the ways they interact with the environment and with each other It allows
proposing a relationship of cognitive and emotional variables with behavior in this
specified setting, which can be tested empirically
The empirical testing of the model showed that economic mechanisms of
statistical discrimination and psychological mechanisms of social identification influence
behavior jointly, and psychological forces are quite strong This has implications for
policy advice, because the recommendation from the standard economic model of
employer discrimination so far was rather to count on the forces of competition in
fighting discrimination. The integrated model and the experiments showed that this might
often not lead to the desired results. Social psychology does only rarely give policy
advice, which is in part a consequence of the many different detail results - to say it with
Brewer's words: "The lack of integration of social-psychological research and theory
relevant to the understanding of prejudice and discrimination makes it difficult to tell the
story to the world" (1994, p. 3l6f).
It is still too early to give policy advice based on the results from this
interdisciplinary study. However, it can be said that politics should neither build only on
the forces of competition, nor ignore them completely in fighting discrimination. It
should also be kept in mind that even if stereotypes can be changed, there might be
underlying emotional evaluations which are very strong and hard to change, and which
will influence behavior especially when people are in situations of high self-relevant
uncertainty Reactions of the discriminated group can also not be ignored, which
especially implies that the 'economic effect of competition' described by Becker will
probably be counteracted by such reactions.
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To conclude, the research showed that interdisciplinary research is always
difTicult, but that in particular (but not only) for the topic of this thesis it is a fruitful
exercise to do. It can contribute to the development of both disciplines, and can help to
achieve better-informed policy recommendations.
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244Summary
This thesis develops an interdisciplinary approach to discrimination of various
groups (women, national groups etc.) in the labor market. The main aims of the research
are: (i) To get an overview of literature in economics and social psychology relevant for
an analysis of discrimination in the labor market, (ii) to develop an integrated, testable
theoretical model making use of both literatures, and (iii) to test at least part of the
predictions of this model experimentally. 11K basic questions to be answered thus are,
whether an integration of economic and psychological factors can explain discriminatory
behavior on the labor market better than one approach alone; whether an integrated
theoretical model can lead to new testable predictions, and finally, whether experimental
tests can provide evidence for at least some of these predictions. More in particular, a
model is constructed which, by inclusion of the psychological concepts of prejudice,
stereotypes, and identification, is able to explain and predict how discriminatory
preferences may develop during a process of increasing competition. Predictions of this
model are tested in experimental and quasi-experimental studies.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of some related literature on discrimination in
economics and social psychology. First, empirical evidence on discrimination in the
labor market is reviewed. It is shown that definitions of the core concepts differ within
and between the disciplines, but also that there are some important similarities between
them. Finally, an integrative framework is described which provides a starting point for
the development of a formal integrated model focusing on some specific aspects of the
framework. Some methodological questions with respect to the approach of the research
to be conducted are discussed at the end of the chapter.
Chapter 3 develops the integrated model formally. Social-psychological and
economic insights are used to develop a model that explains how an increase in
competition can induce employers to rely more on Stereotypie perceptions and prejudices
in their hiring, pay and promotion decisions. This is based on the observation in social
psychology that using Stereotypie perceptions (for example, in personnel decisions) has
certain benefits as well as costs (e.g.. Fiske 1998) The most important benefit in this
context is that, together with identification with an ingroup (e.g., men), the use of
stereotypes and prejudices reduces subjective feelings of uncertainty, arising from
competition. This psychological effect of strengthening competition works in the
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Dit proefschrift ontwikkelt een interdisciplinaire benadering voor de Studie van
discriminatie van verschillende groepen (vrouwen, nationaliteiten etc.) op de
arbeidsmarkt. I)e hoofddoelen van het onderzoek zijn (i) een overzicht te verkrijgen van
de relevante literatuur in de economische wetenschappen en de sociale Psychologie voor
een analyse van discriminatie op de arbeidsmarkt, (ii) een theoretisch model te
ontwikkelen dat de kennis uit beide wetenschappen integreert en dat vervolgens kan
worden getest, en (iii) het experimenteel testen van een gedeelte van de verklärende
variabclcn van het model. De te beantwoorden basisvragen zijn of de integrate van
economische en psychologische factoren discriminerend gedrag op de arbeidsmarkt beter
kan verklaren dan een van de twee benaderingen afzonderlijk, of een gelntegreerd
theoretisch model tot nieuwe, toetsbare hypothesen leidt, en tenslotte, of experimentele
toctscn ilc/c nieuwe hypothesen bevestigen. Er wordt een model geconstrueerd dat, door
intcgratic van psychologische concepten zoals vooroordelen, stereotypen en identificatie,
vcrklaart en voorspelt hoe zieh discriminerende voorkeuren kunnen ontwikkelen tijdens
een proces van tocnemende concurrentie. De hypothesen van het model worden middels
experimentele en quasi-cxperimentclc onderzoeken getest.
lloofdstuk 2 gecft een overzicht van de literatuur op het gebied van discriminatie
in de economic en dc sociale psychologic Eerst wordt een overzicht gegeven van
empirische leiten over discriminatie op dc arbeidsmarkt Verder laat het hoofdstuk zien
dal de dcllnities van de bclangrijkste concepten niet alleen tussen de disciplines, maar
ook binnen de disciplines verschillen. Echter, op sommige belangrijke punten lijken de
conceptcn op elkaar. Tenslotte wordt cr een gelntegreerd kader beschreven, dat als
uitgungspunt dicnl voor het ontwikkelen van een geformaliseerd en gelntegreerd model
gericht op somnugc spccilickc aspecten binnen dit kader. Verder komt aan het einde van
het hoofdstuk een aantal methodologische vragen aan bod met betrekking tot de
onder/ocksmethodc /oals tocgepast in dit proefschrift.
lloofdstuk 3 ontwikkelt het gelntcgreerdc model formeel. Sociaal-psychologische
en economische inzichten worden gebruikt om een model te ontwikkelen dat verklaart
hoe een toename in concurrcntic ertoe kan leiden dat werkgevers in hun beslissingen
over aanstclling. betaling en promotic van werknemers steeds meer gebruik maken van
stereotype pcrccpties en vooroordelcn Oil is gebaseerd op een waameming uit de sociale
psychologic waarbij het gchruik van stereotype percepties (bijvoorbeeld bij beslissingen
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over personeel) bepaalde kosten en baten heeft (bijvoorbeeld Kiske. 1998). Het
belangrijkste nut in deze context is dat het gebruik van stereotypen en vooroordelen
samen met de identificatie met een 'ingroup' (bijvoorbeeld mannen) de subjectievc
gevoelens van onzekerheid die door concurrentie ontslaan reducccrt. Dit psychologische
effect van versterkte concurrentie werkt in tegengestelde richting van het economischc
inkomenseffect in het model van werkgevcrsdiscriminatie van Becker (1957). Beide
effecten zijn gelntegreerd in het model Het model kan ondanks of vanwege concurrentie
de persistence en de versterking van discriminatie op de arbeidsmarkt verklären Du
wordt bereikt door de introduetie van stereotypen en vooroordelen als endogene
variabelen. In de geanalyseerde situatie zijn de bedrijven in teams gestruclurccrd. /odat
het model discriminatie door de werkgever en door de werkncnier in ccn dergclijkc
situatie kan verklaren. De vraag in welke situatie welk van deze twee effecten. het
'psychologische' of het 'economische', sterker is, is een empirische vraag en blijfi open.
Hoofdstuk 4 is een eerste stap richting het empirisch toetscn van een gcdccltc van
het getntegreerde model In eerste mstantie worden alleen maar de psychologische
voorspellingen voor verschillende malen van concurrentie getoetst De expenmenten met
artificiele categorien bewijzen dat, afhankelijk van de mate van concurrentie,
psychologische mechanismen 'discriminerend' gedrag belnvloeden zoals door het
gelntegreerde model was voorspeld. De experimenten taten verder zien dat een effect van
toenemende concurrentie is, dat personen gebruik maken van aJle informaiie' die er is -
tenminste, wanneer ze veronderstellen dat groepslidmaatschap alleen al enige infomiatie
is. Alleen bij sterke concurrentie vindt er statistische discriminate plaats door de
proefpersonen tegen de groep van wie men denkt dat ze gemiddeld slechter is. Dat is een
zwakke variant van 'statistische discriminatie', omdat groepslidmaalschap in Teile gecn
aan de productiviteit gerelaleerde informatie is.
Hoofdstuk 5 breidt de empirische toets uit naar een complexere situatie, daarbij
gebruik makend van een management simulatiespel met echte calegoneCn verschillende
nationaliteiten (Nederlands en Duits). De resultaten van deze sludie bevestigen het idee
dal psychologische effecten bepalend zijn voor het gedrag in een bepcrkte 'economische'
situatie. Wij vmden een ingroup 'bias', maar geen 'bias' ten gunste van Duitse outgroup
leden. Vanuit een productiviteitsgerelateerd oogpunl is de afwezigheid van vertckening
'irrationeel' gedrag, omdat Duitse Studenten Bcdrijfskunde aan de Universitcit
Maastricht gemiddeld beter presteren dan Nederlandse Studenten - en zo worden zc ook
gezien. Echter, de nationaliteit van de groep die de beslissing neemt speelt een
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belangrijkere rol en heeft mcer effect: Duitse groepen zijn eerder bereid om een nieuw lid
op te nemen in hun groep dan Nederlandse groepen. Daarbij maakt hel niet uil of het
nieuwe lid tot de ingroup of de outgroup behoort. Versterking van concurrentie leidt tot
meer ingroup 'bias' en meer 'bias' in het nadeel van Duitse nieuwe leden (de beter
presterende), maar niet van Nederlandse nieuwe leden (de minder presterende). Het
onder/ock gee ft een indicatie dat de psychologische mechanismen, zoals door het
gelntegrcerde model voorgesteld, wel degelijk een rol speien bij het bepalen van
voorkcurcn voor nieuwe teamleden Deze kunnen zelfs sterker zijn dan economische
mechanismen
lloofdstuk 6 kijkt naar een iets ander aspect van loondiscriminatie. Om te testen
of het efficientielooneffect het loonverschil tussen mannen en vrouwen belnvloedt, wordt
een experimented dubbele veiling gehouden. Het experiment laat zien dat zelfs in een
dubbele veiling in het laboratorium vrouwen minder verdienen dan mannen. Echter, de
invloed van efTicientielooneffecten op dit resultaat kan niet helemaal worden verklaard
Vrouwen spannen zieh in het experiment nooit sterk in, maar zij krijgen ook nooit een
hoog loon aangeboden Het is daarom niet duidelijk of zij altijd minder zouden
reciproceren dan mannen, of dat mannen (en vrouwen!) juist verwachten dat vrouwen
zieh a) voor een lager loon sterker inspannen, of dat ze zieh überhaupt nooit sterk
inspanncn Duidelijk is dat vrouwen niet te bescheiden zijn, i.e. ze vragen geen lager
loon Tot slot wijst het experiment naast het absolute loon op een nieuwe verklärende
factor voor vcrschillen in inspanning: het verschil tussen het loon door de werknemer
gcvraagd en het loon aangeboden door het bedrijf. Wanneer een werknemer een veel
lager loon door de werkgever krijgt aangeboden dan hij gevraagd heeft, dan wordt dat
gc/icn als een onccrlijke actie van de werkgever en kan dit leiden tot minder inspanning.
Dit resultaat gecft een indicatie van een mogelijke vicieuze cirkel: vrouwen krijgen een
loon aangeboden dat lager is dan zij hebben gevraagd en als gevolg spannen ze zieh
minder in Wcrkgcvers /icn hun stereotypen bevestigd en, zoals gebeurd in het
experiment, stoppen met het aanstellen van vrouwen uit louter rationele overwegingen.
Dat zou ook het economische effect van concurrentie kunnen tegenwerken zoals
voorgesteld bij Becker (1957), omdat daar wordt aangenomen dat dit effect middels
lagere Ionen voor de vrouwen in beginpenodes werkt
Hoofdstuk 7 vat de resultaten van alle hoofdstukken samen en bediscussieert ze in
een brederc context 1'r wordt nagegaan of het gelukt is om de basisvragen van het
ondcr/oeksproject tc beanrwoorden en of er nieuwe vragen zijn ontstaan Hocwel vele
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vragen onbeantwoord zijn gebleven en er onvoldoendc empirische resultaten zijn voor de
fonnulenng van gefundeerde beleidsadviezen ter bestrijding van discriminatie op de
arbeidsmarkt, kan worden geconcludeerd, dat interdisciplinair onderzoek vruchtbaar kan
zijn voor de analyse van dit ondenverp. Meer onderzoek is nodig. maar de tot nu loe
bereikte resultaten zijn veelbelovend en laten de verwachting toe dat goed getundeerd
advies aan de beleidsmakers vanuit een dergelijke benadenng kan voonkomen. Met
onderzoek heeft \erder laten zien dat, hoewel er altijd problenicn zijn, interdisciplinair
onderzoek kan bijdragen tot de ontwikkeling van beide disciplines.
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